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With the introduction of uncertainty - the fact of ignorance and necessity of acting upon opin-
ion rather than knowledge - into this Eden-like situation, its character is completely changed.
With uncertainty absent, man’s energies are devoted altogether to doing things; it is doubt-
ful whether intelligence itself would exist in such a situation; in a world so built that perfect
knowledge was theoretically possible, it seems likely that all organic readjustments would
become mechanical, all organisms automata.[...] Consciousness would never have developed
if the environment of living organisms were perfectly uniform and monotonous, conformable
to mechanical laws. [...] There is a manifest tendency to economize consciousness, to make all
possible adaptations by unconscious reflex response. [...] The true uncertainty in organized
life is the uncertainty in an estimate of human capacity, which is always a capacity to meet
uncertainty.
Frank Knight
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Talking About Uncertainty
by Carlo Romano Marcello Alessandro Santagiustina
In the first article we review existing theories of uncertainty. We devote particular at-
tention to the relation betweenmetacognition, uncertainty and probabilistic expecta-
tions. We also analyse the role of natural language and communication for the emer-
gence and resolution of states of uncertainty. We hypothesize that agents feel uncer-
tainty in relation to their levels of expected surprise, which depends on probabilistic
expectations-gaps elicited during communication processes. Under this framework
above tolerance levels of expected surprise can be considered informative signals.
These signals can be used to coordinate, at the group and social level, processes of
revision of probabilistic expectations. When above tolerance levels of uncertainty
are explicated by agents through natural language, in communication networks and
public information arenas, uncertainty acquires a systemic role of coordinating de-
vice for the revision of probabilistic expectations.
The second article of this research seeks to empirically demonstrate that we can
crowd source and aggregate decentralized signals of uncertainty, i.e. expected sur-
prise, coming from market agents and civil society by using the web and more
specifically Twitter as an information source that contains the wisdom of the crowds
concerning the degree of uncertainty of targeted communities/groups of agents at
a given moment in time. We extract and aggregate these signals to construct a set
of civil society uncertainty proxies by country. We model the dependence among our
civil society uncertainty indexes and existing policy and market uncertainty proxies,
highlighting contagion channels and differences in their reactiveness to real-world
events that occurred in the year 2016, like the EU-referendum vote and the US pres-
idential elections.
Finally, in the third article we propose a new instrument, called Worldwide Un-
certainty Network, to analyse the uncertainty contagion dynamics across time and
areas of the world. Such an instrument can be used to identify the systemic im-
portance of countries in terms of their civil society uncertainty social percolation role.
Our results show that civil society uncertainty signals coming from the web may be
fruitfully used to improve our understanding of uncertainty contagion and amplifi-
cationmechanisms among countries and betweenmarkets, civil society and political
systems;
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Chapter 1
Uncertainty: reviewing the
unknown
By Carlo R. M. A. Santagiustina
Abstract
This article reviews existing theories of uncertainty. Through a comparative ap-
proach, we highlight the distinctive attributes associated to uncertainty, at the agent,
group and social level. Starting from mainstream characterizations of uncertainty
in economics, information theory, as well as social and cognitive sciences, we move
towards uncertainty modelling and measurement research frontiers. We devote par-
ticular attention to the relation betweenmetacognition, uncertainty and probabilistic
expectations. We describe the relation between higher order beliefs and uncertainty.
We analyse the role of natural language and communication for uncertainty phe-
nomena emergence, persistence, contagion, reduction and eventual resolution. By
so doing, we reconstruct a robust uncertainty phenomena-concept reference relation,
where uncertainty characterizes metacognitive processes. The roots of uncertainty
are shown to reside in a de facto epistemic situation that characterizes all human
agents and their systems: having to learn, while learning to learn. Following cues from
recent applications of information and belief theory to economics, we hypothesize
that agents feel uncertainty in relation to their levels of expected surprise, which de-
pends on probabilistic expectations gaps elicited during communication processes.
Expected surprise will be measured through relative entropy, as formalized by Kull-
back and Leibler. Under this framework above tolerance levels of expected surprise
can be considered informative signals. These signals can be used to coordinate, at
the group and social level, processes of revision of probabilistic expectations. When
above tolerance levels of uncertainty are explicated by agents through natural lan-
guage, in communication networks and public information arenas, uncertainty ac-
quires a -new- systemic role of coordinating device for the revision of probabilistic
expectations and the anticipation of expected utility.
3
Chapter 1. Uncertainty: reviewing the unknown
1.1 Introduction
"The fundamental principle underlying organized activity is the reduction of the
uncertainty in judgments"[1]
This article is a review and a synthesis of modern theories used to represent uncer-
tainty phenomena and to identify, measure, analyse and model its occurrence and
effects in - and beyond- economic affairs. In the following subsections, we introduce
the topics treated in uncertainty literature and formulate a set of research questions
and hypotheses, concerning the emergence and role of uncertainty.
A starting point: distinguishing uncertainty from risk representations
Uncertainty phenomena is often confused with the metaheuristics[2] used to rep-
resent, project and reduce uncertainty; among which, probability theory [3–5], as
formalized in Kolmogorov’s axioms [6], stands out as the formal system used to
quantitatively represent uncertainty. As we will show, the contemporary risk frame-
work[7–9], which is based on, but not limited to, probability theory, is used both
in scientific and business domains to jointly represent and reduce "quantifiable un-
certainties". For those who know its axioms and methods, probability theory is a
powerful tool for mental representation[10, 11] and convergent thinking[12, 13], in
relation to repetitive decisions under imperfect information. In particular, proba-
bility theory appears to be useful for formalizing coherent systems of expectations,
to undertake and rationally justify decisions on the basis of the latter. However,
when ones’ uncertainties, in relation to observed phenomena, are quantified and
analysed in a probabilistic framework, the resulting probabilistic representation is
not necessarily an exhaustive or unbiased representation of former uncertainties.
The methodological constraints of probability theory, as well as the chosen frame
of discernment, (re)determine uncertainties. Probability theory re-projects uncer-
tainties through its use. For example, non-exhaustivity may emerge in relation to
measures that are finitely and non-countably additive, which are not admitted in
probability-space based representation in the classical probabilistic framework: A
hypothetical "uniform distribution" over the set of natural numbers does not satisfy
the three Kolmogorov axioms[6]. Whereas, biasedness may emerge in relation to
the distinguishability requirement for events in the probability-space: The granular-
ity and dimensionality of a probability-space often depends on the characteristics
of sensory instruments used for observation, which by determining distinguishable
outcomes, project real world phenomena in a outcome space.
Uncertainty as a characterization of metacognition and communication processes
In the following sections, we will propose a re-examination of uncertainty phenom-
ena and theories from a metacognition and communication perspective[14, 15]. If
we trivialize the concept of metacognition, it can be described as a process through
which an aware agent elicitates and affects his belief system. Such a process has the
structure of an iterated circular process through which belief system reflexion and
reviewal are alternated[16, 17]. Communication is here defined in its more exten-
sive meaning, as described by Shannon andWeaver in their Mathematical Theory of
4 Ca’Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics
1.1. Introduction
Communication[18]: "All of the procedures by which one mind may affect another"
This definition of communication englobes any process through which meaning is
constructed, codified, transferred, decodified and used to review beliefs and expec-
tations [19–28]. As we will see, metacognition itself implies communication among
different cognitive levels. Communication characterizes also those situations where
the communication-related tasks are seen as instrumental or subsidiary to the ends
of the agent(s) that undertake(s) them. Any communication results in a change of
beliefs and uncertainties across coupled systems. In our review, we will illustrate ev-
idence in favour of the hypothesis that human agents knowingly use their metacog-
nitive and communication capacities to try to jointly reduce their beliefs related un-
certainties. In particular, in relation to the foreseeing of future states of the world and
the commensuration of the likelihood of future events. This activity is undertaken by
mentally speculating on, and anticipating the effects of, future events. By so doing
agents can represent the dynamics of the systems in which they operate and evalu-
ate what to do to render those systems, in actual or prospect terms, more favourable
or closer to ideal states. In neoclassical economics, the aforementioned mechanism
corresponds to the possibility of formalizing a probability space and maximizing ex-
pected utility conditional on probabilistic expectations. In our framework, changes
in uncertainty can, for example, be undertaken through communication occurring
in:
• Market transaction processes: through the enacting of each transaction and
determination of a price, a buyer (seller) comes to know that, under a given
"state of the world", there is at least one seller (buyer) that values a good/ser-
vice less (more) than the transaction price. Where the price is identified with
reference to fiat currency, a numeraire, or, in case of a barter, of the ratio of
the cardinality of exchanged goods/services. If the transaction does not take
the form of a barter among goods/services that are to be consumed instantly
after the transaction, it is always conditional on beliefs of the transacting par-
ties concerning the foreseen utility and price of the exchanged goods/services.
Therefore, a result of market transactions is the redistribution across agents of
uncertainties and of their effects, in relation to foreseen utility and prices of
exchanged goods/services. The latter effects are implicit to any transaction of
goods/services that are not instantaneously consumed.
• Empirical and experimental evidence collection: each time an individual ob-
serves (samples) the state of a system in a natural (empirical) or controlled
(experimental) setting. We can consider observation a type of pull communi-
cation.
• Deliberation and communication about coordination devices: all those pro-
cesses used to generate or modify reference systems, common knowledge be-
liefs, expectations, conventions and metaheuristics, in particular, in relation to
the reduction of strategic uncertainty. Which are generally used for decision-
making, coordination, sense-making, foreseeing or anticipation purposes un-
der imperfect information;
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Chapter 1. Uncertainty: reviewing the unknown
Towards a cognitivist turning of uncertainty paradigms?
In our review we will explore the dominant paradigms proposed by economic, so-
cial, cognitive and information sciences’ literature. Studies in these research fields
appear to be edified on imperfectly overlapping assumptions on what uncertainty
is, and consequently, how to measure and model it. Their findings are comparable
only with respect to limited aspects, which we call the core of phenomenological
human uncertainty. We explore recent evidence and theorizations from the cogni-
tive sciences, which link human uncertainties to metacognitive and communication
processes[14–29].
Metacognition, uncertainty, beliefs and communication
Aswewill see, metacognitive processes can be considered particularly important for
economists in relation to those beliefs that are used to formulate and review proba-
bilistic expectations and to evaluate the degree of confidence attributed to them. At
a systemic level, expectation revision interdependencies emerge when agents elicit
and try to reduce uncertainty, at the group and social level, through communication.
As we will explain, uncertainties at the group and social level can be elicited, re-
duced and eventually resolved, through the communication of probabilistic expec-
tations. In this framework, a necessary condition for agent to exhibit uncertainty is
to be aware of the (non-null) divergence between alternative systems of probabilis-
tic expectations[30], for example the divergence between the prior expectations of
an agent of those of the agents with whom the former communicates. Such a diver-
gence can be considered a measure of the pressure for reviewing expectations, for
reducing expected surprise. Metacognition itself, can be considered a process of it-
erative and reflexive reconstruction of beliefs and expectations, based on controlled
communication between:
• Cognition: Lower level cognition implements the use of a belief system and
monitors its outcomes in terms of decision-making and sense-making;
• Metacognition: Higher (meta) level cognition controls and reviews the belief
system on the basis of information provided by lower level cognition;
Internal communication, between different hierarchical levels of cognition, uses as
support one’s belief system and retrievedmemory based on the latter[31, 32]. Whereas,
external communication uses as support a portion of a shared environment, which
can be physical or virtual. The shared environment is transformed in a communi-
cation medium, i.e. a channel. This medium becomes object of the joint attention
of communicating parties. By joint attention we mean that parties simultaneously
or one after the other send probing impulses to the medium. The communication
medium’s state is used as a signal transmitting device. Therefore, the controllability
of the medium, in terms of costs for probing it and for switching among states; the
cardinality of the set of states; the saliency and distinguishability of states; the maxi-
mum frequencies at which the state can be switched and the vulnerability/isolabilty
of the medium from noise are all key elements for the success of the communication
processes.
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Higher order beliefs that frame the understanding and role of uncertainty
As we will illustrate in the second and third section of our review, a large amount of
studies by psychologists [33–37] suggest that metacognitive processes are used for
the controlled revision of higher order beliefs. Through this review we will explain
why, beliefs of commensurability and ergodicity, are key concepts in the economic
debate about uncertainty, which profoundly differentiate the Neoclassical and the
(new)Keynesian uncertainty analysis frameworks. By commensurability, we do not
simply refer to meaning-invariance in relation to the observation of systems’ states,
dimensions and processes. Which can be defined in terms existence and identifica-
tion of coherent and invariant reference systems (vocabularies), measures and mea-
surands [38]. In our framework, rather that viewing the commensurability from an
epistemic perspective we evaluate it in relation to individual-specific belief require-
ments, which are the conditions considered jointly necessary for the quantitative
integration and/or comparability of specific sets of beliefs associated to sensory ex-
periences.
Commensurability can be seen as a composite belief attribute of sets of beliefs, which
represents the faculty of comparing, in quantitative terms, the perceptions of sensory
experiences considered distinct, phenomenologically speaking, but integrated in the
same belief system. Beliefs are considered commensurable when they are them-
selves believed to be comparable in terms of, one or more, shared (higher-order)
quantitative belief attributes. Where attributes represent original or projected per-
ceptual dimensions of sensory experiences. For example, under this approach, mar-
kets and observed (monetary) prices of goods/services, can be used by individuals
to reduce the uncertainties elicited for goods/services procuration. Where by procu-
ration we mean the process through which one may get hold of goods/services,
and, to dispose of them. Individuals become consumers precisely when they have
the possibility to simplify goods/services procuration through the use of a market
system that projects the material and immaterial costs to be sustained for the acqui-
sition of goods/services to a unidimensional proxy measure, making the costs of
goods/services mentally commensurable through a unidimensional common mea-
sure: prices. Without markets and observable prices for goods/services one would
be in the situation of having to mentally represent all alternative procuration tech-
nologies, i.e. multidimensional combinations of material and immaterial resources,
usable to obtain desired services/goods, with ensuing problems of commensurabil-
ity and uncertainty associated to the elicitation, comparation, choice and utilization
of these technologies. Similarly, beliefs of ergodicity concerning those systems in re-
lation to which one wants to formalize expectations, are also particularly important
in economics. Where by ergodic, we mean systems whose processes have "identical
time averages and ensemble averages"[39]. Ergodicity makes sampled observations rep-
resentative of the system’s actual state and phase-space densities, making possible
state learning and foreseeing. If one beliefs that some observed human systems are
incommensurable and/or non-ergodic, then, observational data concerning these
systems’ states cannot be, respectively, measured or used to forecast the states of
these systems. As we can see, higher order beliefs, especially those concerning com-
mensurability and ergodicity, may deeply affect the meaning and feeling of uncer-
tainty of human agents. These higher-order beliefs are particularly important for
economic research, because they make possible the construction of probabilistic ex-
pectations, which are used in neoclassical economic modelling of rational decision
making under imperfect information.
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Information-gap and expectations-gap related uncertainty
Through a review of recent literature we will identify two distinguishable but inter-
twined types of uncertainty that are particularly important in terms of their eco-
nomic implications. The first can be seen as the outcome of self-metacognition,
whereas the second one is the outcome of group and social metacognition. As
we will see, feelings of uncertainty that emerge in relation to expectation-gaps ev-
idenced during group or social metacognition processes, signal the degree of ex-
pected surprise conditional on one’s expectations and those communicated to the
latter by other members of a group, or, by his social network neighbours. Whereas,
feelings of uncertainty that emerge in relation to information-gaps during self metacog-
nition processes, signal the degree of surprise caused by new evidence conditional
on one’s prior beliefs. These two types of uncertainty are both elicited, reduced and
eventually resolved within metacognitive processes. As we will document, commu-
nication plays a crucial role in such processes. It is through metacognitive processes
that beliefs, like probabilistic expectations, are knowingly revised. We hypothesize
that uncertainty reduction is a fundamental characterization of human metacogni-
tion. Metacognition can be seen in this framework as a way to reduce uncertainty
by reviewing beliefs. Our vision is based on recent works by Golman and Lowen-
stein[40–42]. The axiomatic microfoundations proposed by Golman and Lowenstein
can be considered a cognitivist reframing of the concept of utility to englobe the ef-
fects of information-gaps and related uncertainty. Inspired by their framework, in
the last section we will explored how expectations-gaps related uncertainties may
be integrated in EU maximization models. These uncertainties are not considered in
the classical EU framework. They can be viewed as a way of integrating many of
the ideas behind the Keynesian concept of conventional expectations[43–47] in the
Neoclassical EU framework.
Relative-entropy based measures of expectations related uncertainty
We show that, the above illustrated expectations-gaps related uncertainties, can be
measured through relative entropy, as formalized by Kullback and Leibler[48, 49].
Kullback-Leibler’s relative entropy is a generic measure of the divergence among
distributions that can be interpreted as expected surprise when applied to diver-
gence among pairs of probabilistic expectations of future events. Under this frame-
work social-metacognition can be seen as a coordination mechanism through proba-
bilistic expectations: by communicating and reviewing expectations, agents are able
to elicit and try to locally reduce, group or social uncertainties related to expectations-
gaps, while jointly maximizing their expected utility.
Expectations-gaps related uncertainty as a belief reviewing coordination device
Under this perspective states of uncertainty related to expectations-gaps can be con-
sidered individually and collectively informative signals, which, if explicated, can be
respectively used to coordinate, at the individual and group/collective levelmetacog-
nitive processes. When uncertainty states are explicated by agents through lan-
guage, in communication and deliberation systems, uncertainty acquires a systemic
role of coordination device for belief revision. By being able to explicit and com-
municate (extreme or above tolerance) degrees of uncertainty to their peers, agents
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can request additional time, evidence and more or less intense and extensive com-
munication to better coordinate their revision of expectations and reduce expected
surprise. By so doing they can facilitate the process of reduction of expected surpise,
i.e. uncertainty.
An economic re-reading of the role and effects of uncertainty aversion
To conclude, we will illustrate how, in the previously mentioned framework, by
maximizing a modified expected utility function, agents can jointly and optimally
modify through a unique mechanism:
• Their degree of expectation-gaps related uncertainty levels, or expected sur-
prise;
• Their probabilistic expectations of future events;
Such a mechanism implicitly contains the twofold identity represented by the sen-
tence having to learn, while learning to learn. Which in economic terms may be
summarized by the following concepts:
• Expected utility maximizers: Where, in complement to the standard charac-
terization of expected utility, the more agents are averse to expected-surprise,
the stronger will be their convergence towards the group/social probabilis-
tic expectations distribution. This, to reduce the disutility of expected-surprise
generated by the awareness of expectations-gaps, in relation to subjective prob-
abilities of events, which is a linguistic partition of the future, communicated
by other agents. Where communicated expectations are sets of at least two
subjective probabilities of events belonging to a representation/partitioning of
the phase/state space of a system;
• Simil bayesian social-learners: Human agents, by being able to integrate oth-
ers’ beliefs/expectations in their own, can improve their (expected) predic-
tion accuracy of future events, by minimizing expected surprise conditional
on communicated beliefs (priors) concerning the probabilities of future events.
In situations where percepts (observational evidence) is distributed across a
large-world environment and locally observable, i.e. signals have limited du-
ration and/or intensity, agents, which can be seen as local sensors (subject
to noise), will perceive, process and integrate these local percepts in their be-
liefs. Agents can also (indirectly) learn about events in a large-world through
percepts that are not directly accessible to them, by means of a iterated com-
munication of beliefs, in particular expectations, among neighbouring agents.
In this framework expectations, which are discrete probability distributions
over future events considered possible, are informative representations of lo-
cally pre-processed percepts and prior communications of expectations among
neighbouring agents;
As we will see, our expectations-gaps uncertainty measurement approach appears
to be particularly well suited for empirical studies in those domains of knowledge
that have to do with multi agent network systems. In particular, situations in which
the pay-off of agents, or their expected utility, may -also- depend on the degree of
convergence among agents’ beliefs (expectations) and preference relations for hy-
pothesized future events. For example, in those economic and financial empirical
applications in which uncertainty concerning expectations, and their distribution
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across agents cannot be observed directly, but where it plays a relevant role in deter-
mining observed outcomes and/or prices, as well as their volatility.
Why have we evolved to feel and communicate uncertainty: on the informative
and coordination value of uncertainty
To conclude, we will review main findings and give an intuitive explanation of why,
under our perspective, in which uncertainty is related to the degree of expected sur-
prise due to expectations-gaps, the public communication of uncertainty states can
be considered a coordination strategy for group or social-network beliefs revision.
Especially during those events that jointly change, for a large share of the agents in
a group or social network, the foreseen conditional utilities and probability distribu-
tion for a large subset of possible outcomes in the event-space. For example, when
the United Kingdom’s EU referendum results, or, the victory of Trump in the 2016
United States’ presidential elections were communicated to the worldwide public.
1.1.1 Summary of objectives and research questions
Our main objective is to outline, through a review of existing works, the characteris-
tics and effects of uncertainty phenomena in relation to markets, expert judgements
and communicative/deliberative arenas. In addition, by reviewing literature on the
issue, we want to highlight the pros and cons of the methods that have been identi-
fied and used to model and measure uncertainty and uncertainty aversion. Finally,
we wish to expose and enrich the metacognition-communication uncertainty frame-
work, by integrating it to literature about information-gaps and expectations-gaps,
which, under specific conditions and assumptions, allows us to model and measure
individual, group and social uncertainty. Here follow our main research questions:
1. How uncertainty has been conceptualized in modern times?
2. What is the relation between choice difficulties, indifference and uncertainty?
3. What is the relation between uncertainty and risk?
4. How uncertainty has been conceptualized in contemporary economics, infor-
mation sciences and cognitive sciences?
5. Which relation exists between uncertainty and information?
6. What do those formal representations have in common and in which terms do
they differ?
7. Can we represent human uncertainty in terms of belief related entropy and
relative entropy?
8. How is our uncertainty reshaped through metacognitive processes?
9. Can public communications of states of uncertainty expressed through natural
language be used as a signals of expectations-gap related uncertainty?
10. What is the relation between expectations communication, expectations-gaps,
group/social metacognition and uncertainty?
11. In which terms individuals’ uncertainty is linked to the updating of their be-
liefs and maximization of their expected utility?
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1.2 Conceptualizations of uncertainty in literature
In the following subsections wewill highlight the emergence, drifts, transformations
and crisis of uncertainty paradigms[50] in economics and neighbouring disciplines,
which study the role and effects of uncertainty in human cognition and behaviour.
We would like to acquire knowledge about uncertainty states, by identifying a sta-
ble reference relation between representations of uncertainty and uncertainty phe-
nomena in the human world. However, the condition for the very existence of
-intertemporal- knowledge concerning human uncertainty phenomena, in a factive
sense, is that there must exist an objective truth to discover that mustn’t be influ-
enced by the observer: some general relation between observed states of uncertainty
of agents in isolation, in groups, in networks, or in societies non conditional on the
observer, as if the former where closed and isolated systems. The aforementioned
feature of knowledge is very rarely observed in practice, in particular with reference
to uncertainty phenomena. Because, theories and models of uncertainty do not sim-
ply measure states of uncertainty, they try to reduce uncertainty concerning these
states by imputing uncertainty to specific causes, for example the existence of noise
or random perturbations. In the sections that follow, we will progressively try to
explore and illustrate alternative methods and sources, that we can use to extract
local knowledge concerning uncertainty states of human agents, that can then be
aggregated at the desired level and frequency. Methods which, differently from the
EU theory and risk aversion measures, do not seek to extract intertemporal "truths"
concerning agents’ behaviour when facing uncertainty, but, which can be used to
observe contingent states of uncertainty through (public) communication systems.
The latter may be used to characterize and describe individual and aggregate un-
certainty, when analysed or modelled in the short or very short term, with data
aggregated at high (day) or very high (infraday) frequency.
We will start our review by illustrating modern works on uncertainty. Then we il-
lustrate contemporary research on the issue starting from economic research fields,
where we highlight differences betweenNeoclassical and Keynesian theorizations of
uncertainties. Finally, we expose studies about uncertainty from the cognitive and
information sciences. This second section is an essential building block for iden-
tifying the frontiers of existing frameworks for the analysis and measurement of
uncertainty in economic studies. Through our review we will outline the common
findings and gaps of existing research.
Given the space constraints of this article, the works presented in the following sec-
tions are not exhaustive of their fields of research. The amount of work produced
in the aforesaid areas is so large that some relevant works may have been omitted,
we apologize with authors for eventual omissions. Our aim is to build a review, as
much as possible, representative of open or unresolved research questions in relation
to market agents’ uncertainties, their measurement, and, on the relation between the
latter and observed aggregate market phenomena.
1.2.1 On the modern understanding of uncertainty
The reflections on classical and modern economic thought that will follow are only
a small window on the economic world and theoretical paradigms of the last four
centuries. Despite their non-exhaustiveness, these reflections allow us to show to
which extent uncertainty has always been a fundamental aspect of economic affairs,
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and, associated theoretical representations. We have voluntarily omitted Keynes
from this subsection, because, even if he was a contemporaneous of Knight, we con-
sider his thoughts, as well as raised questions related to uncertainty phenomena
closely related to very recent economic debates on human uncertainty, and, to the
(re)emerging of uncertainty analysis paradigms alternative to the neoclassical risk
framework.
Dubium existentiae
The importance of the state of uncertainty for the revision of higher order beliefs
and for the reconstruction of knowledge and belief systems was highlighted since
the seventeenth century by Descartes. In his Meditations On First Philosophy[51] he
stated that "Although the utility of a Doubt which is so general does not at first appear, it is
at the same time very great, inasmuch as it delivers us from every kind of prejudice [...] if I
am able to find one some reason to doubt, this will suffice to justify my rejecting the whole".
Descartes had a very stylized vision of his own beliefs, probably due to his radical
"confidence in rationality"[52]: he considered himself able to control his own proposi-
tional attitudes, through his -at will- capability of doubting about them and applying
reasoned thought to test propositions and by so update his belief system. However,
even though he knew that some of his beliefs were based on "opinions, in some mea-
sure doubtful [i.e. prepositions possessing a propositional attitude belief attribute that is
neither true nor false]", if these were "at the same time highly probable, so that there is
much more reason to belief in than to deny them" he considered them appropriate to be even-
tually used as "masters of [his] beliefs", and claimed that he would never lose "the habit
of deferring to them or of placing [his] confidence in them"[51]. Descartes was certainly
one of the first to grasp and express the idea that one’s propositional attitudes, may
admit higher order belief attributes, which not necessarily must be binary. Higher
order beliefs trough which one can, for example, represent the truthfulness, the de-
gree of confidence, the plausibility or the probability of a preposition, belonging to
one’s belief system. Descartes also understood that, by voluntarily doubting, i.e.
activating metacognition, one could put under the lens of reason propositions and
beliefs, and by so doing, update his own belief system. Under the aforementioned
perspective belief systems are used in all cognitive processes. Uncertainty, signals
that the belief system is object of potential revision during a metacognitive process.
Uncertainty is for this reason described as a state in which an agent is reluctant or
unwilling to use his belief system for formulating expectations and taking relevant
decisions.
Paradoxon cognitionis et exspectationis humanae
Seventy years later, in 1713, the mathematician Nicolas Bernoulli explicated his un-
certainty in relation to the St. Petersburg paradox through a letter[53] written to his
friend Pierre Rémond de Montmort. The St. Petersburg paradox is a lottery with
an infinite mathematical expectation, valued a limited amount of money, i.e. a finite
certain equivalent, by market agents while facing decision-making under risk.
Such a lottery made Bernoulli doubt of the reasonableness of the usage of math-
ematical expectation for the valuation of price lower-bounds for monetary lottery
tickets. When knowledge generates anomalies in relation to evidence and intuitive
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thinking, paradoxes emerge together with metacognition. In such situations, hu-
mans start doubting, collecting additional evidence, and, if evidence is insufficient
to collapse to a coherent and justified representation from which derive an optimal
choice, by speculating and simulating on possible representations and models of
reality one may find a representation, which fulfils better than the others, choice jus-
tification requirements and criteria of the thinker. Bernoulli was certainly a clever
mathematician, but, despite his doubting and thinking, he was never able to for-
malize a solution to the St. Petersburg paradox. However, this paradox revealed to
be the cognitive fuel used by the spark of human reason, embodied by Bernoulli’s
cousin, to bring to light the foundations of the neoclassical theory of decision mak-
ing under risk: the expected utility hypothesis. In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli[54], cousin
of Nicolas, exposed for the first time a mathematical function that discounted, in
utility terms, the expected value of lotteries over monetary pay-offs, to account for,
and represent, some stylized facts concerning observed bets and human preferences
among alternative lotteries, later conceptualized as the risk aversion of individuals.
The die of the paradigm of expected utility was cast.
Aporia et indifferentiae oeconomicas
One century later, William Stanley Jevons summarized, in his Brief Account of a Gen-
eral Mathematical Theory of Political Economy[55], an extremely refined and modern
view of the role of uncertainty in economic affairs. Not only Jevons was a precur-
sor of the quantitative and cognitive turn of economics, he affirmed that feelings
are "quantities capable of scientific treatment", but also, he claimed that "every expected
future pleasure or pain affects us with similar feelings in the present time, but with an inten-
sity diminished in some proportion to its uncertainty and its remoteness in time". Through
his words Jevons grounded the intuition behind the hypothesis that people discount
utility on the basis of the granularity and saliency of their (beliefs of) knowledge
concerning future situations and their foreseen utility:
• (I) foreseeing horizon distance: The more the foreseen horizon is remote, in
terms of time distance and prototypicality;
• (II) complexity and non-ergodicity: The more a situation appears to be in-
determinate, non-ergodic, incommensurable or complex to be mentally repre-
sented in terms of utility and probability of events;
• F(I,II) representativeness and coherence of the belief system: The harder will
result the process of mental speculation, modelling, simulation and accounting
of all possible combinations of actions and effects;
• G(F(I,II)) foreseen utility intensity: The higher will be the "discounting rate"
of the foreseen utilities at a given time/situation horizon;
Jevons had also understood that "all the critical points of the theory [of economics] will
depend on that nice estimation of the opposing motives which we make when these are nearly
equal, and we hesitate between them". Wemay call the latter, situations of rational doubt
or uncertainty related to the incapacity to consider one alternative strictly superior
to all others. According to Jevons, the incapacity to discriminate prospects in terms
of utility was seen as a critical point, because it was a possible source of cognitive
difficulties in real life, and possibly, random behaviour.
Today, it is considered socially acceptable that, if one is indifferent among a series
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of choice alternatives, he may choose by undertaking a random choice among alter-
natives considered equally good and superior to all others; however, at the time of
Jevons, random choice, even between a small subgroup of choice alternatives, still
appeared to lack the requirement of justifiability, to oneself and to others, both in
moral, volitional and rational grounds. From a rational perspective, when two or
more alternatives, superior to all others, are considered equally good, if time con-
straints are not binding, there is an alternative mechanism to random choice that is
strictly superior to the latter from a global efficiency perspective.
The superior solution consists in exploiting the full information extraction potential
of the choice, by decomposing it, and, delegating or selling the sub-choice among
alternatives considered equally good and superior to all others to someone that is
willing to bear it, or even better, to pay for it. If there exists an individual that values
positively the possibility of undertaking the sub-choice and will buy it, or accept to
undertake it, it means that the latter will be able to extract some additional utility
through the same choice. Therefore, by decomposing choices when one encounters
a situation of indifference, allows the extraction of additional utility from the initial
choice. Utility that would otherwise be lost in case of a random choice between in-
different alternatives superior to all others. This until the full information and utility
extraction potential of the choice is "consumed". As a result, if time constraints are
non binding, random choices are effectively a-priori non-optimal choices.
At the time of Jevons, if one found himself in such a situation of indifference, choice
was generally postponed until one of the alternatives would reveal to be strictly
preferred with respect to others. The latter perspective results particularly interest-
ing if we understand that under this conception, indifference was seen as relative/-
conditional to beliefs of imperfect information and a too weak or absent volition.
Therefore, by undertaking a random sub-choice, the utility, volitional and informa-
tion extraction potential of the choice is inefficiently used. Such inefficiency may
appear small to us, but was considered a very serious waste in a society in which
information, as well as resources were extremely scarce; situation that, excluding
the last century, has always been the norm in human societies. For this reason indif-
ference, which was considered caused-by unresolved uncertainties, themselves due
to weak (choice) volition, lack of information and/or poor cognitive and metacog-
nitive capacities, shouldn’t be settled by random choice. Under this perspective,
indifference characterizes situations where utility differences among alternatives do
not exist in observable terms, however, they may exist in the latent information and
utility space that hasn’t yet been commensurated by the decision-maker. In such cir-
cumstances situations of indifference may be metaphorically assimilated to Pandora
boxes, potentially full of unexpected externalities, in terms of (dis)utility and sub-
efficient information extraction. The latter situations, can be also resolved through
communication or additional information retrieval, to explore the latent information
and utility space of oneself and others hence involved in the decision, refining the
grain of human representations and knowledge of each other. In general, through
communication and information retrieval, preference relations that may initially ap-
pear to be indifferences become, sooner or later, strong. Indifference can hence be
a signal of information and utility extraction global sub-efficiency, which generally
emerges in relation to situations of decision-making under uncertainty: when one
undertakes a choice among alternatives temporally or cognitively very remote com-
pared to contingent, observed or experienced states of the world, his representation
of the state-space will likely exhibit poor granularity. If one uses a thick grained rep-
resentation to commensurate differences in the foreseen utility among alternatives,
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alternatives may appear as equally good/preferred only because the information
set used to compare them is too little to distinguish their actual differences in terms
of utility. Knight, whose thoughts on uncertainty will be mentioned in detail fur-
ther in this section, also discussed this issue and considered it one of the channels
through which the economic effects of uncertainty phenomena were amplified and
propagated through markets[1].
Last but not least, Jevons anticipates, through a written intuition, some findings
from a field of economic research, related to uncertainty and expectations, that will
emerge more than a century later, that of anticipated utility[56–60]. He claimed that:
"we must carefully distinguish actual utility in present use from estimated future utility,
which yet, by allowing for the imperfect force of anticipation, and for the uncertainty of
future events, gives a certain present utility". In his view, utility could be anticipated by
individuals precisely through the foreseeing of future utility. We will return to this
issue later on when we will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of foreseeing
the future and formulating probabilistic expectations of future utility levels.
Adaequatio intellectus nostri cum re
Close to the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, William James, a
radical empiricist that laid the foundations of modern psychology claimed[61] that
the concept of consciousness was "on the point of disappearing altogether". According
to his view, consciousness was about to be rendered, by modern science, epistem-
ically obsolete through direct empirical observation, measurement and analysis of
perceptual phenomena. James questioned the very need to continue to assume the
existance of consciousness, as a necessary tool to explain doubt and uncertainty, in
line with this thought, he considered consciousness a non-entity[62].
William James had identified a more practical role for doubt and uncertainty, closely
related to theoretic rationalism. According to James, consciousness was a casing
layer for world-views based on theoretic rationalism, which he described as the "the
passion for parsimony, for economy of means in thought" and the ensuing "habit of ex-
plaining parts by wholes"[63]. Under this perspective, rational world-views are used
to give relief to the overwhelming process of empirical contemplation of the "richness
of the concrete world", through which humans’ percepts incessantly inspire a multi-
plicity of inconsistent views of the world, with "little pictorial nobility". According
to James, rational world-views, emerge and are revised for practical inter-individual
and intertemporal coherence purposes, linked to people’s preferences to jointly re-
duce actual and expected surprise, i.e. uncertainty.
James related uncertainty to the feeling of unrest, surprise and uncontrollability, and
claimed that, through rational world-views, humans can temporally "banish uncer-
tainty from the future", and by so doing, their "feeling of strangeness disappears". James
represented rational sense-making as a distributed and modularized form of theo-
retical substitute for perceptual reality[64], which could be used to limit and reduce
uncertainty created by empirical analysis and reflections on new percepts. Ratio-
nal sense-making alleviates extreme surprise because individuals "come back into the
concrete from [rational] journey into these abstractions, with an increase both of vision and
power"[63]. According to James single perceptual "experience in its immediacy seems
perfectly fluent", it is in relation other percepts and their joint explanation that un-
certainty emerges. Therefore, rational sense-making can be considered a process of
ex-post imputation of percepts, or empirical evidence, to modularized theoretical
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representations, related to the objectification of percepts, in beliefs and knowledge
systems, through a rational sense-making framework[65]. Its difficulties are rep-
resented by regret and residual uncertainties, which are themselves attributed by
rationality to exogenous factors and noise.
If we transpose James’ view of rational sense-making to contemporaneous economic,
cultural and scientific environments and institutions[66] and their specialization by
functional fields of knowledge, theoretic rationalism can be considered an instru-
ment used to reduce human uncertainties by minimizing the duration, extension
and diffusion of rational world-views reviewing processes when new empirical ev-
idence is collected by agents and groups. The former process is undertaken by at-
tributing actual and expected uncertainty conditional on new evidence, to existing
theoretic representation modules, eventually reviewed, when considered rationally
convenient, for the reduction of actual and prospected surprise, i.e. uncertainty. The
task of maintaining, communicating and eventually reviewing theoretic representa-
tion modules is entrusted to individuals and groups experienced and functionally
specialized in the reduction of uncertainty generated by percepts in a specific area
of the perceptual-space; and eventually, if uncertainty resolution is impossible, to
exogenous factors and noise.
Cogito incertum et opus incertum
In 1921, Frank Knight[1] dedicated the third part of Risk Uncertainty and Profit to
the analysis of the "conditions of existence" of uncertainty in economic affairs. Accord-
ing to Knight, uncertainty in economic affairs encompasses the problem of estima-
tion of the expected utility of alternative money usages/allocations. He is one of the
first to expose a systemic and epistemological representation of human uncertainty
phenomena. In his writings he claimed that such a state is intrinsic to the application
of the "dogma of science" to the understanding and anticipation of cause-effect rela-
tions in a indeterministic and ever changing universe, which enables the possibility
of incurring in a "knowledge paradox", i.e. a state of radical uncertainty:
"Change of some kind is prerequisite to the existence of uncertainty [.. and] change in some
sense is a condition of the existence of any problem whatever in connection with life or
conduct, and is the actual condition of most of the problems of pure thought[...] The
existence of a problem of knowledge depends on the future being different from the past,
while the possibility of the solution of the problem depends on the future being like the
past.[...] The point for us here is that change according to known law does not give rise to
uncertainty.[...] But the process of formulating change in terms of unchanging "laws"
cannot be carried to completeness, and here our minds invent a second refuge to which to
flee from an unknowable world, in the form of the law of permutations and combinations. A
law of change means given behavior under given conditions. But the given conditions of the
behavior of any object are the momentary states and changes of other objects. Hence the
dogma of science, that the world is "really" made up of units which not only do not change,
but whose laws of behavior are simple and comprehensible. But it is contended that there are
so many of these units that the simple changes which they undergo give rise to a variety of
combinations which our minds are unable to grasp in detail. We have examined this dogma
and been forced to the conclusion that whatever we find it pleasant to assume for philosophic
purposes, the logic of our conduct assumes real indeterminateness[...] Real
indeterminateness, however, gives mind a new means of prediction, through grouping
phenomena into classes and applying probability reasoning. This device enables us to
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predict what will happen in groups of instances[...] this method also has its limits. Both
methods in fact, prediction by law in individual cases and by probability reasoning in
groups of cases, have rather narrow limitations in everyday life in consequence of the
organic costs of applying them and the time required to get the necessary data; both outlay
and time are commonly much greater than circumstances will allow us to consume in
deciding upon a course of action"[1]
The indeterminateness mentioned by Knight is not necessarily intrinsic to the phys-
ical world but results from beliefs that are the outcome of interactions and coordina-
tion among agents, and between the latter and their local information environments.
In addition, Knight claims that certain factors like the "inflexibility of prices, due to
habit, indifference, rounding off of figures" may "aggravate the effect of uncertainty" and
disturb the adjustments towards theoretical market equilibrium conditions, as well
as the functioning of market clearing mechanisms themselves.
1.2.2 Uncertainty in contemporary economic literature
Since the formalization of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern (VN-M) expected-utility
(EU) hypothesis[67], the economic study of uncertainty has been superseded by that
of risk. In the VM-N EU theory, risk characterizes environments with imperfect in-
formation concerning the states of world. It is a problem of optimal inference in
a resource and information constrained environment. Through our review we will
briefly describe the EU theory in its objective and subjective probability version, as
well as their violations, like the paradoxes identified by Allais and Ellsberg, together
with some extensions and revisions, like cumulative prospect theory[68]. As we will
point out, the VN-M EU theory has contributed to the advancement of almost all
disciplines that study uncertainty from the risk perspective, ranging from finance
to engineering. However, uncertainty phenomena and its analysis is not confined
to the risk framework. Therefore, to enrich our understanding of uncertainty, we
will also review alternative theories and representations of uncertainty in decision
and sense making. We summarize the main differences in the hypothesis of these
theories of uncertainty, with particular attention to those proposed in recent times in
Neoclassical and (new)Keynesian economic works. As we will see, the search lines
that emerged from the Knightian/Keynesian and the Von Neumann Morgenstern-
Savage paradigms are extremely different, also within each framework some rele-
vant differences exist and will be highlighted in the following sections. Since the
former theoretic frameworks are based on non perfectly translatable assumptions
and reference-systems, they are not necessarily comparable and integrable.
The expected-utility framework and its normative effects on uncertainties
The Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected-utility (EU) hypothesis[67] is a formal
theoretical framework used to describe, compare, aggregate and compose risky prospects,
and to evaluate agents’ preferences among them. It is based on Kolmogorov’s first
order probability axioms[5, 6, 69] and on an axiomatic representation of market
agents as resource constrained objective function maximizers[70]. In this framework
uncertainty is seen as a consequence of randomness or chance. Randomness is de-
finable as a indeterministic perturbation or noise affecting a system or a process.
However, behind random noises and stochastic perturbations may be hidden some
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non-linearities or chaos in the dynamics of deterministic systems[71, 72], which, by
being open, or, computationally too complex or too costly to commensurate, are rep-
resented, for convenience or necessity, as random noises or stochastic processes. One
may be unaware, or, deny for convenience or epistemic strategy[73], that the "fog of
randomness"[74] in his perceptual experience may (also) be due to random noise or
stochastic perturbations in his sensory and cognitive states, while probing a system
through observation.
Therefore, not necessarily randomness in a representation is isomorphic to the phe-
nomenon it refers-to. For example, one may consider randomness:
1. As a characteristic of a system/process observed in isolation, under all possible
conditions, or, under specific conditions, of the observed system/process;
2. As a characteristic of an observed (non isolable) system/process, in relation to
its, conditional or unconditional, coupling with other systems/processes;
3. As a characteristic of the observed system/process in relation to its observer(s),
under specific conditions, or, under all possible conditions, of the observer(s),
of the observed system/process, or, of the observation process;
4. As a characteristic of the observer(s) in relation to the observed system/pro-
cess, under specific conditions, or, under all possible conditions, of the ob-
server, of the observed system/process, of the observation process;
5. As a characteristic of a set of observations in relation to the observer(s), under
specific conditions, or, under all possible conditions, of the observer, of the
observed system/process, of the observation process;
6. As a characteristic of a set of observations in relation the observed system/pro-
cess, under specific conditions, or, under all possible conditions, of the ob-
server, of the observed system/process, of the observation process;
7. As a characteristic of a set of observations in relation to, the whole reference
population, or, the complement of that set;
These distinctions are not trivial from the point of view of possible effects resulting
from the imputation of the belief attribute of randomness to a specific representa-
tion of a phenomenon. In addition, one may also mentally represent randomness as
a particular combination or composition of the above characterizations.
For example, if one accepts, by default, the hypothesis (1) that noise or stochas-
tic perturbations characterize an observed system/process, independently from the
observer(s) and from the observation processes, a belief-mantle of objective external
randomness shapes the representations of that system/process. This belief-mantle,
can push one to consider the dynamics of such system/process a-priori indetermin-
istic. Under the acceptance of any (non degenerate) randomness hypothesis, future
states of the world cannot be forecast with certainty. Agents who attribute a random-
ness belief to their representations of a system/process, may however have the ne-
cessity or preference to foresee possible states/outcomes of a system/process, and,
through the latter, make a-priori rational decisions under randomness-related un-
certainties. The EU hypothesis is a normative framework, which formally describes
a way of representing and dealing with the aforementioned decision-making situa-
tions.
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In works belonging to the objective EU framework, uncertainty is assimilated to a
particular type of randomness, called chance and linked to the frequentist concep-
tualization of probability[75, 76]. In this framework the facing of risky prospects
is considered an objective fact. Risky prospects are lotteries/gambles over known
monetary outcomes, with known probabilities. Where objective probabilities are
limiting relative frequencies of the outcomes of an idealized infinite repetition of the
same statistical experiment, i.e. the lottery. The only information that is subjectively
commensurated in the objective EU framework is one’s utility function, all other
things being seen as external, objective characterizations of a system/process whose
state/outcome is uncertain only to the extent that it is assimilated to a random draw
from a known probability distribution, over the space of possible events/outcomes.
In the objective EU framework, agents try to behave a-priori optimally, from a nor-
mative rationality perspective, by allocating their resources among available lotter-
ies in such a way that, the resulting composite lottery, is the preferred probability
distribution among all possible ones, over one’s future earnings, i.e. the distribution
that maximizes expected utility.
In situations where:
• One faces a choice among known lotteries, or, amoney allocation choice among
known lotteries;
• Probabilities of monetary outcomes for each lottery are objectively known, or,
believed to be objectively known in terms of physical propensity of a phe-
nomenon;
• One is able to commensurate the utility of any possible monetary outcome of
original lotteries and all possible composite lotteries;
• The same choice among lotteries is repeated a very large or infinite number of
times, to "activate" the law of large numbers;
• There is no path dependency from a choice to another, i.e. money and utility is
not transferable across lottery choices;
Choosing how to allocate money among lotteries on the basis of the axioms of ratio-
nality is, in objective terms, an optimal rational strategy to pursue if all the above
conditions are met. Unfortunately very few real-world situations of uncertainty
comply jointly to these conditions. To extend its applicability, if physical theory
justifies it, one may switch from a frequentist view to a physical propensity view of
probability[77], which renders, in rational terms, EU maximization an a-priori opti-
mal strategy even if the same choice is undertaken once: when the physical propen-
sities of the considered phenomena are (hypothesized to be) known, objective EU
maximization becomes rationally optimal also if applied to single events. To make
the EU theory even more "adherent to reality", in terms of its representativeness of a
larger number of real-life situations of uncertainty due to imperfect information, as-
sumptions concerning the objectivity of probabilities can be further soften through
the, so called, subjective probability framework.
In works belonging to the subjective EU framework[78, 79], pioneered by Leonard
J. Savage[80] in 1954, the probabilities of occurrence of possible outcomes/events
are subjectively commensurated and represent the belief attitude vis-a-vis a given
phenomenon[78]. Probabilities in such setting must still be comparable, numeric,
exhaustive and comply to Kolmogorov’s axioms of probability. As pointed out by
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Suppes[81], in the subjective EU framework "probabilities are measures of degree of be-
lief". Uncertainties can be therefore transformed in risks by associating probabilities
to foreseeable events. In the subjective EU framework, uncertainties are jointly com-
mensurated and projected to a consistent representation through a probability space,
and then, collapsed to an optimal choice through the maximization of an objective
function. Objective function that represents the expected utility of an agent, which
is given by the sum of the utility of each possible event/outcome multiplied by its
subjectively commensurated probability.
In the years that followed the axiomatization of the EU hypothesis, the risk frame-
work was object of a huge number of accrual contributions, in particular after its
subjectivist turn. The subjective EU framework rendered risk phenomena some-
thing that extends from the physical world to the cognitive and metacognitive do-
main of mental representation and commensuration of probabilities. As a result of
the academic attention devoted to this framework, a great amount of empirical and
experimental evidencewas collected to test the EU hypothesis, systematic deviations
from the theory and violations were observed and explained:
• The so called EU paradoxes[82, 83]- for example: The Allais paradox, which
revealed inconsistencies of lottery choices in the vicinity of certainty that vio-
lated the independence principle of Savage; the Ellsberg paradox, which showed
that not all uncertainties are representable in the EU framework, because, re-
gardless of one’s utility function and ensuing risk aversion, all individuals ap-
pear to prefer lotteries with precisely known odds. They are averse to lotteries
with partially-specified or ambiguous probabilities. Through these paradoxes,
the existence of more radical and higher order uncertainties, which cannot be
assimilated to risk, were revealed;
• The so called EU fallacies[84–88]- for example: Samuelson’s fallacy of large
numbers, as well as its extensions and revisions, demonstrate that, unless there
is no path dependency and the same choices among lotteries are repeated a
large/infinite number of times, normative rational choices are not a rational
decision-making instrument: maximizing the geometric mean of utility out-
comes in long sequences of investing or gambling is not an optimal choice for
maximizing one’s utility in expected terms;
• Evidence against the EU hypothesis assumptions and implications[89–96]-
for example: There is evidence that expected-utility theorymakes incompatible
predictions about the relationship between risk aversion over modest stakes
and that over large stakes, and that therefore, it doesn’t provide a plausible
and coherent account of risk aversion over all scales of stakes; a large number
of experimentally observed inconsistencies with the EU hypothesis, in partic-
ular choice reversals, have been identified by psychologists and mapped to
a series of possible heuristics used to choose among lotteries, some of which
will be described later, and biases, explainable in terms of non-observable cog-
nitive and computation costs, indifference, misunderstandings and misrepre-
sentation of incentives and probabilities;
Despite critiques to the EU framework, both as explanatory and normative theory of
human decision-making under uncertainty, its axiomatic and probabilistic founda-
tion became the most common formal-language used for risk-analysis and decision-
making under imperfect information. Nowadays, a great number of highly-qualified
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professional categories systematically employ it, as a formal representation and be-
lief frame, in decision-making and sensemaking processes under uncertainty; mak-
ing our human world look like an ever-growing risk society[97–107]. As a result, on
a daily or infra-day basis real-world uncertainties are quantified by risk experts, ana-
lysts and automatized algorithms, who, on the basis real-world real-time data, com-
mensurate subjective probabilities of events, and, represent real-world situations as
lotteries over an (imagined or inferred) outcome/event space. Outcome/event space
that can also be multidimensional, and, which can range from monetary pay-offs to
number of civil casualties per square mile. Multidimensional outcomes are then
collapsed through a multi-criteria objective function, to identify the system gover-
nance/control strategy whose outcome is preferred by the decision maker, given
his elicited choice criteria. The subjective EU framework has become, thanks to its
elasticity, the dominant building-block of representations and justifications of the
behaviour of human agents not only under risk, but also under uncertainty.
Expected utility, together with its extensions, generalizations, concepts and mea-
sures of risk aversion, has reached, in the past half century, such a degree of diffusion
among human agents and organizations that it has become the conventional uncer-
tainty representation paradigm[10]. Subjective EU theory has also been employed
and extended, sometimes inappropriately, to fit to practical purposes that go far be-
yond the field of economic research and theorizations: by banks[108], brokers[109],
insurance companies[110], investors[111], central banks[112], financial market vig-
ilance authorities[113], managers[114] and judges[115]. The usage of risk-aversion
related concepts in a court ruling case[115] is probably the most revealing example
of the diffusion of the aforementioned framework and emergence of an ideological
risk-frame used to confront with uncertainty and its effects: in 2013, the Court of Ap-
peal of Milan ruled that a bank, operating in Italy, had to reimburse one of its clients
for an investment gone bad, because the investment, a swap contract, accepted by
the client wasn’t compatible with his degree of risk aversion, even though the latter
had read and signed the contract. The bank’s fault consisted in the omission of a
formal process for the elicitation of the degree of risk aversion of the client before
proposing such a high-risk propensity preference investment. As the above example il-
lustrates, what was at first only a hypothesis has progressively become a normative
theory[79, 116–119] and a modeling convention that can be used to ground and jus-
tify actions and decisions with uncertain outcomes on basis of the axiomatic founda-
tions of neoclassical economic theory, the so-called rationality axioms, and, resulting
claims of rational optimality, or, of deviations from the latter.
We hypothesize that the EU framework, as well as other risk theories based or in-
spired by the EU hypothesis, became so widely acknowledged and employed by
analysts, market agents and judges, not only because they are believed to be an
adherent-to-reality formal representation of the behaviour of human agents while
facing risks; but also because such a framework can be used as a metaheuristic to
actually face uncertainty, and, face stakeholders and people that bear externalities,
when having to justify a choice under metacognitive uncertainty. We hypothesize
that the subjective EU framework, its extensions, as well as other normative theories
of optimal decision making under risk or uncertainty, can be used as a metaheuristic
for:
• Information extraction, elicitation and signalling conditional on beliefs of
rationality and common knowledge of probability spaces. For example: to
infer the degree of (absolute, relative) risk aversion from observed choices un-
der (known) risky prospects, conditional on the EU hypothesis being true and
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knowing the probability space used by an agent; to measure the probability of
observing a specific set of evidence (choices) made by an agent conditional on
the EU hypothesis being true; to signal rationality through choices under risky
prospect uncertainty;
• Reducing the costs of decision-making and justification, under any type of
uncertainty, by bringing a decision into the subjective EU framework. For
example: by simulating or randomly generating missing information that is
required to use the EU framework, like a subjective probability space, and/or,
a choice space, and/or, an objective function. Once an agent disposes of this
information he can choose, as a EU maximizer would do, and simultaneously,
has all the information necessary to explain, to himself and to others, the ratio-
nal grounding arguments in favour of his action;
• Create ex-post rationality illusions, or, narratives of rationality for conve-
nience and justification purposes. For example: to justify a decision, or, to
hide information concerning the probability-space, utility function or criteria
an agent actually used to choose among alternatives, by identifying all the pos-
sible combinations of utility functions and subjective probability spaces that
can justify a posteriori a decision on the grounds of its compatibility with the
EU hypothesis; to infer, a posteriori, which combinations of probability spaces
and utility functions maximize the probability of EU hypothesis being true
given an observed (set of) choice(s) that have been previously undertaken;
Rabin[94] pointed out that theories of risk attitudes can reveal to be useful proce-
dures, or metaheuristics, for reducing or neutralizing risk aversion. In addition, as
remarked by Painter[120], the risk framework shifts the frame and attention of de-
cision makers and stakeholders away from the belief that "decisions should be delayed
until conclusive proof or absolute certainty is obtained (a criterion that may never be satis-
fied), towards timely action informed by an analysis of the comparative [expected] costs and
risks of different choices and options", which is somehow related to the point made by
Javons, and described in the previous subsection, in relation to what indifference, in
economic choices under imperfect information, signals and represents.
Beyond expected-utility: On the commensuration of uncertainties through first
order probability frameworks
To our knowledge, the fact of being used as a metaheuristics in real-world affairs,
concerns -almost- all contemporary theories of decision-making under risk or uncer-
tainty developed in economics, finance and game-theory. This because, the paradigm
of rational decision-making represents uncertainty as a fact, caused by imperfect in-
formation or randomness, which generates some extra (utility) costs to bare, mea-
sured, in the subjective or objective probability framework, in terms of the distance
between the mathematical expectation and the certainty equivalent of a bet for an
agent, in case one is risk averse and all available prospects/strategies are risky. As
a result, risk studies that have a rationally-optimal decision-making frame, try to go
beyond the identification of elicitation mechanisms or measures to quantify agents’
uncertainties, and, seek to explain the processes throughwhich, despite the existence
of such uncertainties, their consequences, in terms of the psychological and physi-
cal costs associated to the foresight/anticipation of expected utility by risk averse
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agents, can be limited, as much as possible, through the identification of a-priori ra-
tionally optimal strategies, in relation to available choices and information. This can
be done in a multiplicity of ways, for example: by diversifying resource allocation
among risky prospects so that in all states of the world the pay-off is (foresight to be)
the same; by insuring against the occurrence of specific events with extreme pay-offs
by transferring these risks to other agents for which the certainty equivalent of the
gamble/lottery is higher.
Under the above illustrated perspective, the commensuration and reduction of un-
certainty manifests itself also through the use of other types of decision-making
heuristics[95, 121–127] considered alternative or complementary, in explanatory and
normative terms, to the EU framework. The latter decision-making rules and meth-
ods, like the rule of thumb[128] or max-min[129], do not necessarily give as output
the first best solution to a normative expected utility maximization problem and are
not necessarily immune to systematic biases, but, may be used to abbreviate and
simplify complex decision-making processes under uncertainty through simpler or
more intuitive inference procedures. Heuristics are evolution, imitation or experi-
ence sourced techniques, well suited to rapidly choose an action/strategy in dy-
namic environments in which windows for action under imperfect information may
appear at unforeseeable moments in time and have a limited duration, or, when the
possibility of successfully implementing an action/strategy negatively depends on
the amount of time required to infer that action/strategy.
Before going further in our analysis of economic literature concerning economic the-
ories of uncertainty and their implications in terms of optimal behaviour, some fur-
ther clarifications on the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity, in relation to ev-
idence, probability and uncertainty commensuration must be done. According to
Knight[1], to be able to associate the attribute of objectivity to numeric probability
distributions of future states/outcomes of a system/process, one should have an a-
priori perfect knowledge concerning the unknowability of the factors and not simply
the facts of ignorance, in relation to the system or process being observed. Where
explanatory factors, if jointly known and not-ignored, can be used to deterministi-
cally infer, and causally explain, facts. To consider a numeric probability objective,
the unknowability of explanatory factors should prescind from observers and from
their processes of observation, being an external property of a system or process. In
the aforesaid epistemic circumstances, where unknowable factors are known, and
hence, isolable from knowable factors, limiting distributions of frequentist probabili-
ties[76], i.e. relative frequencies, are perfectly informative isomorphisms of the inde-
terminate states/outcomes of such systems/processes. These should be considered
human mind independent characterizations of the world. In such circumstances,
one could talk not only about objective randomness, in terms of its independence
from the observer, but also, about physical probabilities, given their hypothesized
independence from observers and observation processes.
If the latter epistemic condition is verified, once the objective probabilities of states/out-
comes of a system/process are known or assumed to be known, probability rea-
soning becomes a tautological activity, because an objective probability distribution
must be by definition unconditionally true[130], therefore from an epistemic per-
spective the objectivization of probability knowledge renders the latter self-referential.
When objective probability distributions, which describe the joint effects of all known
unknowable explanatory factors on the state/outcome of a given physical system/pro-
cess, are assumed to exist and to be known, they become signal-noise isolation and
commensuration devices, used for the measurement[131, 132] of the influence of
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knowable and commensurable explanatory factors on the state/outcome of a sys-
tem/process. The aggregate effects of known unknowables on the state/outcome
of a system/process are implicit to the shape of the objective probability distribu-
tion. Objective probabilities are assumed to represent, completely and perfectly,
potential knowledge concerning the joint effects of disturbances due to all known-
unknowables and their interactions, on the state/outcome of the system/process.
By considering probabilities as objective and objectively known, new collected evi-
dence concerning the state/outcome of a system/process and its knowable explana-
tory factors, is by assumption considered irrelevant for the updating of probabilistic
knowledge concerning the effects of unknowable factors. In a specular way, devia-
tions from expected states/outcomes of a system/process conditional on knowable
explanatory factors, are considered random noise or stochastic perturbations. As if,
the residual distance between what is expected on the basis of all knowable explana-
tory factors and what is observed should be, by construction, attributed to random
draws from the objective probability distribution, from which no additional infor-
mation or knowledge concerning knowable explanatory factors can be extracted.
For this same reason, Knight claimed that "if the real [objective] probability reasoning is
followed out to its conclusion, it seems that there is "really" no probability, but certainty",
because objective "knowledge [of the unknowability of explanatory factors] is already com-
plete"[1] and perfectly represents known-unknowns in terms of their joint effects on
the state/outcome of a system/process. Because objective probabilities are an iso-
morphism of the state/outcome indeterminacies of a physical system/process. In
such situations where probabilities are, or are assumed to be, objective, the principle
of cogent reason overshadows that of insufficient reason, and, objective probabilis-
tic knowledge represents completely and perfectly potential knowledge concern-
ing the effects of known-uknowables on the states/outcomes of a system/process.
Therefore, what one may learn through observation of a system/process in such
circumstances, is conditional on a prior separation between known-knowables and
known-unknowables, whose effects are separated through, and thanks to, objective
probabilities and their distributions.
Despite the epistemic value of the search for objective probabilities we should al-
ways remember that even if we, the humans, are embedded in a common physical
universe of which we ideally seek to acquire common and objective knowledge, our
uncertainties, in relation to the former, emerge in our mental and conceptual spaces,
which are not necessarily overlapping among agents: we become aware of, and feel,
uncertainties in relation to both internal and external phenomena, through the emer-
gence of aware thoughts during metacognitive processes. Even though some physi-
cal characterizations of human uncertainty have been experimentally identified and
isolated in neurological studies, to our knowledge no evidence has been yet found
against the hypothesis that: uncertainty feelings emerge, are commensurated and
eventually reduced or resolved, through, and conditional on, metacongition.
Since uncertainty is, jointly, a phenomenon characterizing the mind and the brain,
the objective probability approach, which is constructed to prescind from the ob-
server and his subjective beliefs, is not necessarily the optimal road-map to the ob-
servation, commensuration, measurement, analysis and understanding of human
uncertainty phenomena.
On the other hand, subjective probability spaces can be considered explicitable and
implicitable elastic cognitive and metacognitive instruments. Humanmind can gen-
erate these instruments to respond to the preference for coherently and formally
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representing one’s own and others’ beliefs and quantifying and comparing uncer-
tainties in relation to the former. Subjective probabilistic quantifications of uncer-
tainties are beliefs representation or projection systems, which, being inspired by
probability theory, should have as conditions the beliefs of commensurability, com-
parability and exhaustivity of the uncertainties concerning propositions and beliefs
represented through this framework. Several theories of subjective probability ex-
ist, among which the bayesian approach to subjective probability[133–135] is cer-
tainly the more rigorously oriented to learning. The bayesian framework can be
used for the rational updating of prior beliefs when new observational evidence
is available[136, 137]. The conceptualization of subjective probability that we will
adopt in the sections that follow, is somehow halfway between the bayesian view
and that used in psychological experiments[138], where subjective probability is as-
similated to themental expectancy[139–141] of a phenomenon. In general, outside the
bayesian framework, only first order subjective probabilities are considered to be
mentally commensurable by individuals in real life: events’ subjective probabilities
are elicited as if they were real numbers between 0 and 1. If the aforesaid hypothesis
is true, two options are possible, either first order probabilistic mental representa-
tions of uncertainties prescind from higher-order and radical uncertainties, if any, or
they are low dimensional uncertainties projection systems, in which first order sub-
jective probabilities are eventually distorted by higher order or radical uncertainties.
In support of this second view, it has been found that when individuals are asked
to elicit first order subjective probabilities and attribute equal probability values to
all possible states of the world, the so called " fifty-fifty" probabilistic expectation
when there are only two possible states, these probabilities do not represent anymore
(simply) the numerical subjective expected relative-frequency or expectancy of the
occurrence of these states, but a different type of higher order uncertainty attribute
associated to the whole probability space, called epistemic uncertainty[142]. These
higher order and radical uncertainties and their effects will be further discussed in
the next sections.
Subjective probability spaces can hence be used to commensurate and elicit un-
certainties in relation to specific sets of beliefs concerning the states/outcomes of
a target system/process, and eventually, to decide under which circumstances and
throughwhichmechanisms beliefs concerning the former system/process should be
revised. Moreover, differently from risk aversion, uncertainty feelings associated to
probabilistic representations of systems/processes are dynamic. Uncertainties may
change in terms of their degree and identified sources during metacongitive pro-
cesses. As we will explain later in this work, belief revision during metacognitive
processes largely depends on new evidence collected through communication with
other agents and with the environment. The higher is the compatibility between
new evidence and prior beliefs, the smaller is the actual surprise generated by the
communication of such evidence, and, the lower will likely be the uncertainty in re-
lation to the latter, and hence, the contingent pressure to review beliefs. Similarly,
the higher is the compatibility between expectations communicated by others and
prior beliefs on the issue of the recipient of the communication the smaller will be the
surprise generated by the communication of these expectations, and, the lower will
likely be the uncertainty (expected surprise) in relation to the latter, and hence the
pressure to review probabilistic expectation related beliefs. Shackle[143–145] was
probably the first economist to link the feeling of uncertainty to surprise, condi-
tional on prior beliefs. According to Shackle[143], actual surprise is "what we feel
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when an expectation has gone wrong", whereas potential surprise is "the degree of diffi-
culty which an individual has in banishing [an hypothesis concerning the future] from his
mind". Shackle’s intuition on the link between uncertainty and surprise will be fur-
ther discussed in the information theory section, in relation to information entropy
and relative entropy measures.
Given the simplicity, elasticity and coherence of first order subjective probability the-
ory, this framework has been used in several theories of rational decision-making
under uncertainty, many of which prescind from the expected utility hypothesis[57,
59, 146–151], or, relax and change some of its assumptions[152–155]. One of the
most promising alternative frameworks for the representation of uncertainty in ra-
tional decision-making is called regret theory[156–160]. Regret theory, in its origi-
nal formalization[158], is also based on subjective probabilities and expected utility
maximization, however expected utility is conceptually and axiomatically formal-
ized differently. In this framework, also inspired by Bernoulli’s work on psycho-
logical anticipation, agents foresee and actualize possible future rejoicing or regret,
due to the consequences of the undertaking of an action conditional on the conse-
quences that could have occurred under alternative actions, for all possible states
of the world. Differently from the standard EU framework actions are represented
by n-tuples of consequences, where n is the cardinality of the set of states of the
world. A modified utility function allows to represent the negative utility impact of
anticipated potential regret, and, the positive utility impact of anticipated potential
rejoicing. Similarly to the classical EU framework, the optimal action is the one that
maximizes the sum of the product of modified utility and subjective probability for
all states of the world.
From imprecise probabilities to radical uncertainties
It could seem a twist of fate, but, the notion of imprecise risk and probabilities en-
tered public debate in the sector, that of nuclear energy, and the country, the United
States, where one would have hoped that statisticians, together with engineers and
physicists, would have been able to infer, through their "hard science" knowledge
and methods, non-disputable first-order probabilities, and error bounds, of nuclear
facility failures, and, their possible consequences in terms of probabilistic distribu-
tions of fatalities, per facility, per unit of time. In 1953, the statistics director of Gen-
eral Electrics submitted a memorandum, titled The Evaluation of Probability of Disaster,
which proposed a methodology for the commensuration of probabilities of chain
events that could culminate in a nuclear disaster. Twenty years later, in 1974, the
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission published its Reactor Safety Study, called WASH-
1400, which estimated, in probabilistic terms, the risk of an early human fatality
due to a hundred nuclear power plants in the United States to be 2 ∗ 10−10 per
year[161]. WASH-1400 was acclaimed as one of the best risk assessments ever ac-
complished[162]. Through this statistical work, probabilities of fatalities due to Nu-
clear disasters where inferred and compared, in terms of expected fatalities, to other
risks, more familiar to the US public. Risk benchmarks ranged from fires, to air
crashes and hurricanes.
A few years later, the Lewis Committee was commissioned by the US government
to review the study’s conclusions by analyzing the error bounds for the estimated
probabilities reported in the latter, the report of the committee states as follows: "we
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are unable to determine whether the absolute probabilities of accident sequences in WASH-
1400 are high or low, but we belief that the error bounds on those estimates are, in general,
greatly understated"[163]. The question of if, when and how to commensurate and
represent these higher-order uncertainties was raised, and submitted to the evalua-
tion of US’s civil society and its scientific community.
The Lewis Committee claimed that "the spectrum represented by that team [the RSS that
authored WASH-1400] was not broad enough to encompass the full range of scholarly opin-
ion on the subject. This led the RSS team to make estimates with a narrower range of stated
’uncertainty’ that would otherwise have been the case"[164]. The RSS team was criti-
cized for not being able to speculate sufficiently on the effects of scholarly known
unknowns, concerning possible causes of nuclear accidents and their effects, and by
so doing, having failed to elicit, acknowledge and communicate the full range and
degree of uncertainties concerning the outcomes of their nuclear risk analysis, in
particular in relation to the degree of imprecision of inferred probabilities of fatali-
ties.
The degree of imprecision of these probabilities had been understated because of
the objective difficulty and impossibility, for the RSS team, to elicit and commensu-
rate all knowable unknowns related to nuclear disasters[165]. In particular, those
higher order uncertainties that would have emerged in relation to the speculation
on possible causal chains that may produce as outcome a system failure resulting
in a nuclear accident. But also, those uncertainties concerning the effects of nuclear
accidents, in terms of probabilities of human fatalities. This because these estimates
depend on behavioural hypotheses on the reactions of human agents, inside and
outside the nuclear facility, once they become aware of the nuclear accident[166]; as
well as, on estimates of the health impact of nuclear radiation on human bodies. The
aforementioned higher order uncertainties should have been propagated through
the inference process, and, should have affected the error bounds of inferred prob-
abilities of fatality, per nuclear plant, per year; but, were ignored and hence ren-
dered invisible in final estimates of first-order probabilities of fatalities and their
error bounds. Numerical probabilities are salient information[167, 168], which can
overshadow higher-order uncertainties and non-commensurated risk factors[169].
First-order probability spaces grant to commensurated risk factors and elicited un-
knowns the perceived quality of internal consistency, coherence, completeness and
precision[170]. For the aforementioned reasons, inferred probability-spaces can re-
sult extremely useful to oust from people’s mind residual uncertainties and worries
concerning risk factors that may be difficult to commensurate. This because residual
unknowns are masked by the apparent completeness, precision and hence reliabil-
ity of these inferred numerical probabilities[171, 172]. Furthermore, by assessing
and representing risks through first-order probabilities over a predefined outcome-
space, known knowns and known unknowns are froze, and, clearly separated from
residual unknowns. Residual unknowns which may be either unknown unknowns,
or, non-considered knowable unknowns, or, non-elicited knowable unknowns.
The fact of considering first-order numeric probabilities as lower-level projections,
or expected values, of their latent higher-order counterparts, becomes particularly
controversial when the shape of the higher-order distributions of the latter are not
known, or, cannot be safely assumed or inferred. For example, a second-order prob-
ability with a continuous uniform distribution on the interval zero-one would have
the same expected value of a second-order (degenerate) probability with all its mass
on the value 0.5, clearly these two second-order probabilities describe very distinct
states of epistemic uncertainty which, if possible, should be clearly distinguished.
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Moreover, if these latent higher-order probabilities are assimilable to degenerate
random variables only conditionally on commensurated risk factors, but not also,
on non-commensurated risk factors, then, inferred first-order probability values and
error bounds, can be biased, because only commensurated unknowns are allowed
to affect the inferred first-order probabilities and their error bounds, whereas, possi-
ble effects on the latter of incommensurable uncertainties and risk factors are jointly
ignored.
In addition, the more one becomes familiar and accustomed to the use of probabil-
ity measures in decision and sense-making, the more probabilistic information on
commensurated uncertainties will likely become salient to him[173], up to the point
of creating an illusion of risk control[174], and, of objective knowledge about the
effects of unknowable explanatory factors on the state/outcome the considered sys-
tem/process[172]. The latter phenomena has been annoverated among the causes of
overconfidence[175–177].
Another important point concerning the practical limits of the use of a probabilistic
framework for uncertainty representation and commensuration, is linked to epis-
temic priors concerning the probability-space to which probability mass may be at-
tributed. Such a space should:
• be preliminarily defined and remain unchanged during the whole process of
evidence collection and measurement, i.e. a statistical experiment;
• be an exhaustive representation of all possible and distinguishable states of the
world;
Hence, a probability-space, once formalized and used to represent the randomness
of a system/process, generates some extra costs imputable to the activities of spec-
ulation -in the philosophical sense- on residual unknowns and commensuration of
previously non-considered risk factors. This because, probability-space based repre-
sentations, by being systems of interdependent and self-consistent knowledge, im-
ply some sunk costs and switching barriers, related to the eventual necessity of re-
defining the whole structure of the probability-space, and, re-attributing the weight
of evidence (probability mass) to distinguishable outcomes, in such a way that all
probability axioms are respected. The latter necessity of redefining the probabil-
ity space generally emerges in relation to the outcomes of the aforementioned com-
mensuration and speculation processes, on residual unknowns. Residual unknowns
which once elicited could result incompatible with the prior probabilistic represen-
tation of a system/process.
Moreover, the concept of probability measure, which is instrumental to that of prob-
ability space, used in real-world applications to represent risks, implies that events
that are indiscernible are considered identical, this means that any probability space
depends on a frame of discernment used by the observer. Among many other fac-
tors, the ability to discern states of an observed system depends on the process
through which a sensory device, i.e. a measurement system or/and the observer, is
able to probe andmimic (isomorphically or approximately represent) the states/out-
comes of the target system/process or its transitions. The maintenance of frames
of discernment requires agents to face specific costs, for example: for the mainte-
nance/calibration of probing sensors, for rounding measurements if memory is not
unlimited, and, for the memorization of the frame of discernment and collected evi-
dence. The willingness to support these costs should not be given for granted, espe-
cially with reference to probabilistic representations of complex systems. Therefore,
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if individuals are rational, and, if they do not value per-se frames of discernment,
it must be that the latter contribute to their utility through some other mechanism.
We hypothesize that frames of discernment contribute to agents’ utility by being
used to elicit, commensurate, aggregate and represent commensurable known un-
knowns, in a coherent and formal system, and through the latter stabilize, as much
as possible, their expectations under imperfect information. Conditionally on those
"stabilized" probabilistic expectations agents can anticipate expected utility and ex-
pected surprise, also called uncertainty. We will come back on this point in the last
section of this work.
Many years before the WASH-1400 study was published, during the first half of the
XXth century, issues related to imprecise and higher-order probabilities and beliefs
were at the fulcrum of the economic debate among incompatible schools of economic
thought. Alternative conceptual orientations on these topics were highlighted by
the contraposition between the Neoclassical and the Keynesian views of uncertainty
phenomena. These two uncertainty paradigms could be distinguished precisely in
relation to the concept, role and usage of probabilities in the two frameworks. Since
its origin the Keynesian approach was "characterized by the deep conviction that the
economic, and social, environment is dominated by uncertainty that cannot be reduced to
risk and treated with the traditional tools of [first order] probability theory"[178].
Such a conviction of Keynesian economists, may be seen as related to the existence
of epistemic uncertainties that cannot be commensurated, represented or resolved
through probability reasoning, for example, those uncertainties emerging from be-
liefs of incommensurability and non-ergodicity. Under beliefs of non-ergodicity
the information separation axiom[179] of information theory, also called Shannon-
Khinchin’s 4th axiom, is violated. The 4th axiom allows us to consider information
atomistically: if the axiom holds, statistical dependencies among single informa-
tion units can be considered negligeable in terms of their entropy effects. When
the latter axiom holds we can simplify entropy with its Gibbs-Boltzmann version,
and, give to observed densities in the phase-space of dynamical systems a proba-
bilistic interpretation, which is required to formulate probabilistic expectations[180].
Whereas, under beliefs of incommensurability, the very references of cognition ap-
pear to be reversed, absolute uncertainty becomes the de-facto equilibrium mental
state for those that belief that real-world systems and phenomena are incommensu-
rable. That said, beliefs of commensurability and ergodicity, even if subjective, may
reveal to be rather stable and useful to be held, and will generally last until a new
anomaly, indeterminacy or paradox, in relation to one’s belief and knowledge sys-
tems emerges. These higher-order beliefs are not necessarily the results of a process
of inference of the commensurability and ergodicity properties of the actual target
system that one may want to represent, they could be simply never updated pri-
ors. Moreover, agents that may have correctly inferred, speculated or guessed that
a system is non-ergodic or incommensurable, would derive no concrete advantages
from these beliefs, both in terms of forecasting and control capacities in relation to
the latter system, and, in terms of mental stance towards the future. In addition, if
it is true that expected utility can be mentally foreseen by human agents, and, pro-
duces a present anticipated-utility effect at the moment in which expected-utility is
elicited[58, 59, 149, 181, 182], if one beliefs that a system is non-ergodic or incom-
mensurable he will not be able to forecast and hence anticipate any utility that may
derive from his interaction with that system. The latter is certainly an evolutionary
disadvantage for those that may, even rightly, belief that some real-world systems
are non-ergodic and/or incommensurable.
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The aforementioned epistemic position, frequently assumed by Keynes, was implicit
to many of his early economic works[183]. According to Keynes, in many real-world
situations "there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever.
We simply do not know. Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for decision compels us as
practical men to do our best to overlook this awkward fact and to behave exactly as we should
if we had behind us a good Benthamite calculation of a series of prospective advantages and
disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate probability waiting to be summed"[46].
This view also emerged clearly in his Treatise on Probability, in which probability
magnitudes, were not considered necessarily commensurable or comparable:
"No exercise of the practical judgment is possible, by which a numerical value can actually
be given to the probability of every argument. So far from our being able to measure them, it
is not even clear that we are always able to place them in an order of magnitude. Nor has
any theoretical rule for their evaluation ever been suggested. The doubt, in view of these
facts, whether any two probabilities are in every case even theoretically capable of
comparison in terms of numbers, has not, however, received serious consideration. There
seems to me to be exceedingly strong reasons for entertaining the doubt. [...] There are some
pairs of probabilities between the members of which no comparison of magnitude is possible;
that we can say, nevertheless, of some pairs of relations of probability that the one is greater
and the other less, although it is not possible to measure the difference between them; and
that in a very special type of case a meaning can be given to a numerical comparison of
magnitude."[184]
Keynes viewed probability judgments as commensurations on the level of partial
entanglement between an argument’s rational expectancy and its epistemic uncer-
tainty: "Unlike the relative frequency theory of probability, in which probability is inter-
preted as a property of the physical world, Keynes treats probability as a property of the way
individuals think about the world. As a degree of belief, this property is subjective to the
extent that information and reasoning powers vary between persons. But it is not subjective,
according to Keynes, in the sense that the probability bestowed on a proposition given the
evidence may be subject to human caprice. The probability of a conclusion given the evidence
is objective and corresponds to the degree of belief it is rational to hold."[185] The objective-
ness of probabilities is seen by Keynes as an emerging property of rational reasoning
on an argument in situations of epistemic uncertainty.
A very interesting -not merely statistical- innovation introduced by Keynes’s Treatise
on Probability is that the probability of any argument is a bi-dimensional entity[184]:
1. the first dimension, called probability magnitude, is similar to a classical first-
order probability value that is based on both evidence in favour or against
an argument: "as the relevant evidence at our disposal increases, the magnitude of
the probability of the argument may either decrease or increase, according as the new
knowledge strengthens the unfavourable or the favourable evidence;
2. the second dimension, called probability weight, represents the amount of re-
trieved and elicited relevant evidence (informative known knowables), with
respect to all possible relevant evidence (informative knowables). Probabil-
ity weight therefore represents the epistemic support used for a judgement,
on which the probability magnitude of an argument is built-upon: "As the rel-
evant evidence at our disposal increases [...] we have a more substantial basis upon
which to rest our [probability magnitude] conclusion. I express this by saying that
an accession of new evidence increases the weight of an argument. New evidence will
sometimes decrease the probability [magnitude] of an argument, but it will always
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increase its weight". Keynes added to the concept of weight the following re-
mark, through which we can associate uncertainty represented by probability
weights to the inverse of entropy in information theory: "we may say that the
weight is increased when the number of alternatives is reduced, although the ratio of
the number of favourable to the number of unfavourable alternatives may not have
been disturbed [... And] we may say that the weight of the probability is increased, as
the field of possibility is contracted";
Keynes’s view of probability is for many conceptual aspects similar to theories of
imprecise[186–191] and higher-order probabilities[192–195] which started emerging,
and were applied in economics[196–200] and psychology[201, 202] studies, almost
sixty years after the publication of A Treatise on Probability. For an analysis of the re-
lation between Keynes’ probability and epistemic uncertainty we refere to the works
by Runde[203, 204], Weatherson[205] and Dow[45, 206].
In his General Theory, Keynes highlighted the connection between uncertainty and
low probability weights[205], and, clearly dissociated the concept of uncertainty
from probability magnitudes, which represent risks. According to Keynes, lotteries,
like those described in the EU framework, are not situations of uncertainty but only
of risk[207]. Uncertainties are represented by Keynes as low probability weights.
Weights therefore represent the degree to which rational probabilities are an epis-
temically reliable guide to rational decision, given the potential surprise which may
ensue from their usage. Accordingly, Keynes claimed[184] that the main limit of the
classical probability framework is that it imposes a random view of uncertainty that
is debatable. This point is precisely the argument used byDempster and Shaffer[208]
to explain why a more flexible and less randomness-oriented theory of evidence un-
der uncertainty, is necessary to correctly treat epistemic uncertainties that are ig-
nored or overshadowed by randomness in classical probability theory. The Demp-
sterShafer theory of belief functions[209–212], is a generalization of the Bayesian the-
ory of subjective probability, which, despite its versatility and capacity to represent
epistemic uncertainty, has received until now little consideration by economists, or
maybe, by economic journals; with some welcomed exceptions[213–217].
As we have explained throughout this subsection transition between radical uncer-
tainties to probabilistic risks, of various orders, are epistemic belief driven. One is
confronted to a risk when facing a situation considered, subjectively or objectively,
indeterminate, commensurable and ergodic, with a stable and consistent probabilis-
tic frame of discernment, and, a stable and tollerable degree of epistemic uncer-
tainty, with reference to a process that exhibits stochastic dynamics. On the other
side, one is confronted to radical uncertainty when facing a situation considered,
subjectively or objectively, indeterminate with a belief system that, given the insta-
bility or the intolerably high degree of epistemic uncertainty, doesn’t allow one to
make, or rationally rely upon, inferences and forecasts conditional on contingent
beliefs and evidence. This can happen for different reasons[218–220] For example:
because the belief system is temporally inconsistent or incomplete, because beliefs
are being reviewed; because probabilities/utilities/states are believed to be incom-
mensurable; because even though probabilities/utilities/states are believed to be
commensurable their commensuration would require too much time or computa-
tional capacity, in relation to one’s constraints, preferences and rationally optimal
behaviour.
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Under this perspective, uncertainty and risk theories, may be both viewed as sense-
making frameworks to avoid the occurrence or reduce the duration of states of rad-
ical uncertainty. Indeterminate situations are transformed in elicited uncertainties
and measurable risks, obtained by grouping similar phenomenological instances
in event categories, in such a way observed phenomena become recognizable and
countable occurrences of events in a measure-space. States of radical uncertainty
are therefore more likely to occur when agents are confronted to phenomena, agents
or environments with volatile, or, rarely observed characteristics/attributes, which
make them difficult to be categorized and represented in a formal sense-making and
decision-making framework. We can transpose this concept to the aggregate level by
saying that aggregate radical uncertainty in economic systems may be viewed as the
average frequency at which agents incur in a state extreme or intolerable expected
surprise, when having to make expectations and take decisions while facing indeter-
minate situations. At the aggregate level this value will likely depend on the degree
of complexity, openness, speed of structural change of the system, and, the infor-
mation, belief and resource endowments and constraints faced by the agents during
communication, decision-making and sense-making in a multi-agent system.
As we will see in the next sections, in situations where epistemic uncertainty is in-
tolerably high, communication and the formation of conventional expectations can
be used as shared beliefs systems to coordinate action and reduce the frequency and
duration of states radical uncertainty.
Elicitation of beliefs, markets and uncertainty
Here follows a brief subsection in relation to markets, uncertainty and the elicitation
of beliefs, of various order. An important characteristic of contemporary economies
stands on their capacity of eleciting market agents’ preferences[221–226] and be-
liefs[227–231]. Elicited information about beliefs can be used to represent/map the
agents-beliefs space in relation to the diffusion of known unknowns, and possibly,
exploit agents’ information-gaps as a market opportunity[40–42]. In relation to the
elicitation of beliefs, Karni has recently shown[232, 233] that agents’ subjective in-
formation structures under Knightian uncertainty, intended as second-order beliefs
over a set of different priors, can be inferred through a revealed-preference proce-
dure. If one can elicit subjective information structures of others, and determine if
and when the set of priors changes, new entrepreneurial opportunities in markets
for beliefs become available[234]. Elicited known unknowns become commercially
exploitable: by offering to an agent the information that would allow him to elim-
inate the information-gaps related to his belief of ignorance and ensuing state of
epistemic uncertainty, at a price that is inferior or equal to the expected-utility gains
of such a change in his beliefs and epistemic uncertainty.
In this rather dystopian vision of the world, agents’ subjective information struc-
tures and epistemic beliefs attributes can be endogenized through markets, which
offer services to redefine beliefs of various order, through beliefs transforming tech-
nologies, based on controlled communication treatments[235]. All communicated
messages would be tailored, on the basis of beliefs elicited by the targeted agent,
to reduce his state of epistemic uncertainty, in relation to his known unknowns.
Through communication, agents would be facilitated in the process of converge to
epistemic belief attributes of faith and agnosis, in the doxastic philosophical mean-
ing, which are states in which epistemic uncertainty is absent and therefore expected
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surprise, which is generally considered an economic bad, is absent/null. Faith, ag-
nosis[236] and ignorance-of-ignorance[237, 238], represent together the epistemic
(set-theoretic) complement of states of uncertainty.
It is interesting to note that, market agents endowed with technologies that extend
agnosis, the realm of unquestioned or unquestionable known unknowables, or faith,
the realm of unquestioned or unquestionable known knowns, to priorly known un-
knowns, can provide through markets a service that reduces uncertainty. Demand
fluctuations of these markets for beliefs would hence depend on the amount of epis-
temic transitions from unknown unknowns to known unknowns, of uncertainty
averse agents. Preferences for the reduction of uncertainty would push the latter to
pay to reduce their information and expectations gaps and ensuing uncertainties. In
such a way, uncertainty itself becomes a green-field for moral hazard[239], because
belief-markets can continue to exist only if a sufficient number of individuals are in a
state of uncertainty, and, keep on being averse to such a state. This market situation
is very similar to that of the so-called "arbitrageurs", described by Miyazaki[240].
1.2.3 Uncertainty in information and communication theories
from an economist’s perspective
In the following subsection we briefly review the concept of uncertainty as defined
and measured in information theory, pioneered by Shannon[18] and Weaver[241].
Throughout the subsection we will try to relate uncertainty measures from informa-
tion theory, to interpretations and conceptualization of uncertainty in economics, as
described in the previous subsections.
Communication, messages, signals and noise
As described by Shannon[242] the problem of communication is that of reproducing
messages from an environment or agent to another. "Messages have meaning; that is
they refer to or are correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual
entities. [...] The significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of
possible messages. The [communication] system must be designed to operate for each possible
selection, not just the one which will actually be chosen since this is unknown at the time
of design". The problem of communication is therefore associated to the openness
to external influence of real-world systems and human agents, and, the ensuing dy-
namics of state entanglements among them. Communication can be seen as a device
for (mental/physical) state coordination among loosely coupled systems and agents,
which exhibit non null degrees of freedom in their communication process. Degrees
of freedom emerge in relation to the maximum/limiting "number of independent sig-
nals that can be exchanged between the [message] transmitter and the receiver"[243]. This
implies that the two systems that can communicate do not deterministically deter-
mine each others’ state prior to, and unconditionally from, the communication pro-
cess. They are both in a latent state of readiness to communication-driven change.
Uncertainty exists precisely because agents, through their communications:
• elicit these degrees of freedom and their latent readiness to change;
• disturb their own state, by determining/choosing the message to be sent;
• disturb the state of the communication medium, in a instrumental way;
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• disturb the state of the receiver, by stimulating a state shift through the signal,
the transformation of the medium, which must be interpreted by the receiver
to be able to reduce his uncertainty in relation to the meaning of the signal.
Signal which can hence be considered a conditioning impulse with potentially
indeterministic effects;
By so doing agents can jointly collapse their degree of expected surprise and their de-
gree of communication freedom, reducing available signalling capacity, in terms of
time, space, memory and cognitive resources available for further communication.
If the mental/physical state shift of the receiver, in relation to the received signal,
corresponds to that desired by the sending agent, the message has been successfully
transferred. Otherwise, there exists some noise or perturbation in the communica-
tion process. Noisy message transfers can occur in relation to:
• differences between the representation and reference systems used by the two
agents to synthesize/interpret signals;
• interferences of other signals transferred through the same medium by others;
• perturbations and noise that characterize the medium/channel;
However, since the sender may have access to the receiver’s mental/physical state
only through feedback signals of the state of the receiver, sender’s uncertainty con-
cerning the degree of communication success may depend on additional iterative
communication steps. Through iterated communication, the sender that had initi-
ated the communication process, can try to change his own entropy level, in addition
to that of the receiving agent(s) and of the communication medium or environment.
From a rational perspective, a message should always determine a collapse or shift
of the senders’ expectations of receiver’s possible actions/states, to a posterior distri-
bution, conditional on the sent message, which is strictly preferred, by the message
sender, to the original one. Moreover, the message sender, by receiving feedback
signals concerning the response of the receiver to his impulse, can try to infer the
success rate/degree of the prior communicating process. All signals elicited and
memorized during communication processes can be used as evidence, to infer the
capacity of signals to affect, in the desired or undesired way, each others’ states.
These inferred relations can both increase or decrease agents’ uncertainty, however
if the system is ergodic, in the long run uncertainties should be lowered through this
evidence collection mechanism. Communication must hence be seen as a process
that can be used to reduce uncertainties concerning non-deterministic dependency
and coordination relations among agents and systems.
Entropy
To keep this subsection as intuitive and simple as possible we will present and de-
scribe the discrete versions of entropy and relative entropy measures, in classical
probability and in the Dempster-Shaffer framework.
Entropy represents the average amount of surprise produced by a stochastic source
of data. In terms of communication, entropy can be seen as the expected number of
atomistic/independent informative units contained in a message. Message that may
concern a system/process, in relation to which, the receiver of the message, is aware
of being in a state of imperfect knowledge and hence of potential surprise, concept
that will be explained further on in this subsection. States of awareness of imperfect
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knowledge may generate in one’s mind these feelings of uncertaint(y)/(ies), which
in information theory are measured in terms of surprise. Changes in entropy are
related to these changes in the set of known unknowns of an agent. Entropy is re-
lated to the variety and distribution of possible answers to a question. Imagine a
draw from a known degenerate random variable distribution, receiving a message
concerning the realized state of such a draw doesn’t change the entropy of the agent
because that message doesn’t dissipate/resolve any prior uncertainty. This because
the question had little surprisal potential given the prior shape. The agent was al-
most certain of the result of the draw, the information content of the message was
therefore ininfluent to him. Whereas, imagine to receive a message that tells you
that an event previously considered very improbable occurred, the surprisal poten-
tial of the transmitted information is very great precisely because the event wasn’t
expected, given prior beliefs.
Entropy and normalized entropy in the probabilistic framework
In classical probability theory, given a discrete probability distribution, called P ,
with n mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The
entropy of this probability distribution can be computed as follows:
H(P ) = −
n∑
j=1
P (j) ln(P (j)) (1.2.1)
In the discrete case, the value of H(P ) is at the maximum entropy value Hmax, if
the probability of each possible event is the same, i.e. the distribution P is uniform.
Which is equivalent to say that for all j P (j) = 1n . The ratio between the entropy and
the maximum entropy of a discrete distribution P with n events, called normalize
entropy or efficiency, can be computed as follows:
H(P )
Hmax
=
−∑nj=1 P (j) ln(P (j))
−∑nj=1 1n ln( 1n)
= −
n∑
j=1
P (j) ln(P (j))
ln(n)
(1.2.2)
The value of H(P ) is at its minimum entropy value Hmin, when the probability of
one event is equal to one (1), all others being identical and equal to zero (0), i.e.
the distribution P is degenerate. Shannon entropy can be generalized by the Rényi
entropy[244], which can be used to represent situations in which there is non-null
entropy entanglement between atomistic information particles, i.e. when the chain
rule of conditional probability doesn’t hold.
Entropy, specificity and other aggregate uncertainty measures in the Dempster-Shaffer
framework
In the more general framework of Dempster-Shafer[209], which allows us to repre-
sent a belief structure under imprecise information, we can compute Shannon en-
tropy as follows:
Assume that X = {x1, . . . , xn} is a finite set of elements of cardinality n, called the
frame of discernment or universe of discourse, which represent the support of a be-
lief structure m. A belief structure m allows us to assign a mass m(A) = a to any
subset of the frame of discernment A ⊆ X . In the Dempster-Shafer framework we
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can impute shared mass among a subset of multiple elements from X, without indi-
cating how it is shared among them.
Any A ⊆ X such that m(A) = a is called a focal element. If each focal element
consists of only one element from the frame of discernment, i.e. focal points are sin-
gletons, the Dempster-Shafer belief structure corresponds to a Bayesian belief struc-
ture, and, Shannon entropy measures are computed as in the classical probability
case. Otherwise, we have to proceed as follows:
Call belief of A, i.e. Bel(A), the sum of all the masses of all possible subsets B ⊆ X
of the set A, such that:
Bel(A) =
∑
B|B⊆A
m(B) (1.2.3)
Call plausibility of A, i.e. Pl(A), the sum of all the masses of all sets B ⊆ X that
intersect A, such that:
Pl(A) =
∑
B|B∩A 6=∅
m(B) (1.2.4)
As pointed out by Yager[245]the connection between probabilistic information and
the Dempster-Shafer framework is based upon the fact that belief and plausibility
are respectively lower and higher boud for the underlying probability of an eventA.
We can hence compute the Shannon entropy ofm as follows:
H(m) = −
∑
B⊆X
m(A) ln(Pl(A)) (1.2.5)
In addition to Shannon entropy, in the Dempster-Shafer framework there is a speci-
ficity S(m)measure that represents the non-random epistemic vacuousness compo-
nent of uncertainty, which can be computed as follows:
H(m) = −
∑
B⊆X,A 6=∅
m(A)
nA
, nA = cardA (1.2.6)
When S(m) = 1 m is a Bayesian belief structure, and H(m) is equivalent to its clas-
sical probability version.
Many other measures of doxastic uncertainty have been developed in the Demp-
sterShafer, framework[246–250]. Like that of Harmanec and Klir[251], which have
developed a symmetric, continuous, additive and subadditive aggregate uncertainty
measure, which gives the maximum value of the set of Shannon entropies, of each
possible probability distribution that is consistent with the lower DempsterShafer
belief bound.
An extension of the Dempster-Shaffer belief framework, called Transferable Belief
Model (TBM)[252–254], allows one to attribute mass also to the empty set, non-null
mass on the empty set allows one to represent beliefs related to the possibility of oc-
currence of gray and black swan events[255], events that an agent a-priori knows he
cannot distinguish or foresee, but which could be possibly imagined if the agent had
infinite time to speculate on possible, and at the moment indiscerned, states of the
future world; but also, on the infinitely many almost-impossible events that would
push one to represent the outcomes of a process/system through a continuous space.
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Relative entropy as surprise
Kullback and Leibler[49] developed a measure of the divergence among distribu-
tions, also called relative entropy, which is very useful to measure surprise in re-
lation to the comparing of belief structures. For example, when used to measure
the divergence between prior and posterior beliefs, it can be considered as mea-
sure of the (extra) surprise implied by the "switch" between the two distributions.
Let P and Q denote two discrete distributions on the same support: both P and Q
have the same partitionwith nmutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, also called relative en-
tropy, between P and Q is defined as:
KL(P ‖ Q) =
n∑
j=1
ln
(
P (j)
Q(j)
)
P (j)
=
n∑
j=1
ln (P (j))P (j)−
n∑
j=1
ln (Q(j))P (j)
= H(P,Q)−H(P )
(1.2.7)
Where H(P,Q) is the cross entropy of P and Q, and H(P ) is the entropy of P .
KL(P ‖ Q) divergence can be also interpreted as a measure of communication effi-
ciency losses (in cross entropy terms), when encoding a message using a distribution
( Q ) other than the real one (P ). We remind our readers that communication effi-
ciency consists in the rate of infomativeness of a message, which is equivalent to its
average surprise (entropy) per signal element. Under the aforementioned perspec-
tive KL(P ‖ Q) can be seen as the (extra) surprise which derives from believing in a
prior Q and then coming to know that the true distribution is P .
Since KL(P ‖ Q) represents the degree of information inefficiency due to use of an
approximation ( Q ) in place of a hypothetical true distribution (P ), we can imagine
a situation in which agent A has a set of prior beliefs Q which he knows to be a
subjective and potentially biased probabilistic representation, which he uses to ap-
proximate and anticipate the true unobservable "randomness" of a real-world pro-
cess. Let us now imagine that, through communication, agent A comes to know that
the belief structure of another agent, called agent B, concerning the same process,
is distributed as P , KL(P ‖ Q) would hence represent the uncertainty, or better the
(extra) expected surprise, derived from the following self-questioning by agent A:
What if agent B is right, and, his beliefs (P ) correspond to the truth, while my own beliefs
(Q) are only an approximate and therefore biased representation of reality that will further
limit my capacity to anticipate/foresee we world? −→ KL(P ‖ Q) (the latter is a measure
of the (extra) expected surprise that agent A will feel when experiencing such a state
of doubt and skepticism concering his own beliefs, in relation to those of agent B,
which are temporally evaluated and hypothesized to represent the truth.)
One of the most interesting properties of the KL divergence resides on its non-
symmetry:
KL(P ‖ Q)−KL(Q ‖ P ) =
n∑
j=1
ln
(
P (j)
Q(j)
)
(P (j) +Q(j)) 6= 0
⇒ KL(P ‖ Q) 6= KL(Q ‖ P )
(1.2.8)
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This property allows us to represent changes in expected surprise in a non sym-
metric way. Which is a very likely psychological hypothesis in relation to beliefs
communicated and then compared by agents. In the above describe situation, if
the communication of beliefs is bilateral, agent B, which comes to now beliefs Q of
agent A, could hypothesize that the inverse truth-approximation relation among be-
liefs exists: What if agent A is right [...]?
In such circumstances agent Bwill experience an (extra) expected surprise, different
from that of agent A, and, equivalent to KL(Q ‖ P ). If eventual zeroes of P and
Q are associated to the same events, KL(P ‖ Q) divergence is finite and contained
in the zero one interval. KL(P ‖ Q) tends to infinity when the distribution Q, our
so-called approximation, imputes 0 probability mass to some events that have non
null probabilities in the distribution hypothesized to be true P . This situation can
be assimilated to a state of extreme expected surprise, or radical uncertainty. It is
equivalent to a situation in which the aforesaid agent A, self-questioning his beliefs
in relation to those of another agent (hypothesized to be true), imagines the surprise-
effect of the potential realization of an event which he considered almost impossible,
given his prior subjective beliefs Q, but which, according to the communicated be-
liefs of agent A, which are hypothesized to be true, could happen with non-null
probability.
1.2.4 Uncertainty in cognitive sciences
from an economist’s perspective
In the following section we will briefly review how uncertainty is conceptualized
and studied in the cognitive sciences. We will try to highlight shared paradigms, in
relation to previously described uncertainty frameworks.
The neurological characterizations of uncertainty
To identify the neurological characterizations of states of (self-declared) uncertainty,
Harris et al.[256] employed functional neuroimaging. In their experimental setting,
people were asked to "judge written statements to be true (belief), false (disbelief), or
undecidable (uncertainty)". The objective of the study was to "characterize belief, dis-
belief, and uncertainty in a content-independent manner", by including statements from
a "wide range of categories: autobiographical, mathematical, geographical, religious, ethi-
cal, semantic, and factual". The results of the study clearly evidenced that, subjects
which declared that the belief attribute of a statement was undecidable "differentially
activated distinct regions of the prefrontal and parietal cortices, as well as the basal gan-
glia", with respect to when the state of belief or disbelief were declared. Therefore,
from a neurological point of view, the 2nd order belief characterization called "un-
certainty" is observable and clearly distinguishable from that of conscious belief and
disbelief, such a meta-cognitive process has a physical counterpart, i.e. associated
phenomenon, therefore it is not only a conceptual human construct.
Additional research from the neural sciences[257–259], has confirmed this view and
evidenced that responses of the human brain to (higher-order) uncertainty, in par-
ticular ambiguity, are clearly distinguishable from those caused by risk, i.e. choices
among predefined gambles in a formal and explicit probability-space. In particu-
lar, neurologists[260–262] have found that activity in the inferior frontal gyrus and
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posterior parietal cortex is significantly higher when confronted to uncertainty (am-
biguity or ignorance) compared to risk, they conclude that these regions may be
involved in searches for hidden/simulated evidence during expectations formation
or outcome anticipation tasks under (higher-order) uncertainty. Neural responses to
situations of higher-order uncertainties, with reference to the activation of the pos-
terior parietal cortex, posterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior insula,
suggest that higher-order and strategic uncertainties, are neurologically similar phe-
nomena, clearly distinguishable from risk, i.e. the first-order uncertainties emerging
during economic gambles, when gambles are known. Uncertainty and risk, are not
only different from a mental and epistemic perspective, they are also distinct neuro-
logical phenomena.
The psychological origins and implications of uncertainties
After World War II, psychologists, through their experimental analysis approach,
started filling the gap of uncertainty theories and frameworks in relation to other
fields of knowledge[68, 92, 93, 95, 127, 263–273]. In particular with reference to the-
ories of risk and expected utility from economics, and, measures of entropy from
communication and information sciences.
In 1957, the experimental psychologist and philosopher Daniel Berlyne, in a work
titled Uncertainty And Conflict[274], illustrated almost perfectly the process of in-
creasing dependencies and contagion between the humanae scientiae, occurring at
that time. In particular, in relation to the analysis and representation of uncertainty
phenomena. Berlyne claimed that emerging psychological information theory was
"a type of theory in the scientific sense: it applies information-theory measures to phenom-
ena within the purview of psychology and uses information-theory language to formulate
laws or hypotheses with testable implications about behavior. [...] The phenomena that con-
cern behavior theory consist, in fact, of two sets that can be partitioned into subsets with
associated probabilities, namely stimuli and responses. The language of information theory
is therefore, in principle, applicable to everything within the competence of behavior theory.
[...] measures as "amount of information," "uncertainty," and "relative uncertainty" can
be applied. [...] Reaction time, retention of verbal material, and accuracy of psychophysical
judgment, to cite examples, appear to be functions of "uncertainty" and "amount of trans-
mitted information." [...] An observer can compute information-theory measures from data
not accessible to the individuals he is observing. But there is not likely to be much connection
between these measures and variables of psychological importance [, like uncertainty], unless
there is some isomorphism between the situation as viewed by the observer and the situation
as it impinges on the observed organism [... these] observed response tendencies [to stimuli,
can be considered] "reaction potentials". Cognitive behavior theories would describe them
as "expectations" of the consequent stimuli, and the "expectation" resembles the "reaction
potential" insofar as both imply the occurrence of a particular response, if certain additional
conditions are met". Berlyne also linked psychological conflict and competing tenden-
cies to entropy and utility as follows :" if we examine the information theorist’s formula
for "uncertainty" or "entropy", we find that it satisfies the first five of our requirements for
a degree-of-conflict function, but not the sixth. It increases with the number of alternative
responses and is at a maximum when their strengths are equal. But it does not vary with
their absolute strengths [... Entropy] can be regarded as an indication of the "complexity"
of a conflict, or of the difficulty that an observer would have in predicting which of the con-
flicting responses will be the first to occur. It does not reflect the "scale" of the conflict,
Talking About Uncertainty - Carlo R. M. A. Santagiustina 39
Chapter 1. Uncertainty: reviewing the unknown
which depends on the energy invested in the competing response tendencies. There may be
a temptation to relate these two components to the utility and probability of-outcome factors
that must be taken into account in decision theory." Finally, Berlyne related uncertainty
to states of metacognitive activation, like doubt, perplexity and ambiguity as fol-
lows: "Other words that seem apposite to situations that call for investigatory behavior are
"doubt", "perplexity", and "ambiguity." These words likewise imply some degree of behav-
ioral conflict; they indicate that different aspects of a situation evoke discordant reactions or
else that a particular reaction is called forth by one aspect and inhibited by another. They are
opposite in meaning to words like "clear" and "distinct", which generally imply that certain
response tendencies have come, through discriminatory learning, to predominate over their
competitors. "Doubtful", "perplexing", or "ambiguous" stimulus situations are usually also
cases of high "uncertainty" in the information-theory sense, both because the subject cannot
predict very successfully what the future behavior or the hidden properties of the entities will
be, and because observers will not be able to predict very successfully how he will react to
them."
In the years that followed, the representation of uncertainty as a source of psycholog-
ical conflict emerging from communication and metacognition[14, 15, 275] was fur-
ther explored, and implemented to multi-agent frameworks and experiments[276–
278, 278, 279, 279, 280]. These works showed that uncertainty emerges in relation
to metacognitive processes undertook to evaluate, and eventually correct, belief and
knowledge systems used to represent the world, in relation to signals communi-
cated by other agents or coming directly from the environment. Uncertainty is this
framework appears as a psychological conflict at the metacognitive level in relation
to learning and coordination problems. This view of uncertainty is a cognitivist
transposition of the notion of strategic uncertainty, which in the cognitive frame-
work acquires not only a subjective perspective, but also, a social one. These works
show that eliciting and measuring higher-order uncertainty, during individual and
social metacongition processes, is the key to explain observed deviations from the
EU hypothesis framework at the individual and aggregate level.
A very recent stream of psychological literature, linked to the latter, has focused on
the cognitive relation between uncertainty, variance/bias tradeoffs and learning in
open systems[281–286]. This area of research, pioneered by the German psychologist
Gerd Gigerenzer[10, 287–289], clearly distinguishes optimal action in small worlds,
with respect to optimal action in large worlds. Large worlds that, given their com-
plexity and openness, are intrinsically more "uncertain" than the former. Where by
uncertain we do not refer to physical indeterminacies, but to the frequency and in-
tensity of states of metacognitive uncertainty, i.e. extreme or untollerable expected
surprise. This stream of literature clearly evidenced that, rationally optimal action in
the the "two worlds" rarely coincide. Therefore, rationally optimal decision-making
heuristics and metaheuristics to be used in small worlds should be different from that
used for rational decision-making in large worlds. For example, DeMiguel et al. [290]
have shown that Markowitzs Nobel prize-winning mean-variance portfolio alloca-
tion model[291], performed worse than the "naive" 1/N risk diversification heuristic
when applied to real financial asset price time-series.
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1.3 Communication, metacognition, uncertainty and beliefs
revision
In the following section, we will use very recent literature, from the cognitive and
social sciences, to show in which terms uncertainty states are associated to the ac-
tivation of higher levels of cognition, through which agents try to solve decision-
making and sense-making problems, at the epistemic level, under imperfect infor-
mation. As we will show these processes are undertaken through communication in
groups and/or social networks. We are particularly interested in the social embed-
dedness of these metacognitive processes, and, on the relation between inter-agent
doxastic communication and epistemic uncertainty, but also, on the role of the lat-
ter in belief revision. We will show why self and social metacognition processes are
necessary conditions for the commensuration, mitigation and resolution of states of
uncertainty in aware intelligent systems, which in our case are human agents and
their societies. We will show how, aware intelligent systems which are endowed
with epistemic beliefs (priors) concerning their environment, are able to review the
latter after communication, to locally reduce epistemic uncertainty, conditionally on
their priors and preferences, and, on beliefs communicated by others; without "loos-
ing", through falsification, all prior knowledge that is not perfectly compatible with
"evidence" received while communicating with other agents. We will put in relation
our findings to the social embeddedness of expectations revision, and, we will link
the latter to the Keynesian notion of conventional beliefs and expectations, and, their
role as knowledge compression device used for coordination.
Searching for a mental mechanism for epistemic signal-noise separation
In the last decades, human knowledge and belief systems have been extensively
studied both in relation to cognition[292–294] and metacognition[17, 37, 295–297].
The study of metacognition concerns cognition about cognition, including, but not
limited to, normative and sensemaking matters, like truth value judgements, justi-
fications and updating of epistemic beliefs[298–301]. In the cognitivist framework
that we will illustrate, uncertainty can be seen as a -latent- property emerging from
metacognition[275, 302, 303], undertook by human agents in relation to commu-
nication processes[36] and the epistemic surprise they generate[14, 34, 304]. This
because, to be epistemically valued, non-metacognitively-denoised (doxastic) mes-
sages received by agents through communication, also called perceptions of be-
liefs[305], are, in epistemic terms, at first and by default assumed to be true, hence
they immediately become themeter of judgement of one’s prior epistemic beliefs[301],
i.e. knowledge. Because, a-priori to metacognition, the latent claims that are under
investigation are our epistemic beliefs, and not, aware percepts of the outer world,
which are considered evidence. However, a-posteriori, once epistemic beliefs are
updated through metacognitive processes, new evidence is separated in a metacog-
nitively cleaned epistemic-signal, the a-posteriori believed-to-be "true" content of
(doxastic) messages, and, a residual epistemic-noise, the a-posteriori believed-to-
be "false" content of (doxastic) messages. Where the epistemic-signal is that part
of evidence which is a-posteriori non-dissonant to, and integrated into, reviewed
beliefs, whose surprise effects were reduced through metacognition. Whereas, the
epistemic-noise is that part of evidence which is a-posteriori dissonant and orthogo-
nal with respect to reviewed beliefs; whose surprise effects were not reduced through
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metacognition. Epistemic-noise can be considered the information waste given re-
viewed epistemic beliefs. Epistemic-noise represents quasi-information, that is, evi-
dence which produces a irreducible surprise effect, but not also, an epistemic effect,
in terms of changes in epistemic beliefs and hence of optimal behaviour inferred
from those beliefs. Therefore, it can be considered as the degree of communicating
and learning inefficiency. Epistemic-noise represents latent information that is not
a-priori false, but which is a-posteriori considered unreliable for necessity of reduc-
ing as much as possible expected surprise through belief revision, conditionally on
all available evidence, priors and preferences. The epistemic signal-to-noise ratio,
conditional on reviewed beliefs, represents the expected surprise, or the expectation
of epistemic disappointment[306], which we consider assimilable to the Knightian
and Keynesian views of uncertainty.
Agents’ epistemic beliefs can be therefore seen as a dynamic compressed version
of past evidence that one has been sensible to, and which hasn’t been knowingly
and instrumentally considered false/unreliable [307–310]. If individuals were not
averse to "feelings" of surprise, which is an attribute of the relation between evidence
and beliefs, they would have no pressure to learn by changing their beliefs in a
subjectively optimal way. The epistemic notion of truth and falsity of information
can therefore be (also) considered instrumental to the reduction of metacognitive
uncertainty[311].
Metacognition
The concept of metacognition includes, among others, processes of knowledge falsi-
fication and updating and their ensuing effects on beliefs and expectations reviewal.
As claimed by Nagel[312], in The View From Nowhere, through cognition "we can add
to our knowledge of the world by accumulating information at a given levelby extensive
observation from one standpoint", however, "we can raise our understanding to a new
level only if we examine that relation between the world and ourselves which is responsi-
ble for our prior understanding, and form a new conception that includes a more detached
understanding of ourselves, of the world, and of the interaction between them", the latter
metacognitive processes are generally referred to as epistemic cognition[313].
Metacognition is considered the system of control of cognitive processes at various
hierarchical levels[314]. Through metacognition, cognitive processes are horizon-
tally aggregated and recursivily represented and iterated at higher levels of abstrac-
tion[315]. Lower level of cognition provide the information that are processed by
higher levels. Through metacognitive control mechanism lower levels of cognition
are hence steered. Phenomena of neural hierarchical aggregation, reflexivity and
recursivity, somehow isomorphic to the concept of metacognition, have been exten-
sively identified in neurological studies, as an organizational principle of human cor-
tical networks and functions[316–319]. Experimental results have shown that, under
situations of increasing perceptual discrimination difficulty quantified through ob-
jective measures, the descriptions of undertaken tasks by agents, before knowing
their performance, revealed "reflexive self-awareness in the sense that humans are aware
of themselves as cognitive monitors [...] responses were prompted by feelings of uncertainty
and doubt about the correct answer on the trial"[320], which were significantly increas-
ing with the perceptual discrimination difficulty of the task. Metacognition appears
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to be a critical factor in the determination of the outcomes of lower cognitive pro-
cesses under situations of objective environment complexity[321, 322] or informa-
tion overload[36, 323–325]. Metacognitive uncertainty monitoring ability, elicited
both before and throughout the execution of experiment tasks, was identified as a
one of the most relevant and statistically significant predictors of accuracy improve-
ments in learning[326], and also, of the precision of the self judgement of one’s ex-
pected and actual performance, respectively, after the description of the task, and,
after its execution but before knowing the objective performance measurements.
Given the above stated findings related to metacognition, it has been argued that ra-
tionality cannot simply be reduced to the use of logic but requires agency: "Agency
is intrinsically and unavoidably subjective in its nature but reflection on and coordination of
ones reasons and reasoning can enhance rationality and objectivity. This enables the progress
of rational agents through qualitatively distinct levels of rationality. These are [...] largely
levels of epistemic cognition. Logic is important in this view, but rationality is fundamentally
metacognitive rather than logical. Our knowledge and control of our inferential processes is
not limited to logical inferences. Even in the domain of logic, what makes us rational is our
metalogical understanding about the epistemic nature and role of logic and our correspond-
ing ability to distinguish, coordinate, and interpret logical inferences, not just make them
mindlessly along with inferences of all sorts. More generally, epistemic cognition supports
better inferences but it is the epistemic cognition itself that is central to our rationality, not
the correctness of the resulting inferences as determined by an external expert or standard."
[327]
During metacognitive processes, rationality may be therefore seen as a form ofmeta-
subjective objectivity[328–331]: "subjectivity need not be construed as a realm of idiosyn-
cratic ideas and feelings. Rather, it may be seen as a property of cognitive actions (reasoning,
remembering, perceiving, etc.) that take place, as they must, from some point of view [priors,
preferences and evidence]. Objectivity, on this view, is not a realm of absolute truth and
rigorous logic distinct from the realm of subjectivity. Rather, subjectivity and objectivity
are complementary poles of the relationship of knowing. Given that knowing always takes
place from some point of view, ones knowledge is always a function of ones viewpoint and
thus unavoidably subjective. To the extent that knowledge is constrained by a reality distinct
from the knower, however, it is also a function of that reality and thus, to that extent, objec-
tive. [...] continuing self-reflections [...] never transcend subjectivity but nevertheless may
allow increasing objectivity. If we define the reflective analysis and reconstruction of ones
subjectivity as metasubjectivity, we can then define rationality as metasubjective objectivity.
It is important to emphasize that psychological reflection takes place in the course of transac-
tions[communications] with ones environment. From an external point of view, the object of
reflection is not pure subjectivity but a subject-object (or subject-subject) relationship. The
construction of that external (metasubjective) point of view enables explicit understanding
and reconstruction of the previously implicit subject-object relationship. [...] "[332]
In cognitive psychology, epistemic beliefs are not simply subjective beliefs to which
agents commit, they are dynamic mental constructs reviewed and justified, to one-
self and to others, by spontaneously or voluntarily probing the environment and
other agents in search of evidence. If evidence is perfectly coherent with epistemic
priors agents experience no surprise, they are metacognitively certain about the
truthfulness of their beliefs. Metacognitive certainty refers to "the extent to which
a person is convinced of a belief and views the belief as valid. Applied to the self, two people
might each belief that they are outgoing (primary thought). However, one of these people
might be convinced that this belief is correct, whereas the other person might hold some
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reservations about the validity of this belief (both secondary thoughts). When a person holds
a self-view with high rather than low certainty, the selfview tends to be more predictive of
behavior and information processing, more stable over time, and more resistant to change.
[...] Furthermore, when [agents] interact with someone whose expectations [...] countered
their self-beliefs, those low (but not high) in certainty changed their behavior to align with
their partners expectations."[333]
Themore prior beliefs of agents are improbable given the evidence that they observe,
themore they experience surprise. If an agent is uncertainty averse, surprise acts as a
"epistemological pressure" for beliefs revision, to render beliefs more probably "true"
with respect to observed evidence, and by so doing reduce a-posteriori uncertainty,
i.e. expected surprise, conditional on beliefs and collected evidence.
Interruptions to lower level cognitive processes are the result of highly discrepant
events with respect to schema or prior expectations: "these events triggered not only
feeling of difficulty but surprise as well. This is an important finding because it reveals the
close relation between metacognition, in the form of feeling of difficulty, and emotions, such
as surprise. Surprise serves the relocation of attention from the prevalent schema to the dis-
crepant event. Feeling of difficulty along with surprise provide the input for better appraisal
of the demands of the situation as well as for better control decisions."[326] In the psycho-
evolutionary surprise framawork[334], it has claimed that "the most important func-
tional property of conscious states is widely thought to be their system-wide accessibility
and their being (thereby) poised for exerting global control. The information that the sur-
prise feeling reliably provides concerns the occurrence and intensity of mental interruption
and/or the occurrence and degree of a schema-discrepancy. Note that, on both counts, the
formation provided by the surprise feeling can be said to be metacognitive in character that
is, it is information about, respectively, the person’s cognitive processes or the status of his
or her belief system. Hence, on both counts, surprise can be called a "metacognitive" or a
"metarepresentational" feeling. Taken together, these points suggest that the function of the
surprise experience is to make this information globally available [...] to exercise global con-
trol specifically, to influence goal-directed actions such as epistemic search. Surprise elicits
curiosity because it informs the conscious self about the occurrence of schema-discrepancies
or of mental interrupts. [...] Subjective experience of surprise [...] differs in crucial respects
from that of other emotions because, in contrast to the latter, it is hedonically neutral, and
the information that it provides is uniquely metarepresentational."
Metacognitive certainty and metacognitive uncertainty are non necessarily symmet-
rical concepts: if on one side, metacognitive certainty refers to the extent to which an
agent considers his beliefs under evaluation to be "true", from a higher-order belief
perspective. On the other side, metacognitive uncertainty can refer to the lack of
the aforementioned (higher order) epistemic characterizations of evaluated (lower-
order) beliefs, or, their truth value of being "false", or, their truth value being "true"
while contemporaneously acknowledging/believing that there are some known un-
knowns that, once known, could imply a revision of present beliefs. Under the latter
perspective, agents can be considered sceptical towards their own epistemic beliefs,
and, the latter are seen as instrumental and therefore precarious forms of knowl-
edge, used to reduce as much as possible uncertainty, by limiting one’s own free-
dom and volatility of representation, given observed evidence. Therefore, we can
see metacognitive procedures for epistemic beliefs revision as metaheuristics, used
to, dynamically, keep expected-surprise as low as possible conditionally on prefer-
ences, priors and evidence. Where by preferences we mean: aversion to uncertainty,
aversion to risk and preferences for states of the world, in terms of foreseen utility as
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a function of events or states of the world. As new evidence becomes available, epis-
temic beliefs and uncertainty change in relation to preferences in an optimal way.
Social metacognition as a mechanism for uncertainty reduction
The analysis of the interdependencies between social metacognition and uncertainty
is no new stream of literature. More than half a century ago, the social psychologist
Leon Festinger claimed that "individuals understandings of the world are held as true to
the extent that they can be affirmed by some social group"[335].
Two decades before, Muzafer Sherif, illustrated his view on the effects of the embed-
dedness of beliefs in social structures and their communication networks. In Group
Norms and Conformity[336], which soon after became the founding pillar of modern
social psychology, Sherif claimed that: "an opinion, a belief, an attitude is perceived as
correct, valid, and proper to the extent that it is anchored in a group of people with similar
beliefs, opinions, and attitudes.[... Once it] is standardized and becomes common property of
the group [... in which it is considered] objective reality. Sherif also explained the social
conditions and processes under which beliefs and norms are reviewed. He did so by
linking conventional beliefs reviewal to metacognitive uncertainty: "when there are
[cognitive] stresses and tensions in the lives of many people in the community, the equilib-
rium of life ceases to be stable, and the air is pregnant with possibilities. [...] Such a delicate,
unstable situation is the fertile soil for the rise of doubts [...] The doubt and the challenge
which no one would listen to before, now become effective. These are times of transition from
one state to another [...] The transition is not simply from the orderliness of one set of norms
to chaos, but from one set of norms to a new set of norms through a stage of uncertainty".
In relation to the aforementioned claims by Sherif, it has been recently found that
signals of states of surprise and uncertainty, elicited by agents in groups and so-
cial networks through natural language, "support event analysis by communicating to
others the mental state of the sender and in this way solicit their help with explaining the
event"[337]. Agents participate to group or social metacognition processes, precisely
because these processes offer to their participants rich information environments,
through which beliefs elicited or communicated by others can be used as elastic
doxastic supports to review or stabilize epistemic beliefs in a locally optimal way:
"Peoples judgments regarding the meaning of their metacognitive experiences can impact
other, downstream judgments. What is more, peoples judgments regarding the meaning of
their metacognitive experiences are malleable, indicating that people who are having similar
metacognitive experiences may show very different ultimate judgments as a function of their
lay theories linking these experiences with meaning"[333]
According to uncertainty-identity theory[338], social groups that are very homoge-
neous and polarized from a belief[339, 340] and preference[341, 342] homophily per-
spective, can provide a stabilizing support for the beliefs of their members. Through
doxastic communication, beliefs are attracted towards the belief barycenter of the
group[343]. Therefore, an agent that is able to elicit the distribution of beliefs within
groups to which he is connected through social ties, can target his communication
processes towards those groups and agents that exhibit the greatest doxastic affinity
with him; with respect to the concentration of probability mass of expectations of
group members on the states of the world that are preferred by the agent[343, 344].
Agents will therefore be "socially" and hence doxastically attracted by the largest
groups whose norms and expectations are closer to their "ideal" ones. Hogg and
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Blaylock[345] have found that the more a group is large and doxastically polarized,
the more it "provide[s] a sense of shared reality to their members [... these groups] serve the
function of reducing these persons uncertainty. Accordingly, the greater members need for
certain knowledge about the world, the greater should be their attraction to groups with a
firm sense of shared reality. Such epistemic need for firm knowledge has been termed the need
for cognitive closure. One may expect, therefore, that when individuals need for cognitive
closure is high, groups that are able to provide coherence, consistency, order, and predictabil-
ity to belief systems acquire particular appeal [... Where] the need for [cognitive] closure
is defined as the desire for a quick and firm answer to a question and the aversion toward
ambiguity or uncertainty. Ample evidence exists that a heightened need for closure leads
to a seizing and freezing on available information and on judgments that such information
implies".
Moreover, those events that generate high levels of surprise because considered im-
possible or almost impossible, have been shown to "elevate peoples need for cognitive
closure" because through closure agents try to reduce actual and expected surprise,
i.e. uncertainty. Finally, "there is much support for the notion that a heightened need for
closure leads to a syndrome of group centrism, including pressures toward uniformity, rejec-
tion of opinion deviates, in-group favoritism, out- group derogation, and the endorsement of
autocratic leadership.[345] Therefore, when agents are very much averse to surprise,
the occurrence of black swan events[206, 255, 346] at first destabilizes, in doxastic
reviewal pressure terms, the epistemic beliefs of agents which experience extreme
surprise. Hence, it produces an even more deleterious and long-lasting effect on the
structure of social networks and on the intensity of communications. Agents being
put under pressure by uncertainty exhibit an increasing need for cognitive closure.
However, such a need for closure, while temporally mitigating expected surprise by
reducing average information flows, can further polarize society, from the point of
view of its degree of doxastic group segregation. Doxastic segregation which clearly
doesn’t favour inter-group communication and limits the spreading and dissemina-
tion of locally emerging evidence across the social system. Limiting the forecasting
accuracy of agents, and therefore, increasing the (unseen) surprise potential that the
future holds for them.
According to J. G. March and H. A. Simon[347] communications across groups and
social networks act as uncertainty absorption mechanisms: "Uncertainty absorption
takes place when inferences are drawn from a body of evidence and the inferences, instead
of the evidence itself, are then communicated." Therefore, as suggested by Baecker[348],
communication can be seen as the process of "determination of the indeterminate but de-
terminable", i.e. the epistemic beliefs, with the aim of "understanding the determinate",
i.e. received doxastic signals.
The philosopher Donald Davidson, claimed[349, 350] that human rationality can be
better understood as the (a-priori) fitting of beliefs to evidence, and, the (a-posteriori)
judgement of observed evidence, in terms of signals and noises, on the basis of (pos-
terior) beliefs. Where beliefs represent and characterize the patternization and causal
justification of evidence. Resulting beliefs become beliefs of knowledge, and are ele-
vated to the status of epistemic "truth", until new evidence contradicts, reveals to be
unprobable, or, rationally non-justifiable, with respect to expected patterns of new
evidence. According to this view through rational sense-making beliefs become jus-
tifiable and hence transferable to the mind of another human, who can hence judge
his own (prior) beliefs in relation to recieved doxastic signals, and, eventually con-
verge towards them. By so doing, the process of patternization and causal justi-
fication of evidence, including communicated doxastic evidence, is carried further
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in terms of epistemic completeness and signal-noise ratio[351]. Davidson also sug-
gested that the same sort of relation occurs in a single mind through metacogni-
tion[352]. Luhman[353–357] also considered social interactions and ensuing uncer-
tainty as a composite mechanism through which conventional beliefs shifts occur
in groups and social systems. Tensions between conventional beliefs and commu-
nicated information/beliefs determines the re-negotiation of epistemic signal-noise
separation mechanisms, i.e. the new shared truths and doxastic conventions nec-
essary to coordinate the representations and forecasts of real-world phenomena. If
on one hand, uncertainty is necessary for the autopoietic reorganization of societies
and for their adaptation to changing information environments, on the other hand,
society members cannot tolerate excessive levels of uncertainty and hence try to in-
visibilize sources of uncertainty by reviewing their doxastic endowments for the
minimization of contingent surprise, given observed evidence. Under this perspec-
tive double contingency[358]may be viewed as amechanism to reduce differences in
epistemic beliefs, while contemporaneusly surprise emerges and is hence contracted
through iterated communication and beliefs reviewal processes. Society itself can
therefore be seen as an "operative oscilation of uncertainty and organization"[359].
Natural Vs formal language, and, the granularity of communicated uncertain(ty)
signals
"Are information and uncertainty part of each other?"[360]
Uncertainty reporting and elicitation schema[361–366] have been extensively and
increasingly used in the last decades, for aiding NGOs, international organizations,
governments and corporates, to include experts’ judgements in formal decision-
making framework under "imperfect information". As pointed out by Parker and
Risbey[170], there are two basic requirements that uncertainty reports should meet,
generally referred-to as faithfulness and completeness:
• faithfulness: "an uncertainty report should accurately describe what the agent be-
lieves the extent of current uncertainty [i.e. expected surprise] to be; it should not
imply that uncertainty [i.e. expected surprise] is greater than, less than or otherwise
different from what the agent actually believes it to be";
• completeness: "an uncertainty report should take account of all significant sources
of uncertainty [i.e. expected surprise], and should consider all available (relevant)
information when doing so";
In formal uncertainty reporting[367], it is often assumed that the representation of
uncertainty should take the form of a standardized schema, regardless of the extent
of available information. Often the assumption is that uncertainty should be rep-
resented using precise first-order probabilities. Outcomes of interest are generally
presented through probability distributions, specified over the values of a parameter
or variable considered possible. In these formal uncertainty representation settings,
natural language terms are also codified to avoid possible meaning ambiguities, de-
rived from the common interpretation of a language, which not necessarily corre-
sponds to its use in a "specialized" field. In addition, confidence bounds are added to
estimated probabilities to reveal the imprecision or volatility of these inferred num-
bers. If, on one hand, these formal uncertainty representation schemes are powerful
instruments to commensurate and elicit uncertainty; on the other hand, "metrics to
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assess information may engender confusion when low confidence levels are matched with
very high/low likelihoods that have implicit high confidence".[368].
Evidence shows that real-world experts, especially those that study human systems
and their outcomes, like central bank governors or military councilors of govern-
ments, publicly describe their degree of confidence in their judgements with coarse-
grained probabilistic/possibilistic expressions, often using natural language[369–
374]. It must be remarked, that experts are not considered experts on the basis of
their above-average degree of confidence in their judgments, but, on the basis of
their capacity to estimate with high precision their degree of uncertainty in relation
to the latter, i.e. their expected surprise conditional on their epistemic beliefs. Hence,
if those who are called experts voluntarily choose to use coarse-grained judgements,
then, we can hypothesize that, conditional on their beliefs that also concern the re-
ceiver of the message and noise sources of the medium, such vague/coarse-grained
signals must a-priori have been considered the optimal choice to vehicle/convey a
specific message, and its actual information, to targeted receiver(s). By codifying the
desired message in such a way that it has, according to its sender, the highest signal-
noise ratio for the reciever in expected-terms. Moreover, when experts are forced to
formalize probability judgments interesting biases emerge[168, 176, 375–379]: some-
times they spontaneously use numeric intervals for probabilities, in other cases, they
use numeric probability values in such a way that the number of digits of elicited
probabilities is proportional to their confidence on the information set used infer
that probability judgement. Both, the number of digits and the probability inter-
val, are implicit representations of higher-order uncertainties, which are evidenced
when one tries to represent formally the sources of his expected-surprise, in nu-
meric first-order probabilistic terms. Higher-order uncertainties can therefore be
"hidden" within first-order probability judgement. So maybe, granularity is not al-
ways a crude approximation of information, as we often assume, but reflects the
granularity of epistemic beliefs used in the judgement, and therefore, it could be the
optimal information encoding scheme for describing the actual degree of uncertainty
of agents, not only experts, given their beliefs.
If we think to information from Shannon’s perspective[242], which viewed the latter
as a measure of surprise. Then, when an agent sends, to a target group of agents,
a message of "uncertainty" concerning the state/outcome of a (named) system/pro-
cess; for example: by using the noun "uncertainty" in relation to a forthcoming deci-
sion of monetary policy, like the fixing of the official lending interest rate by a central
bank; he elicits and signals his epistemic beliefs on the issue. The noun "uncertainty"
must be clearly distinguished from the adjective "uncertain", because the former con-
veys a message on epistemic beliefs that is not exclusively personal, but collective,
whereas the latter doesn’t. "Uncertainty" relates the beliefs of all parties involved
in the communication. When an agent sends a message of radical "uncertainty", he
jointly elicits and signals his epistemic beliefs concerning:
1. his own and others’ epistemic beliefs. Where "others" represents the agent(s)
to which the message is addressed;
2. the fact that he considers the latter doxastic endowments (1) totally unfit to
rationally infer/anticipate the state/outcome of a (named) system/process;
3. the fact that, given (1,2), he anticipates his own and others’ extreme/infinite
surprise, to be expected in relation to the (actual or expected) state/outcome
of the aforementioned system/outcome;
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Therefore when one communicates, to a target group of individuals, the occurrence
of a state of, so called, radical "uncertainty", in relation to a real-world system/pro-
cess and its state/outcome; wemust think of it as amessagewith infinite entropy po-
tential. Because in such circumstances, the sender wants to convey to the receiver(s)
an idea similar to the following:
On the basis of my known knowns and known unknowns concerning the [actual or expected]
state/outcome of a system/process [the grammatical complement of the word "uncertainty"]
and about your epistemic beliefs concerning it; the message that i want to give you, to help
you reduce the surprise that awaits you in relation to the observation of the latter state/out-
come, is that neither you nor I, given our epistemic beliefs, are, at the moment, able to imag-
ine, identify or attribute expectancy/probability mass, to the state/outcome that is more likely
to occur, therefore, you as I should expect the unexpectable and prepare to it, by speculating
as much as possible on the latter system/process and collecting evidence that at the moment
neither you nor I have evaluated or had access to.
Such a message is by construction instrumental to social metacognition, because it
refers to the senders’ epistemic state, but also to the receiver(s)’ epistemic state(s), as
represented by the sender. The interesting point is that the message is elastic/mal-
leable from an surprisal effect point of view, even if it has infinite surprise potential.
Because:
• if the receiver is uncertainty averse, he will prefer to avoid as much as possible
surprise in relation to such message. He can obtain this effect by consider-
ing the latter a declaration of total ignorance of the sender, with respect to a
(named) system/process, and/or, his beliefs concerning the beliefs of the re-
ceivers. The receiver can therefore interpret the message simply as a request
for help/information, which has nothing to do with his own capacity to infer
the state/outcome of the (named) system/process;
• on the other hand, if the receiver is uncertainty seeking, he will prefer to think
that, the sender has "complete" knowledge of knowables and unknowables,
of both, himself (the sender) and the receiver, and therefore, his suggestion
should be totally embraced. The receiver would experience extreme/infinite
surprise, and, should consider all states/outcomes to which he previously at-
tributed probability mass as almost impossible, and, identify states/outcomes
that were considered almost impossible, or not even considered in his out-
come/state space, and attribute to the latter the whole probability mass;
• a third path is also possible, if the receiver is uncertainty neutral, he will prefer
to improve, as much as possible, his epistemic situation, his feeling of know-
ing, conditionally on his priors (those of the receiver), concerning the degree
of knowledge that the sender has about himself (the receiver) and about the
(named) system/process. Information/surprise extracted from the message
will in this case totally depend on the reciever’s priors;
We can imagine a situation in which a uncertainty averse human agent, objectively
incapable of projecting colors in the hue, saturation, and brightness continuous-
space, is obliged to play a game in which he has to extract every minute a ball from
an urn, which he is told to contain coloured balls, of an unknown number and of
unknown colors. Probably, to reduce his expected surprise, before extracting any
ball he will attribute, through his beliefs, non-null probability/expectancy mass to
colors he already knows, maybe through an uninformative discrete prior. However,
imagine that the agent has extracted 100 balls from the urn, and at each extraction,
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the extracted ball is of a (objectively) different color with respect to those previously
extracted, at a given moment the better epistemic strategy to reduce surprise, is to
attribute all the expectancy/probability mass, in equal parts, to those colors that the
agent can imagine, which haven’t yet occurred, and, attributing mass 0 to those that
have already occurred. Now imagine that all colors that the agent can imagine have
occurred, to try to anticipate through his beliefs the extraction, and, reduce ensuing
surprise, he will have to attribute mass not to imaginable colors, but to their com-
plement, the set of unimaginable colors, which are only unimaginable and not also
indiscernible. Therefore, having no other alternative he will attribute probability
mass to the empty set, that will represent perceptually discernible but unimaginable
events. The only valuable knowledge for him in such situation, is his awareness of
the existence of these unimaginable unknowns, this is precisely what radical uncer-
tainty represents. Now imagine that another agent enters the room and asks to the
player what is the best forecasting strategy to play the game, if the two agents share
the same imagination capacity, the most informative message he can give him will
probably be:
prepare yourself for radical uncertainty!
As we have seen in this section, communication, in particular the communication of
states of uncertainty and radical uncertainty, plays an essential role in human social
metacognition, feelings of surprise and beliefs reviewal: if contingent communica-
tion activity is ignored, it will be impossible to understand and predict the degree of
uncertainty of socially embedded agents, because posterior beliefs and uncertainty
are mutually defined through social metacognition and its underlying communica-
tion and surprise[380]. Society is therefore the structure that creates the"common
context of reference that render shared knowledge and consensus a possibility". Therefore,
crowd sourced measures of civil society uncertainty, based on real world communi-
cation among agents, should be developed to capture the magnitude and effects of
the above mentioned phenomena, and estimate their possible economic effects.
1.4 A brief discussion on, and proposal for, endogenizing
uncertainty and doxastic communication in economics
On the basis of previously reviewed works, we propose a small contribution to the
existing Neoclassical EU framework. Through a change to the expected utility func-
tion, which allows to endogenize expectation communication and social metacongi-
tion processes, and to show how, on the basis of the latter, agents can jointly update
their beliefs, maximize their expected utility and reduce their expected surprise, i.e.
uncertainty. Our vision has been inspired by recent works by Golman and Lowen-
stein[40–42]. In their works, information-gaps related uncertainty aversion is inte-
grated through the specification of a new utility function; where information utility
corresponds to the preference for clarity over possible answers to questions of in-
terest, related to the awareness of information-gaps. Information-gaps which are
represented by a function of entropy weighted by attention. Through our own re-
formulation of expected-utility, uncertainty can be clearly distinguished from risk,
without requiring to abandon the probabilistic framework for risk commensuration.
This contribution, should be seen as inferred from works described and analysed in
this review. Its implications will be only sketched here, and possibly, more rigor-
ously formalized and explored in future works by the author.
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Expectations communication, EU maximization and uncertainty reduction
We can imagine that, human agents may exploit communicated expectations, i.e.
priors concerning the probabilities of future events, to contemporaneously max-
imize their expected utility and reduce their expected surprise by updating their
beliefs conditional on evidence. Including doxastic evidence concerning others’ ex-
pectations. By so doing agents would indirectly coordinate their expectations with
others, with whom they communicate through markets and social networks. Com-
munication of expectations among agents generates surprise and surprise is the ac-
tivator of metacognition, which determines the emergence of the third dimension of
the problem of choice, as defined by Ellsberg[83], which implies the evaluation of the
nature of "one’s information concerning the relative likelihood of events. What is at issue
[during metacongitive processes] might be called the ambiguity of this information, a quality
depending on the amount, type, reliability and unanimity of information"; but also, the
revision of beliefs to reduce as much as possible uncertainty, conditionally on one’s
preferences.
Under this perspective, agents would choose individually optimal inter-subjective
expectations, on the basis of their preferred trade-offs between:
• preferences for attributing probability mass to events that are more favourable
to them, from which the can (mentally) anticipate the greatest utility;
• preferences for reducing expected surprise, measured as a function of relative
entropy, i.e. Kullback-Leibler divergence, between (optimally chosen) posteri-
ors and priors of their neighbours, with whom they coordinate through expec-
tations communication, and optionally, their own;
This view may be seen as a mathematical transposition of what Allais[82] called
the instrumental deformation of subjective probabilities:"certaines personnes qui ont
confiance en leur etoile sous-estiment la probabilité des évènements qui leur sont défavorables
et surestiment la probabilité des évènements qui leur sont favorables"; jointly with the idea
that "too much choice [concerning probabilities of future events] can produce a paralyzing
uncertainty"[381].
In a simplified version ofwhat should be developed as amulti-agent networkmodel,
agents, expected utility (EU) maximizers, would endogenize probabilistic expecta-
tions, i.e. sets of probabilities of possible events at a given time horizon, using them
as EU maximization arguments. These probabilities should be subject to min-max
constraints determined, for each possible event, by the range of observed probability
values in the probabilistic expectations set containing the prior of the agent and the
priors communicated by other agents with whom there has been communication.
Uncertainty averse agents, would take into account the cost opportunity of -self and
social- metacongitive uncertainty by having, as an additional component in their
expected utility function, a penalty equal to a weighted sum of pairwise Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence, between optimal posterior expectations and the priors of
agents with whom they have communicated, and optionally, their own prior. This
utility penalty represents the cognitive difficulty of holding and relying on a set of
beliefs, concerning the future, which diverge with respect to those held by other
(neighbouring) agents operating in the same environment.
Similar theoretic settings have been previously used to model coordination games
in presence of imperfect information or strategic uncertainty. For example, Golub
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and Jackson[382–384] model the lack of consensus in a dynamic network coordina-
tion game, through a distance of beliefs measure, that has various points in com-
mon, but which is not identical to, the concept and measure of uncertainty that we
have proposed. In their framework, consensus -belief/information coherence in the
network- is reached through an iterated process of beliefs contagion among neigh-
bours. Agents start with different belief sets concerning the distribution of possible
state of the world. They are imperfect sensors, because they receive signals subject
to group-specific random-noise structures. Agents know that they do not perfectly
observe the state of the world, and, that also others do not perfectly observe such a
state. By being aware of the possible imperfection of knowledge derived from local
signals, they are individually and collectively uncertain/doubtful about their un-
derstanding of the world and of events occurring within it. By so doing they exhibit
the individual and social metacognitive capacity that determines a state that wemay
label as uncertainty, as described in the previous sections of this work.
Accordingly, they coordinate on the unknown true state of the world by commu-
nicating with their neighbors. To disentagle signals -of the true state of the world-
from noise, and by so doing, they reduce uncertainty. They synthesize posteriors
by averaging the prior beliefs of their neighbors. Interesting enough, the authors
find that the dynamics of belief convergence in such games can be inferred through
a reduced "representative agent" network model, in which there is only one node
for each type of agent, which allows to approximate consensus distance dynamics
through the simplified framework. The authors claim that an average-based belief
updating mechanism has a number of properties that render it a technically appeal-
ing and empirically plausible assumption[384]:
• it leads distributed network systems of agents to converge to an efficient coor-
dination equilibrium using, iteratively, computationally cost efficient heuris-
tics.
• under some non stringent conditions, concerning size, the group distribution,
the density and the degree of omophily in the network, such an updating
scheme converges -in probability- to fully rational limiting beliefs, i.e. Bayesian
posterior conditional on all agents’ initial information sets;
• it is similar to what the majority of individuals appear to do when placed in-
teracting an experimental social learning setting and in empirical studies;
Relative entropy of communicated expectations-gaps as expected surprise
In our framework, communicated expectations are considered local signals about
the event-space already elaborated by network neighbours and hence integrated in
their probabilistic expectations.
Imagine that there are m agents, jointly communicating to each other their priors
(probabilistic expectations) in a clique, concerning n mutually exclusive and collec-
tively exhaustive events at a given horizon, where the partitioning and horizon is
common knowledge. Since in our setting agents are communicating in a network
through natural language we can imagine that each event is defined by a unique
sequence of words and that, in such circumstances, one event should always be the
complement of the union of all others, therefore the latter event will be definable
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only in relation all others, for example through the words "none of the aforesaid events
will occur". Call P = {P1, . . . , Pm} the set of priors, i.e. expectations before commu-
nication; where Pk represent the discrete distribution of probabilistic expectations
of the kth agent. The prior probability of occurrence of the event j for agent k is
given by Pk(j). In relation to what we have explained in section 1.2.3, we can imag-
ine that, for the kth agent, the sum of all Kullback-Leibler belief divergences with
the priors communicated by agents, including his own: the sum of KL(Px ‖ Pk) for
x ∈ {1, . . . ,m} that we call Aggregate Relative Entropy (ARE), will represent the
aggregate (extra) expected surprise of agent k, in relation to a specific partitioning of
the outcome space, emerging through the process of communication and comparing
of his prior with probabilistic expectations communicated by his neighbours:
ARE(k) = KL(P ‖ Pk)
=
∑
i∈{1,...,m}
KL(Pi ‖ Pk)
=
∑
i∈{1,...,m}
 n∑
j=1
ln
(
Pk(j)
Pi(j)
)
Pi(j)

(1.4.9)
Clearly, it will be sufficient that the kth agent considers one event j almost impossible
(Pk(j) = 0 ) when at least one of the other k − 1 agents considers it possible with
non-null probability (∃i 6= k Pi(j) 6= 0), to experience a state of extreme expected
surprise: ARE(k) = +∞ also called radical uncertainty.
If we divide aggregate relative entropy 1.4.9 by the number of agents with whom kth
agent interacts, we obtain the Mean Relative Entropy (MRE):
MRE(k) =
1
m− 1KL(P ‖ Pk)
=
1
m− 1
∑
i∈{1,...,m}
KL(Pi ‖ Pk)
=
1
m− 1
∑
i∈{1,...,m}
 n∑
j=1
ln
(
Pk(j)
Pi(j)
)
Pi(j)

(1.4.10)
Mean relative entropy represents themean (extra) expected surprise emerging through
the process of communication and comparing of probabilistic expectations with a
neighbouring agent in a communication/social network.
If the kth agent changes his probabilistic expectations after the communication pro-
cess, by choosing a new set of probabilities P postk 6= Pk, the sum of all Kullback-
Leibler divergences between communicated priors, including the prior of the agent
k, and the posterior P postk , called Posterior Aggregate Relative Entropy of (PARE),
will represent the posterior expected surprise of agent k, given his new beliefs P postk ,
in relation to previously communicated expectations and his own prior:
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PARE(k) = KL(P ‖ P postk )
=
∑
i∈{1,...,m}
KL(Pi ‖ P postk )
=
∑
i∈{1,...,m}
 n∑
j=1
ln
(
Pk(j)
post
Pi(j)
)
Pi(j)

(1.4.11)
If PARE(k) < ARE(k) by changing his probabilistic expectations from Pk to P
post
k
the kth agent was able to reduce aggregate relative entropy by (1 − PARE(k)ARE(k) ) ∗ 100
percent, by reviewing his beliefs.
Amodified expected-utility function with expected surpise
If agents are uncertainty averse, to reduce expectations-gaps related uncertainty, i.e.
ARE, resulting from the communication of expectations among agents, they can up-
date their priors to reduce expected surprise. In such a framework posterior expec-
tations would represent individually optimal inter-subjective probabilities of events,
conditionally on preferences and partitioning used in the expectations communica-
tion process. Posterior expectations would take into account the expected surprise
that can emerge in relation to coordination failure, with reference to neighbouring
agents in the social/communication network. Neighbouring agents which, from a
causal point of view, will more likely determine the perceptual/information/doxas-
tic evidence and environment to which an agent will be subject to, and its ensuing
surprise potential. In such a framework the KL penalty, which represents the sub-
jective costs of uncertainty, in terms of aggregate expected surprise, will curve the
expected-utility indifference curves of the agent, in the event-probability space, pro-
ducing individually optimal inter-subjective probability indifference curves. How-
ever, choosable combinations of probabilities will have to respect the probability
laws. In addition, for each event j, with j ∈ {1, ..., n}, probabilities will have to be
contained in the min-max range of "observed" probabilities [min(P(j)),max(P(j))]
for that event, i.e. in the expectations-set of the agent, containing his own and others’
communicated priors. Under some conditions on the distribution of communicated
beliefs/expectations, these indifference curves will be convex, as the classical utility
indifference curves when represented in the goods-quantity space.
We can imagine a round of probabilistic expectations revision to be organized as
follows:
1. Individual observation and expectations updating phase: the agent observes
his environment, collects evidence and reviews his beliefs on the basis of non-
doxastic evidence, using his preferred updatingmechanism, for example: bayesian
updating;We do not explain or refer to this phase through our model
2. Social doxastic communication phase: the agent turns to the social world to
communicate his expectations for a specific common knowledge partitioning
of the outcome-space at a given horizon. By coming to know the probabilis-
tic expectations of others, each agent has the possibility to metacognitively
project himself and his probabilistic expectations in the support delimited by
"observed" upper and lower probability bounds; for each event these are the
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extremum (min and max) values of the set containing probabilities communi-
cated by others and one’s own prior;
3. Social expectations updating phase: The agent maximizes his expected utility
as a function of probabilistic expectations, which, if the agent has an optimistic
future orientation, are individually optimal inter-subjective beliefs used to an-
ticipate future utility. By so doing, he also optimally reduces his uncertainty, in
terms of expected surprise, which perturbs/damages his capacity to anticipate
utility from probabilistic expectations, as explained here below;
The optimal posterior probabilistic expectations P post∗k , which is the vector of poste-
rior probabilities P postk which maximizes the (modified) expected utility EUk(P
post
k )
function of the kth agent, are given by:
P post∗k = arg max
P postk
EUk(P
post
k )
Where: EUk(P
post
k ) := βk
n∑
j=1
uk(j)Pk(j)
post − αkKL(P ‖ P postk )
≡ βk
n∑
j=1
uk(j)Pk(j)
post − αk
m∑
i=1
KL(Pi ‖ P postk )
≡ βk
n∑
j=1
uk(j)Pk(j)
post − αk
m∑
i=1
 n∑
j=1
ln
(
Pi(j)
Pk(j)post
)
Pi(j)

Subject to: ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : 0 ≤ min(P(j)) ≤ Pk(j)post ≤ max(P(j)) ≤ 1
n∑
j=1
Pk(j)
post = 1 , βk ∈ {−1, 0, 1} , αk ∈ IR
(1.4.12)
Where αk is a scaling factor parameter,
which represents the agent’s degree of aversion to expected surprise;
if αk > 0 the agent k is uncertainty (expected surprise) averse;
if αk < 0 the agent k is uncertainty (expected surprise) seeking;
if αk = 0 the agent k is uncertainty (expected surprise) neutral;
Where βk ∈ {−1, 0, 1} is a parameter that represents the future orientation psychology of
the agent;
if βk = 1 the agent k is optimistic;
if βk = 0 the agent has no future orientation
he is indifferent in relation to the anticipation of future utility and disappointment;
if αk = −1the agent is pessimistic;
The utility uk(j) represents the actual anticipated utility that the kth agent would
experience if all agents, including himself, would be sure that the event j will occur
almost certainly, with probability one, all other events being almost impossible.
The posterior probabilityPk(j)post∗ represents the rationally optimalmental expectancy[139–
141] of event j for agent k.
In general we will have that βk = 1 and αk > 0, which means that the kth agent is
optimistic and uncertainty averse, other parameter values are related to very special
cases. It must be remarked that the utility penalty due to the divergence from prior
beliefs is independent from how these beliefs were derived.
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The future orientation represents an asymmetry in the treatment of doxastic evi-
dence concerning the future. If agent k is optimistic (βk = 1) he will attribute rel-
atively higher probability weights to those events that generate the greatest antic-
ipated utility in his mind, than if he would have done if he had no future orien-
tation (βk = 0). An optimistic agent, by attributing greater probability weights to
favourable events, should in average be more surprised by the ex-post occurrence of
events in the left side of the distribution for which relatively more doxastic evidence
has been underweighted/ignored, i.e. the events that were a-priori considered "un-
favorable" in terms of maximum anticipable utility (uk(j)). Such an agent should
be "by evolutionary nature" more resilient to "bad" news, or in more precise terms,
less sensible (in terms of expectations change and disappointment) to the communi-
cation of expectations that attribute high probability to those events relatively more
unfavourable to him in terms of maximum anticipable utility.
If agent k is pessimistic (βk = −1) he will attribute relatively greater probability
weights to unfavorable events and will be in average ex-post more surprised by the
occurence of events in the right side of the distribution, for which relatively more
doxastic evidence has been underweighted/ignored. Such an agent is more vulner-
able to "bad" news, or in more precise terms, more sensible to the communication
of expectations that attribute high probability to those events relatively more un-
favourable to him in terms of maximum anticipable utility. From a psychological
and neurological perspective pessimistic agents are agents for which the right hemi-
sphere of the brain predominates during speculations about the future; which avoid
sources of possible (ex-post) disappointment by underweighting the probabilities of
events that are more favourable to them. As pointed out byHecht[385] "the optimistic
schema is scaffolded and assimilated into neural structures and systems within the LH [left
hemisphere] , while the pessimistic schema is primarily associated with, and integrated into,
neural circuits and networks in the RH [right hemisphere]. On one side stubborn opti-
mism (when βk = 1 and αk = 0) "may lead to negligent and reckless behaviors - e.g.
not taking the necessary precautions to prevent common hazards - which may result in a
catastrophe"; on the other side, a socially exasperated pessimism (when βk = −1 and
αk very large) may push one to worry "too much about potential dangers [mentioned by
social network neighbours and in the news] and focusing on what might go wrong [, which]
leads to avoidance behavior, passivity, exacerbation of low mood and an increase in the vul-
nerability to depression". As we can see from our model, agents that have a future
orientation (βk 6= 0) are vulnerable to preference-driven expectation confirmation
bias, on the right side (optimism) or on the left side (pessimism) of the distribution
of the anticipable utility of events. The parameter α determines how reactive an
agent is to communicated expectations, i.e. his belief reactivity, or probabilistic ex-
pectations elasticity, in relation to the psychological pressure for the minimization of
expected surprise after expectations communication.
Residual beliefs divergenceKL(P ‖ P post∗k ) of the kth agent is considered the epistemic-
noise, the residual incoherence of expectations, which we generally call uncertainty.
Which represents residual expected surprise at the end of the process of beliefs revi-
sion, when optimal posterior beliefs P post∗k have been determined. It is residual not
because impossible to reduce, but because considered inconvenient to be further re-
duced, in terms of deviation from the optimal trade-offs between expected surprise
αkKL(P ‖ P postk ) and anticipated utility
∑n
j=1 uk(j)Pk(j)
post. This epistemic-noise
doesn’t represent, in objective terms false or wrong doxastic information, concern-
ing future events. But, more simply, it represents that part of doxastic information
which is not compatible with an agents’ optimal probabilistic expectations, which
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however still produces for him an expected surprise.
We can imagine real-life situations in which an agent exhibits distinct preferences
for priors not in terms of their contents but in terms of their source, i.e. the agent
from which they come, including oneself. In this case our (modified) expected util-
ity function would be rewritten as follows:
EUk(P
post
k ) := βk
n∑
j=1
uk(xj)Pk(j)
post − αk
∑
i∈{1,...,m}
γikKL(Pi ‖ P postk ) (1.4.13)
The parameter γik can be used to represent several social factors, like authority, legit-
imacy, affection or reputation, recognized by the kth agent to the ith agent, in terms
of weight/relevance given to his communicated expectations. The γks should be
rescaled in such a way that
∑
i∈{1,...,m} γ
i
k = 1
When expectations are discriminated by source, the γik are different, we expect that
for the kth agent γkk > γ
i
k for i 6= k. Because γkk represents the weight given to his
own prior expectations. Our model is almost an isomorphism of Keynes’s view of
conventional expectations:
"Notwithstanding uncertainty, individuals have to make decisions and act. They do so by
pretending that they have behind them a good Benthamite calculation of a series of prospective
advantages and disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate probability, waiting to be
summed. In order to behave in such a way, some techniques are devised. They are essentially
conventions like assuming that the present is a reliable guide to the future despite the past
evidence to the contrary or trying to conform to the behavior of the majority. This means that
individual decisions and actions cannot be regarded as independent of one another." [46]
We extract four key points in relation to the role of conventional expectations that unite
our framework to Keynes’s view:
• uncertainty is a distributed state concerning expectations, and more generally
epistemic beliefs, which is related to the local incoherence of expectations com-
municated in multiple agent network systems. Agents coordinate their actions
through the communication/contagion of beliefs concerning the future, i.e. ex-
pectations;
• under given conditions, related to the structure of the network and the dis-
tribution of preferences, the system may slowly converge (in probability) to
coherence, i.e. the global optimum of the system;
• if all agents have the same preferences, risk aversion and uncertainty aver-
sion, the system benefits as a whole if all agents are represented through a
unique (common knowledge) set of conventional expectations. Because the
convention reduces the need of continuously communicating with all neigh-
bouring agents to elicit their updated beliefs, and also, because it is memory
efficient. Agents’ doxastic identity becomes insignificant because they all coor-
dinate through the same set of impersonal conventional expectations. In infor-
mation terms, all agents’ beliefs are efficiently approximated by conventional
expectations of a representative agent;
In our framework beliefs are Markovian. Once a node (agent) communicates with
his neighbouring nodes and reviews his expectations on the basis of evidence he for-
gets his old priors. However, we hypothesize that the memory of past uncertainty
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levels may be stored, and, used later on to compare the present uncertainty situa-
tion to the past, and by so doing, evaluate if it is a good moment for communication
or for closure. On the basis of value, sign and/or slope of the surprise and uncer-
tainty outcomes of communication. For example: if the residual expected surprise
KL(P ‖ P post∗k ) is very high respect to its average value, in past expectations revision
processes, it may seem convenient for agents, in expected terms, to communicate
such a state of uncertainty to immediately require/trigger another round of com-
munication. In such a way agents can elicit posterior expectations of neighbouring
agents Ppost∗ and their potential information/surprise effects KL(Ppost∗ ‖ P post∗k ),
and iterate the process of revision of beliefs again, to try to converge to states of lower
metacognitive uncertainty. Therefore, real-world public communications of uncer-
tainty should be considered precious signals to evaluate locally (for specific agents)
and at the aggregate (social) level expected surprise in human systems, which may
also influence the behaviour of agents in markets.
In our model, metacognitive processes and their doxastic outcomes are not inde-
pendent from preferences. Preferences for events, produce indirectly the effect of
preferences for probabilistic expectations, but only in a instrumental way, because
mediated by doxastic evidence and its expected surprise effects. If agents are indif-
ferent to events, the process of learning is in epistemic terms optimal, the posterior
maximizes the feeling of knowing, because the signal/noise ratio of doxastic evi-
dence communication is maximized when the sum of Kullback-Leibler divergences
is minimized, i.e. when agents feel the smallest possible expected surprise given
their beliefs and observed evidence. If agents are not indifferent to events, i.e. they
derive more utility from some events respect to others, the process of learning is still
optimal in rational terms, i.e. the posterior maximizes the modified expected utility
function, but not in terms of theminimization of expected surprise, agents are biased
in their usage of doxastic evidence by their preferences. However, posteriors are al-
ways objectively optimal conditionally on the agents’ preferences. Residual uncer-
tainty represents the expected-surprise effect due to the awareness of the existence
doxastic evidence that is ignored because incompatible with optimal beliefs. Vol-
untarily ignored doxastic evidence consists of information that one hasn’t yet been
(sufficiently) incentivized to integrate in his rationally optimal belief system, given
his will to maximize the modified expected utility function, which represents the
psychological benefits/well-being that an agent feels by anticipating utility through
his rationally optimal inter-subjective probabilistic expectations. In a more sophis-
ticated version of the model, we could imagine that ignored doxastic evidence is
ex-post not simply treated as noise, because the agent who ignored it could in a sec-
ond moment regret his "disbelief choice", if, doxastic evidence first considered noise
reveals a-posterior to be useful to reduce actual surprise and disappointment, when
the time horizon of the probabilistic expectations is reached and one of the possible
events occurs.
For seek of realism, we could also hypothesize that the partitioning process itself
determines the future orientation (pessimism and optimism) of agents, when hav-
ing to update their beliefs after a process of communication. We could imagine that
when an agent is confronted with a partition that describes in detail and with a thin
(event) grain negative scenarios, i.e. those with the smallest anticipable utilities, and
jointly uses a thick grain or omits to differentiate and describe positive scenarios
by leaving them in the residual event, i.e. the event defined as the complement of
the union of the all the other events, the future orientation of this agent will very
likely be pessimistic; this because, through the aforementioned partition, the agent’s
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thoughts are oriented and focused towards more adverse scenarios, which are ren-
dered salient and explicit. Whereas, when an agent is confronted with a partition
that describes in detail and with thin (event) grain positive scenarios, i.e. those with
the large anticipable utilities, and omits to differentiate and describe in detail nega-
tive ones by leaving them in the residual event, i.e. the complement of the union of
all others, his future orientation will very likely be optimistic. The aforesaid mecha-
nism could be a way of endogenizing the future orientation in our model. We could
finally imagine that the negotiation of the partition used by agents taking part to
the process of communication of probabilistic expectations is strategic, agents could
manipulate their own and others’ future orientations in the preferred way by strate-
gically partitioning the outcome space through natural language.
1.5 Discussion
As we have seen in this article, in its more radical interpretation, metacongitive un-
certainty represents situations in which the only valuable knowledge one possesses
is his awareness of the existence of unimaginable unknowns. Under this perspec-
tive, since ancient times, uncertainty has been seen in philosophic literature as a
epistemic state of extreme scepticism towards forecasts of future events, which can
push one up to the point of considering specific real-world systems/processes and
their states/outcomes unimaginable or incommensurable.
However, as we have seen throughout this review, in particular in relation to cogni-
tivist theorizations of uncertainty, if an agent is averse to this epistemic state of sur-
prise and expected surprise, he will try to individually and collectively reduce his
uncertainty trough self and social metacognition and metaheuristics: he will search
for evidence, including doxastic evidence communicated by other agents, which can
be used, together with metaheuristics, like bayesian probability, to review his beliefs
in such a way that the ensuing expected surprise, conditional on evidence and his
own preferences, is reduced as much as possible. If an agent values positively the
epistemic state of uncertainty, in relation to a specific or all aspects of perceived real-
ity, he may simply contemplate his expectation of infinite surprise in relation to the
latter without updating his epistemic beliefs.
Uncertainty can therefore be seen as the state of awareness of knowledge failure in
expected terms. We metacognitively consume surprise/information, to optimally
learn and collapse to more stable and justifiable epistemic beliefs, in relation to ob-
served evidence and one’s preferences, and by so doing, we reduce expected sur-
prise. It is through the pressure of surprise and expected surprise that we are pushed
to synthesize new beliefs instrumental to the survival of any intertemporal feeling
of knowing. To release ourselves from the ineluctable tendency to aware epistemic
horizon failure that uncertainty brings. Aware failure of our knowledge of the world,
of other beings and of their beliefs, and, aware failure of the preservation and sur-
vival of our own awareness and knowledge, as individuals, groups, societies and
species. For uncertainty averse agents, economic and social life can be transformed
in a search for an escape way from uncertainty. In belief revision terms it can be
seen as the use of rationality in a environment that is not deterministically imposed
to human agents, but, which is exploitable and transformable by the latter through
their choices, expectations and communications.
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Orientations towards the future, probabilistic expectations and their communication
shape the doxastic evidence environment that will be later observed. The escape di-
rection from uncertainty that one chooses, if he is uncertainty averse, represents pre-
cisely his capacity in creating mental attractors for his awareness, through self and
social metacognition and ensuing sense-making and decision-making. Mental at-
tractors which may well be preference-driven. The more one is able to "create" (live
in) a stable environment, in terms of controllable probing signals and predictabil-
ity of ensuing evidence, the easier it will be for him to stabilize his epistemic beliefs.
From this point of view, preferences, which favour the repetitive and voluntary seek-
ing of particular evidence, can be considered, at the individual and collective level,
epistemic belief stabilizing forces.
However, the farther we get from uncertainty, through the artificial creation of evi-
dence in our environment, the greatest is the implicit sacrifice, in terms of individ-
ual, group and social fixation of our beliefs, and, the greater will be the surprise,
if our perceptual/information/doxastic evidence environments are perturbed in an
unforeseen way. Therefore, the alienation of uncertainty is jointly the measure of the
power of individually and collectively using our metacongitive capacities to regen-
erate and protect our feeling of knowing, and, the measure of our will to undertake
the path of denial of the acknowledgement of our ignorance of the future, as indi-
viduals, groups, societies and species. Uncertainty can be considered as one of the
outcomes of a metacognitive mechanism that allows one to evaluate the signal im-
portance of epistemic "noise", a process of trembling cognition, which can serve to
abandon local optima and explore alternative belief and knowledge systems. Our
civilizations, languages, concepts and institutions, represent such a millinery strug-
gle against uncertainty, through the construction and fall, in our imagination and
humanworlds, of temples of conventions. For the teaching of metaheuristics and for
the use of metacognition; necessary to coordinate our epistemic beliefs and to protect
aware life from unreachable explanations and unexplainable understandings.
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Twitter uncertainty indexes and
uncertainty contagion during the
unfolding of the Brexit-Trump Era
By Carlo R. M. A. Santagiustina
Abstract
We develop a set of non-market uncertaintymeasures, called Twitter uncertainty (TU)
indexes, for the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), by aggregating
decentralized signals of uncertainty elicited through a real-world online commu-
nication medium, the Twitter news and social networking platform. We use our
new measures to infer market non-market uncertainty contagions, within and among
these two countries, in a VAR modelling setting. To compute our TU indexes we
use messages containing the word uncertainty, published publicly on Twitter dur-
ing a nine months time interval that covers UK’s EU-referendum and the 2016 US’s
presidential election. We exploit Twitter as an information source that contains the
wisdom of the crowds concerning the degree of civil-society uncertainty, self-reported
on Twitter by the worldwide english-speaking community, in relation to the United
Kingdom (UK-TU) and the United States (US-TU), across the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarter
of the year 2016. We hence estimate a structural VAR model to infer the dependen-
cies among: civil society uncertainty, measured with our US-TU and UK-TU indexes;
policy uncertainty, measured with the US-EPU and UK-EPU; market uncertainty, mea-
sured by VIX and VFTSE option-implied volatility indexes. Results show that, at
the country level, there is a relevant bidirectional Granger causation relationship be-
tween civil society uncertainty andmarket uncertainty, and only for UK, between policy
uncertainty and market uncertainty. In addition, civil society uncertainty shocks in the
US had positive and significant spillover effects on UK’s market uncertainty during
the year 2016.
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2.1 Introduction
Objectives and delineation of the research structure and boundaries
In this article, we propose a new set of uncertainty indexes that allow us to aggre-
gate and measure decentralized signals uncertainty coming from the Twitter social
network and its community, called Twittersphere. We use these signals to model
processes of inter-source and inter-area uncertainty contagion during the year 2016.
This study is of particular interest because of the occurrence of two major events,
widely associated to the concept and phenomenon of uncertainty, that unfolded dur-
ing the aforementioned year in the two countries analysed in this work: the vote in
favour of Brexit in the United Kingdom and the election of Trump in the United
States. These occurrences are a natural experiment setting, which we will exploit, to
infer processes of uncertainty contagion among market and non-market systems in
the UK and the US, both within and between these two countries, in the year 2016.
In addition, this study contributes to existing literature because it allows us to differ-
entiate the ripple effects on market systems of civil society uncertainty from those of
policy uncertainty, in terms of impulse-responses of option-implied volatility in these
two countries.
In the first section we describe the methodology used to build Twitter Uncertainty
(TU) indexes from a database of more than one million Twitter posts, also called
tweets, written in english and containing the term "uncertainty". Tweets are textual
messages published publicly by users, with a maximum lenght of 140 characters.
Tweets are generally used for microblogging, social deliberations and real-time news
publishing, commenting and retweeting. We explain in which terms our TU indexes
are proxymeasures for civil society uncertainty in relation to the two geographic-areas
of interest for this study. By civil society we mean a public information and delibera-
tion space between States, NGOs, firms, financial markets, medias and households,
in which agents undertake processes of group or social metacognition[14, 15] and
communicate their ensuing uncertainties. By uncertainty we mean actual and ex-
pected surprise in relation to information-gaps and expectations-gaps of agents par-
ticipating to processes of communication and social metacognition. For an in-depth
explanation of our approach to uncertaintyin general and to civil society uncertainty in
particular, we refer to the first article in this collection, titled Uncertainty: reviewing
the unknown.
In the second sectionwe presentmarket uncertainty and policy uncertainty proxymeausures
that will be used in the third section tomodel inter-source inter-area uncertainty con-
tagions in the United Kingdom andUnited States. Market uncertainty in UK andUS is
respectively proxied through the VFTSE and VIX option implied volatility indexes.
Whereas policy uncertainty in UK and US is proxied through the daily Economic Pol-
icy Uncertainty indexes by country, developed by Baker, Bloom and Davis[386]. We
explain their construction methodology and compare their time series to our civil
society uncertainty TU indexes’ time series.
In the third section we use our Twitter Uncertainty indexes, jointly with othermarket
and non-market uncertainty measures, to infer if, and in which terms, the proxied de-
gree of civil society uncertainty, allows us to anticipate and explain, in a structural
VAR modelling setting with constant parameters, the observed degree of market
uncertainty and policy uncertainty in these two countries, across the 2nd, 3rd and
4th quarter of the year 2016. We comment the results of our inference results in
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terms of lagged Granger causation and instantaneous Wold causality. We show in
which terms the fluctuations of these different uncertainty sources may be antic-
ipated through the use of our VAR model for forecasting. We finally undertake
an historical decomposition of observed uncertainty variables’ fluctuations, to im-
pute changes in each uncertainty measure, to endogenous shocks and fluctuations
of other uncertainty measures endogenized through our VAR model.
To put a limit to the length of this article, and to try to avoid omitting details po-
tentially of interest for the readers, we included a rich appendix with an in-depth
analysis of the content of UK-TU and US-TU indexes, which may be considered a
manual validation process to further empirically legitimate the use of our TU in-
dexes as proxies of civil society uncertainty. Always in the appendix we describe the
details of our model specification choices, like the information criteria used for the
choice of the lag order and the stationarity tests. We include orthogonalized cumu-
lative impulse-response functions and the forecast error variance decomposition re-
sulting from the estimated structural VAR model. As well as the robustness checks,
together with the estimation of our uncertainty contagion model under alternative
specifications, and, constraints on contagion channels.
In the introductory subsections, which follow, we delineate the phenomenological
context and research field in which this work is empirically and theoretically ubi-
cated. We link its content to real-world events that occurred during the period under
investigation and to existing studies that analysed, measured or modelled the effects
of uncertainty on market systems during the unfolding of the Brexit-Trump Era. We
briefly cover and review the topics, questions and hypothesis formulated in other
works concerning the inference of market non-market uncertainty dependency rela-
tions. We briefly survey existing literature on text-based proxies for latent variables,
in particular, with reference to risk and uncertainty measurement. We illustrate the
uses in literature of these uncertainty proxies, in particular, for the modelling of the
interdependences among market and non-market uncertainty variables. Finally, in re-
lation to reviewed works and existing literature gaps, we illustrate our own research
questions and hypotheses, whichwill be empirically tested and discussed in the next
sections of this work.
Context and field of enquiry
"How Brexit Uncertainty Could Produce a British Boom" (June the 29th, 2016)
is the title of a post[387] published on The Wall Street Journal’s web-page, few days
after the EU-referendum vote in the United Kingdom.
"An Age of uncertainty is upon us" (November the 19th, 2016)
is the first sentence of an article[388] published on the of The Economist, few days
after the United States presidential election.
"Finance, it’s the Age of uncertainty"(December the 15th, 2016)
is the heading of an article[389] published on the weekly magazine l’Espresso, few
days after the Italian Constitutional Referendum. "Measuring uncertainty is no game
for economists", states the article among its conclusions, in bold.
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Will 2016 be remembered as the year of the global apogee of the concept and feel-
ing of uncertainty? Or maybe, it’s just an illusory perception of contemporaries,
which will soon be refuted. Have we, contemporary men and women, sailed too
long in dead calm seas? Forgetting the fear and the tumult caused by the arrival
of the umpteenth storm: the storm of (expected but still indeterminate) change. Is
uncertainty only a "wipping boy", created to justify our limited foreseeing capacity,
and, the lack of consensus among policy experts’, economists’ and market opera-
tors’ expectations, as supposed[390] by the Bank of England’s external member of
the Monetary Policy Committee Kristin Forbes. The same Kristin Forbes which, a
few months after Brexit, also affirmed that "uncertainty is not as bad for the economy
as feared"[391]. Probably, this fear of a speculative bubble on the word uncertainty,
stems from the fact that the Bank of England itself used the word "uncertainty" 123
times in official communications during the year 2016[392]. In the light of that, what
is was the use of the word uncertainty signalling?
In the world of finance and business, it was shared opinion that "events in Britain,
Italy and the U.S. created turmoil in the markets, while decisions by the Federal Reserve, the
European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan further stoked it"[393]. As pointed out by
the president of UBS investment bank, Andrea Orcel: during the year 2016 financial
industry and operators "have moved from trying to manage risk where you prepare for it,
you have historic series, you have hedges, you make decisions, you debate them, you plan for
different scenarios to managing uncertainty. Uncertainty is very different. Uncertainty is,
’OK, there’s going to be an election. Is Brexit going to happen?’ How do you judge that? If
it happens, what’s the consequence? How do you hedge? How do you price for actions as a
result of a tweet or a throwaway comment without getting it wrong?"[394].
This generalized state of uncertainty that followed the Brexit vote and the election
of Trump was not limited to local and isolable political, financial and economic
affairs[395]. It rapidly extended globally, across borders and systems, like an un-
derground river in full spate, which shook the foundations of human expectations,
making people jointly feel in precarious balance in all spheres of life, as if their ex-
pected surprise related to the foreseeing of the future had dramatically and suddenly
grown, especially in relation to economic decision and sense making. While uncer-
tainty eroded the epistemic pillars of knowledge and belief systems, human capacity
to formulate and justify probabilistic expectations, and, to reach, through the com-
munication of the latter, social and market consensus on the more likely economic
and political scenarios to be expected, was temporally lost. The process of coordi-
nation of expectations failed. People started looking to their future with a sense of
systemic uncontrollability, helplessness, concern and anxiety, awaiting the opening
of the next economic, financial or political chasm. Risks became systemic, difficult
to commensurate and isolate, because political, economic and social phenomena ap-
peared to such an extent intertwined that they were almost-impossible to compart-
mentalize and represent, through rational sense-making, as isolable-systems, un-
certainty became once again the one master of peoples’ mind, giving the go to a
social metacognition mechanism capable of forcing people to confront with intolera-
ble levels of expected surprise, resolvable only through further communication and
revision of beliefs, that can eventually ultimate in the construction of revised con-
ventional inter-subjective belief systems, usable to coordinate human expectations
and actions in market and social systems.
Given the complexity of the aforementioned global "uncertainty puzzle", very few
macro-economic studies tried to model the dependency relations among different
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-specialized- uncertainty variables that represent distinct sources or types of uncer-
tainty, to which a market systemmay be subject to. As Jurado et al. pointed out[396]:
"the conditions under which common [uncertainty] proxies are likely to be tightly linked to
the typical theoretical notion of uncertainty may be quite special. Stock market volatility can
change over time even if there is no change in uncertainty about economic fundamentals, if
leverage changes, or if movements in risk aversion or sentiment are important drivers of as-
set market fluctuations. Cross-sectional dispersion in individual stock returns can fluctuate
without any change in uncertainty if there is heterogeneity in the loadings on common risk
factors. Similarly, cross-sectional dispersion in firm-level profits, sales, and productivity can
fluctuate over the business cycle merely because there is heterogeneity in the cyclicality of
firms’ business activity".
However, in most studies concerning the period of the Brexit vote and election of
Trump, uncertainty was proxied by only one of these measures, or, by using the first
principal component extracted from two or more among them[390]. Models that
use only one uncertainty measure or one principal component are potentially sub-
ject to omitted variables and aggregation biases. These are typical problems in the
area of macro-economic studies that seek to commensurate the effects of "generic"
uncertainty, which produce the following consequences:
• No uncertainty heterogeneity: By representing uncertainty through a unique
aggregate measure it results impossible to identify eventual significant differ-
ences among the responses of aggregate economic variables to uncertainty im-
pulses/shocks that are different "by nature";
• No dependencies among specialized uncertainty variables: By representing
uncertainty through principal components is equivalent to assume that vari-
ables’ observed values are independent in time, therefore by using PCA we
cannot appraise the lagged dependency structure -and hence reinforcing feed-
backmechanisms- among different specialized uncertainty variables. By doing
so one may obtain autocorrelated residuals without understanding the source
of the observed autocorrelation;
A recent study, published in the ECB’s Financial Stability Review of May 2017[397],
started to fill the overstated literature gap by estimating the dependencies between
non-market uncertainty, proxied with the EPU indexes, market uncertainty, proxied
with the option implied volatility indexes, and other macroeconomic variables, for
US and UK during the year 2016, using a Bayesian VAR model. The authors find
that:
• "Policy uncertainty had a notable tightening effect on US and UK financial condi-
tions [and co-determined an increase in option implied volatility (see chart A.3)], in
particular around the respective political events";
• "All else being equal, the surge in US economic policy uncertainty since November
[2016] would have had a tightening impact on US financial conditions. This effect
was, however, outweighed by a positive demand shock";
Despite the aforementioned study is the first -to us known- tentative of modeling the
interactions among market and non-market uncertainty measures, it may potentially
suffer from variable aggregation problems that render its findings questionable, due
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to the fact of using time series aggregated at a monthly frequency. Monthly fre-
quency that is certainly too low, and therefore inappropriate, to identify and disen-
tangle causal dependency relations between market and non-market uncertainty vari-
ables and associated phenomena, to which these measures may be differently sensi-
ble, in terms of responsiveness, latency and sensitivity. The Governor of the Bank of
Italy, Ignazio Visco, has recently tried to attract the attention of the public towards
this issues, by claiming that despite in 2016 "there has been a sharp rise in global policy
uncertainty. [And] this is a cause for concern [... because] there is ample empirical support
for the claim that economic policy uncertainty if persistent dampens economic activity and
trade as well. We should be aware of the fact that economic policy uncertainty measures
with all the caveats that apply to news-based approaches may capture longer-term concerns
only partly correlated with perceptions of the short-term macroeconomic outlook on which
financial markets tend to focus"[398], therefore these two measures are not and should
not be considered substitutes. The Governor of the Bank of Italy added that, after the
2016 EU-referendum and US elections, there has been a "divergence between economic
policy uncertainty measures [EPU indexes] and financial market volatility [option-implied
expected volatilities]"[398]. The divergent pattern of market and non-market uncertainty
proxies, has raised additional questions[399] relative to the dependencies among
different uncertainty sources and their measures, certainly highly correlated, but
differently sensible to real world phenomena. Reason for which in this article we
have developed our crowd-sourced text-based civil society uncertainty proxy, to try
to disentangle direct uncertainty dependencies between policy/political and mar-
ket outcomes. In particular, to disentangle the effects of policy uncertainty on market
uncertainty, proxied through option-implied volatility, from market uncertainty fluc-
tuations mediated, amplified or originated by civil society uncertainty, proxied by
Twitter communications and deliberations on uncertainty related issues. Civil soci-
ety uncertainty, which, as we will see, generally emerges in relation to patterns of
rapid and diffused divergence from/of conventional expectations, within a society
or social group, producing above tolerance levels of actual and expected surprise,
signalled through the use of the word uncertainty, during processes of group or so-
cial metacognition, directly observable on online social networks like Twitter.
Text-based measures have already been developed and used in economic and fi-
nancial studies, to obviate the problem of proxying unobservable risk and uncer-
tainty variables. For example Romer and Romer[400]have measured monetary pol-
icy shocks using -among others- textual information sources published by the FED,
like the Minutes of Federal Open Market Committee. They develop an ad-hoc manual
procedure to deduce Federal Reserve interest rate change intentions from published
FOMC narratives. Cavallo andWu[401] used information from specialized journals:
Oil Daily and Oil & Gas Journal to create a binary daily index which distinguishes
dates in which the price of oil was driven by arguably exogenous events from those
inwhich it was driven by developments related to the state of the oil market. Casarin
and Squazzoni[402] have constructed three -daily frequency- bad news indexes for
the 2008-2009 financial crisis, based on the content of the front page banner headlines
of financial newspapers. The index values depend on the daily number of negative
banner headlines concerning the crisis, on the number of columns where such news
were reported and on the number of negative words therein contained. Caldara and
Iacovelli[403] have constructed a worldwide index of Geopolitical Risk, called GPR
Index and two specialized indexes, called Geopolitical Threats (GPT) and Geopoliti-
cal Acts (GPA) indexes. They used an automated token-dictionary based text-mining
methodology, based on rescaled monthly counts of the occurrence of words related
66 Ca’Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics
2.1. Introduction
to geopolitical tensions in articles from international newspapers in English.
Finally, Baker, Bloom and Davis[386] have developed a set of country specific Eco-
nomic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) indexes based on newspapers articles, which we
will use in this work as proxies for policy uncertainty. These indexes are based on
a rescaled counting of the number of daily articles, coming from a set of country
specific newspapers, in which specific tokens, used as identifiers of economic pol-
icy uncertainty, occur. The aforesaid work inspired our Twitter Uncertainty mea-
sures, which, as we will see, have very different qualities and potential drawbacks
respect to existing text-based uncertainty measures employed in economic and fi-
nancial studies.
The main difference between these measures and the one that we propose is that
existing measures are based on narratives and data produced by relatively small
groups of experts and analysts, i.e. figures considered technically capable of eval-
uating objectively and with scientific method specific instances of events and risks,
which they have the role of monitoring and reporting about. Like rating agencies,
analysts, journalists and other professional political, financial and economic com-
mentators. Whereas, the uncertainty measures that we develop and use in this work,
are based on textual uncertainty signals produced and diffused by hundred of thou-
sand agents, that publicly communicate and deliberate about socially relevant un-
certainty issues, through an online distributed information network system, called
Twitter.
Hypotheses
As previously anticipated, one of the key hypothesis behind our interest for the mea-
surement of civil society uncertainty, trough new Twitter based proxy indexes, is the
possible existence of causal relations between civil society uncertainty and market un-
certainty. In our studymarket uncertaintywill be proxied throughmeasures of option-
implied volatility: VIX and VFTSE.
Relationships between market and non-market uncertaint have been a constant sub-
ject of debate among market operators during the last years[404–407]. In particular,
precautionary savings and risk appetite[408–412] have been one acknowledged as
the main contagion channels of non-market uncertainty on economic decisions and
outcomes. When widely diffused, wait and see[413] behaviors may lead to a stagna-
tion or contraction of transactions, making markets become thinner and their prices
more volatile. This mechanism has also been identified as a possible explanation for
cyclical burst-boom patterns in aggregate investment, where the trough of the cycle
corresponds to major elections and is therefore associated to political/policy uncer-
tainty[414]. The existance of contagion channels among policy/political uncertainty
and market volatility have been object of numerous investigations in finance and
economic disciplines, especially in the past decade. These market non-market con-
tagion channels appear to be particularly relevant in periods of crisis and structural
change[415, 416]. It has been found that political uncertainty was among the main
sources of stock market volatility in Germany between 1880 and 1940 [417]. Un-
certainty shocks, proxied by the innovations in the VIX index and in the EPU[386],
contributed to the fall in the US GDP during the recent 2007-2009 recession[418]. In
addition, it has been hypothesized and tested[419], that, during the last financial cri-
sis, rises in the volatility of policy uncertainty have dampen stock market returns and
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increased stock market volatility, and, increases in stock market volatility have re-
duced stock market returns and increased policy uncertainty. Volatility in basic com-
modity price levels has been idetified as one of themain causes of increasing political
turmoil and hence uncertainty before the Arab Spring[420]. Moreover, political un-
certainty, caused by the Arab Spring itself, led to significant increases Middle East’s
and North Africa’s stock market volatility indexes[421]. Finally, downward stock
market volatility jumps have been causally linked to the resolution of policy uncer-
tainty[422].
We must remark that it is sufficient that "individuals who do not invest in the stock
market are likely to use its ups and downs as a guide to the state of the economy"[423]
to formulate their expectations, to create a contagion channel between stock market
volatility and non stock market uncertainty. On the other side, through the public debt
channel, political and policy uncertainty, at the country level, has clearly an effect on
the dynamics of international capital markets and hence on the volatility of prices
of assets traded in these markets. As we can see from the above stated studies in
some circumstances political uncertainty is among the causes of market volatility,
in others, political uncertainty is a by product -or externality- of market volatility.
Given the complexity and the -suggested- existence of loop mechanisms, it often re-
sults very difficult to disentangle causes from effects, especially using aggregated
low frequency data. This is also a good reason for developing a new set of uncer-
tainty proxies which can aggregate civil society uncertainty signals by target area, at
the desired frequency.
In this study we will hypothesize, and test if, the TU indexes and the EPU indexes,
which are respectively used to proxy civil society uncertainty and policy uncertainty,
can be considered complementary aggregate uncertainty measures, in relation to
their contributions in explaining observed fluctuations inmarket uncertainty, in a lin-
ear VAR modelling setting. We will also try to infer the eventual existence, sign
and type of dependencies among the aforementioned non-market uncertainty mea-
sures, within and across the two countries considered in this study, the United States
and the United Kingdom. In addition, we will hypothesize, and test if, these two
sources of uncertainty affect in distinct ways and with different latencies, both in
terms of granger causation and estimated impulse-response functions, market uncer-
tainty, here measured through option-implied volatility indexes.
Here follow some additional hypotheses on the dependencies among market and
non-market uncertainty in the United States and United Kingdom, that will be tested
through the estimation of our VAR uncertainty contagion model in the third section
of this work:
• Hypothesis 1: non-market uncertainty (TU and/or EPU) Granger causes market
uncertainty (VIX or VFTSE) in the corresponding geographic-area;
Remark: if Strong Efficient Market Hypothesis (Strong EMH) were true hypothesis
1 should be rejected;
We are interested in testing hypothesis 1 because we wish to see if information pro-
vided by the lagged values of civil society uncertainty and policy uncertainty uncer-
tainty proxies have explanatory power for market uncertainty, i.e. have statistically
significant coefficients in the VIX and VFTSE equations.
• Hypothesis 2: non-market uncertainty (TU and/or EPU) in one of the two geographic-
areas,Granger causesmarket uncertainty (VIX or VFTSE) in the other geographic-
area;
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We are interested in testing hypothesis 2 because we wish to see if information pro-
vided by the lagged values of civil society uncertainty and policy uncertainty uncer-
tainty proxies in one country have explanatory power formarket uncertainty variable
of another country. This hypothesis is linked to the existence of international uncer-
tainty spillover effects.
• Hypothesis 3: The lagged dependence relation between civil society uncertainty
or policy uncertainty, and, market uncertainty in the corresponding geographic-
area is positive and bidirectional, i.e. reinforcing feedback mechanisms ex-
ist;
Remark: hypothesis 3 is compatible with market uncertainty embeddedness in social
and political systems an their processes;
Hypothesis 3 may be viewed as a transposition of Granovetter’s[424] concept of em-
beddedness to market uncertainty phenomena. Under this perspective market uncer-
tainty, like option-implied volatility, is embedded in social and political processes.
Market uncertainty jointly affects and is affected by non-market uncertainty phenom-
ena. In particular we hypothesize that processes of political and social metacogni-
tion, through public communications and deliberations about expectations, affect
the perception of expectations-gaps and hence the uncertainties of market agents,
in terms of their actual and expected surprise. Changes in the degree of expected
surprise which can in turn influence economic behaviour and choices of market
agents, in particular in relation to options which can be seen as conditional insur-
ances against specific events or states of the world, on which probability of occur-
rence there is no convergence of views among market agents. Similarly we hypothe-
size that publicly communicated information aboutmarket volatility, may affect indi-
viduals’ non-market uncertaintyand expectations, for example the volatility of public
debt may affect policy and political expectations. Through such a mechanismmarket
uncertaintymay affect the non-market uncertainties of agents, in terms of actual and
expected surprise associated to political and social issues. This hypothesis should
be evaluated in relation to social-metacognition[15, 425, 426] theories, which have
been exposed in the first article of this collection. If market uncertainty is not inde-
pendent from other types of uncertainty, by considering option implied volatility a
proxy measure of market uncertainty and considering market uncertainty independent
from other type of uncertainty to which a socio-economic system may be subject to,
we could underestimate the impact of non-economic uncertainty shocks on market
uncertainty and consequently on risk premia.
• Hypothesis 4: The cumulative response of market uncertainty to a civil society
uncertainty shock is significantly different from zero only in the short term,
and not significantly different from zero in the medium-long term;
Remark: hypothesis 4 is compatible with Semi-Strong EMH;
We wish to testHypothesis 4 because it could be that civil society uncertaintymeasures
(US-TU and UK-TU) are neutral in the medium and long term even if they may
Granger-causemarket uncertainty proxies (VIX and VFTSE) in the short run. Neutral-
ity is measured in terms of the cumulative responses of VIX and VFTSE to UK-TU
and US-TU impulses: civil society uncertainty proxies are neutral in the medium and
long term if cumulative responses are non-statistically significantly different from 0,
or exhibit confidence intervals very close to zero, two months (40 observations) after
the impulses;
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• Hypothesis 5: Through our VAR modelling setting, it is easier to correctly pre-
dict the sign of next-day market uncertainty variations, i.e. changes in option-
implied volatility, with respect to those of civil society uncertainty and policy
uncertainty;
Remark: hypothesis 5 is compatible with the hypothesis that extrememarket volatil-
ity phenomena, in the timespan under study, were more easily and precisely fore-
seeable compared to social and political uncertainty phenomena;
Wewish to testHypothesis 5 because we believe that civil society uncertainty and policy
uncertaintywhere the main drivers ofmarket uncertainty in the US and UK during the
year 2016.
• Hypothesis 6: Through our uncertainty contagion modelling setting, market un-
certainty spillover effects are the main channel of contagion of civil society un-
certainty and policy uncertainty shocks to other countries;
We wish to test Hypothesis 6 because we believe that the main uncertainty contagion
channel is the international interdependence among market systems, which allows
local civil society uncertainty and policy uncertainty (extreme) events capable of affect-
ing local markets, to rapidly propagate worldwide and produce internationalmarket
and non-market uncertainty ripple effects.
Research questions
Here follow the main research questions that we will try to answer through this
study:
1. Can we measure civil society uncertainty through twitter data?
2. Which are the pros and cons of our Twitter-based proxymeasures of civil society
uncertainty?
3. In which terms our civil society uncertainty proxies represent different phenom-
ena with respect to existing policy uncertainty and market uncertaintymeasures?
4. Which were the dependecies between civil society uncertainty , policy uncertainty
and market uncertainty in the US and UK during the year 2016?
5. Which were the spillover effects of civil society uncertainty , policy uncertainty
and market uncertainty between the US and UK during the year 2016?
6. Is the usage of non-normal gamma-like stochastic disturbances, still a neces-
sary market uncertaintymodeling assumption when civil society uncertainty and
policy uncertainty are used as explanatory variables?
7. Can we use of civil society uncertainty and policy uncertainty proxies to forecast
next-day market uncertainty? Which is the out of sample next-day forecasting
performance?
8. To which extent can we considermarket uncertainty observed in the US and UK
during the year 2016 impredictable?
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9. In which terms unexplained civil society uncertainty and policy uncertainty can
be associated to the concept of radical uncertainty and black swan[255, 346, 427]
events?
10. Is it more difficult to predict next-day positive variations, i.e. uncertainty
booming patterns, with respect to negative variations, i.e. uncertainty reso-
lution patterns? for which variables and in which terms our forecasting per-
formance is asymmetric?
11. What do differences in our civil society uncertainty and policy uncertainty fore-
casting performance tell us about the events that occurred in the year 2016?
2.2 From Twitter Uncertainty data to Twitter Uncertainty in-
dexes
2.2.1 Twitter Uncertainty data
In the last decade "Twitter has evolved from a phatic and ambient intimacy machine [...]
to an event-following and news machine. [...] Twitter increasingly has come to be stud-
ied as an emergency communication channel in times of disasters and other major events
as well as an event-following and aid machine"[428]. Among open source repositories
of crowd communication data, some, like Twitter, are not specialized by topic or by
professional category of users. Twitter with its more than 330 million monthly active
users, mostly English speakers, is at the same time a communication medium and a
deliberative platform for its international open community.
Therefore, Twitter can be considered an instrument for collective elicitation and in-
terpretation of global events and expectations, and hence, of the cognitive states
explicitly associated to these events and expectations. By being an extremely large
multi-national open and free access online community, in which posted information
is freely and publicly observable through a unique platform, Twitter performs the
role of a virtual public information and deliberation space. Accordingly, as we will
document in this study, its information flows may be captured and used to proxy
(online) civil society’s "states of nature", especially for what concerns English speak-
ing countries. Accordingly we exploit this characteristic of Twitter to track and mea-
sure at hight frequency, potentially in real time and at worldwide scale, uncertainty
phenomenon through a single system: Twitter.
Twitter as a data source for empirical studies
In the last decade, a great number of academic studies have used Twitter and its
freely accessible data to analyze the opinion dynamics related to specific global
events or phenomenon[429–433], like epidemics[434–439], natural disasters[440–450],
revolutions[451–459] and elections[460–474]. Twitter has also been used to predict
stock market prices[475–481], to extract consumer preferences[482], to analyze con-
sumer satisfaction[483, 484] and brand engagement[485–489].
The advantage of using online data sources is that they can "leverage distributed hu-
man knowledge to obtain information that does not exist in conventional databases"[490].
The Internet can therefore be viewed as a system for collective attention and in-
terpretation[491–493], where people virtually gather to discuss and make sense of
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what is happening, what others believe is happening and what could happen in a
specific environment, at a particular moment in time[494–497]. It has been shown
that "partially ignorant actors in a distributed system can accurately interpret complex sit-
uations when they interact appropriately[498]. Since, when individuals deal with "un-
certain situations highlighted by potential danger [...] they will seek information from a
variety of sources [... and] one channel that provides many opportunities for this purpose
is the Internet"[499], tweets about uncertainty appear to be a potentially good proxy
for analysing civil society uncertainty in relation to a given area o the world. Be-
cause Twitter will be at the same time source of information and expression tool for
its users, which renders it an idle instrument for collective interpretation of global
events.
The Twitter corporation itself is investing huge efforts in developing new instru-
ments for businesses to access and process this data. Recently Twitter affirmed
through its official blog that their "data is being used by a variety of financial market
participants"[500]. In September 2015, Bloomberg publicly announced[501] "it has
signed a long-term data agreement with Twitter that will further enhance financially rele-
vant information found on the social media platform for users of the Bloomberg Professional
service". Other more practical arguments for using a crowd-driven web data sourc-
ing approach include "reduced cost, increased data sizes, and [information] environments
closer to those in the real world with respect to an experimental setting. These characteristics
may ultimately enable research not possible via traditional methods"[502].
Data collection
Our dataset comprehends Twitter posts (tweets) in English, containing the term "un-
certainty", published on the social network Twitter from the first of April 2016 to
the first of January 2017. The data has been collected progressively, by repetitively
querying the API of Twitter during the above mentioned period of study. We used
the Search API and not the Stream API because our downloading infrastructure, a
small scale home server, could not be considered beforehand sufficiently robust to
guarantee, at the moment we started the downloading process, operativeness with-
out interruptions during the entire period of our investigation. Therefore the Search
API was for us the best solution, because in case of interruption of the downloading
process, we could go back up to seven days to eventually get the missed tweets, like
if we had a buffer in case of inoperativeness of our server. Luckily our server never
had problems during the period under study.
Our querying algorithm, coded in RapidMiner Server, a Java server program, re-
peated up to 180 times per fifteen minute period a get query to the Twitter API.
Besides the keyword filter (q="uncertainty") and the language filter (lang="en") pa-
rameters, each get query contained a different value in the since_id parameter, the
value of this parameter was set equal to the tweet identifier number of the most re-
cent tweet that had been downloaded in the previous query iteration, this to have a
time sliding downloading window that allows us to catch as much posts as possible,
and, to avoid downloading multiple times the same tweet. Since the rate limit of
the Rest API is 180 queries per 15 minute period, and each query can get up to 100
observations, the maximum capacity of our data downloading infrastructure is 10
800 tweets per hour, i.e. 259 200 tweets per day. Even in peaking hours we didn’t
72 Ca’Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics
2.2. From Twitter Uncertainty data to Twitter Uncertainty indexes
approach this rate limit, therefore we can consider to have, if not the whole popula-
tion, a very large sample of the tweeting activity in English about uncertainty, both
in terms of size of the population and content representativeness for each day.
Data cleaning and processing
Raw dataset contains 1 439 686 observations. We filter the dataset by Source Name,
removing all observations for which the Source Name contains the regular expres-
sion "[Bb][oO][tT]": 33 566 tweets are removed from Traw. We do so because, since
we consider the use of the word uncertainty a signaling device used among hu-
mans to express their perception of uncertainty, i.e. expected surprise, we want to
omit content produced by profiles that explicitly state to be programs in their Source
Name. In addition we remove all tweets that are uploaded through an online horo-
scope service called "Twittascope": 116 228 tweets are removed from Traw. When one
retweets a post of another user, the following structure is added to the message "RT
@[username]:", this structure lengthens, in terms of number of characters, the original
tweet. Retweets that, given the length of the retweet structure, would be longer than
140 characters are cut. A special UTF-8 character (U+2026) is added automatically
at their end, to indicate that the message is not identical to the original tweet, and
that at least one character is missing. We therefore use this special character as an
identifier of cut retweets. To attenuate this message truncation issue, when a match
is found we replace cut retweets with their original version. We have repeated this
process for all observations in Traw that are retweets, we call the resulting set Tclean,
which is our cleaned observations dataset.
Descriptive statistics
Our cleaned database contains 1 289 892 tweets in English containing the term "un-
certainty". 495 777 of which are unique, i.e. have a post content distinct from all other
tweets in our database. Among non-unique tweets 619 340 are retweets. The remain-
der are copies of other posts in our database. Almost 10% of total tweets (105 107) are
direct messages to other users, these messages start with the user-name (@tag) of the
user to whom they are intended. Tweets have been posted by 742 924 different users,
in a period of 275 days, from the first of April 2016 to the first of January 2017. As we
can see from table 2.1, June and November have been particularly intense months
from the point of view of twitter posting activity about uncertainty, with more than
two hundred thousand tweets per month. These two months contain, respectively,
the UK EU-referendum and the US presidential elections.
Table 2.1. Number of observations per month
Month Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
N.Obs. 97 462 101 798 212 834 161 789 112 220 110 843 145 265 213 224 133 323
January (2017) has been omitted from the above table because it contained only one day -with 1134 obs.-
All observations respect the 140 character twitter post length limit. The number of
tokens per tweet ranges from one to thirty-five. The mode is eighteen tokens per
tweet. The marginal distribution density is rather flat and higher than 0.05 (5%) for
values between ten and twenty, the majority of our observations fall in this range.
Tweets with one token should contain solely the term "uncertainty" or an URLwhich
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contains this term. Three observations do not fulfil this requirement, we remove
them.
More than half of the total number of tweets have been uploaded through mobile
twitter applications or browsers. Whereas only about 20% have been uploaded
through Twitter’s web-client interface. Apple portable devices are the primary up-
loading source for tweets in our database, followed by android and windows de-
vices. Only a small fraction of the total population has been uploaded through other
social networks, like Facebook or LinkedIn, or blog platforms, like WordPress. The
remainder have been uploaded through third party services, like IFTTT and Hoot-
suite or through user specific uploading services.
2.2.2 Twitter Uncertainty Indexes
The key difference between the Twitter Uncertainty (TU) indexes, which we will
construct in this subsection, and pre-existing aggregate uncertainty measures based
on textual data from newspapers[386, 403], is that our TU indexes, being based on
Twitter posting activity, exploit the characteristics of this online social network and
decentralized news provider, which is an open access, open content, distributed in-
formation communication and deliberation system, with millions of active users
per day, to recognize and measure the degree of, area specific, civil society uncer-
tainty events. We use Twitter and the Twittersphere as a natural sensor for uncer-
tainty phenomena. A receiving, amplifying and archiving system for human signals
of uncertainty, which are elicitations of mental states associated to actual and ex-
pected surprise. These signals generally emerge and are communicated during so-
cial metacognition processes, when agents communicate their expectations and ob-
serve their degree of divergence. Given our index computation methodology, each
published textual observation containing the word uncertainty in relation to a given
area counts alike. Our uncertainty measures are only apparently naive, because the
weighting of uncertainty signals is implicitly delegated to the Twitter network and
its decentralized community of users, which through their online interacting be-
haviours, generate the global social metacognition patterns that we observe in rela-
tion to uncertainty, which we aggregate by day and by target area. Twitter users are
jointly the communicating parties and the sensors of such multi-agent network sys-
tem for global social metacognition, called the Twittersphere. By reporting, dissemi-
nating, transforming, citing and commenting information about uncertainty events,
the Twittersphere becomes itself a model and gauge of the degree of civil society
uncertainty in relation to specific events, or, areas of the world in which the latter
have, or may, occur.
In the following section we will illustrate the methodology used to construct our
uncertainty indexes from our Tclean database of tweets containing the term "uncer-
tainty". This subsection starts with a brief review of the criteria used to filter ob-
servations and construct our dataset of Twitter observations about uncertainty. We
then highlight the main differences between our indexes and the most similar pre-
existing uncertainty indexes based on textual data, i.e. the Economic Policy Uncer-
tainty (EPU) indexes by Baker, Bloom and Davis[386].
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Index construction technique and differences from existing uncertainty measures
Similarly to the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index by Bloom, Baker and
Davis [386], the presence of the word uncertainty" in a textual observation (a tweet) is
a necessary condition for that observation to be potentially considered and counted
as a signal for civil society uncertainty. For this reason the term "uncertainty" was one
among the query conditions used to download our Twitter Uncertainty dataset.
A major difference between our TU indexes and the EPU indexes is that for the
construction of the EPU indexes, besides the term "uncertainty", the term "uncertain"
is also used as an identification signal for uncertainty. We voluntarily choose to
avoid using this second term -"uncertain"- in the construction of our indexes for the
following reasons: tweets are not exclusively news containers, they are also used
as narration and story-telling devices for private life events and personal thoughts.
The adjective "uncertain" is generally used to qualify one’s individual mental state in
relation an actual or expected phenomenon, like the weather or the outcome of a job-
interview, under such circumstances it is only a quality of a noun, in a sentence. In
tweets in which it appears, the adjective "uncertain" is generally used instrumentally,
as a non-necessarily essential qualification of a entity. Whereas, the term "uncer-
tainty", being a noun, is the main or only element of subjects of verbs, or, of objects
of verbs or prepositions in a sentence.
While the noun "uncertainty" is frequently used in sentences that describe external
and collective situations, using the third person singular or a plural form, "uncer-
tain" is frequently used in statement in the first person singular, to describe ones’
personal thoughts.
Especially in tweets, the word "uncertainty" is very rarely used to elicit private-life
uncertainties, but, it is frequently used with reference to states of diffused uncer-
tainty in reference to a group, community or society, to which the writer of the post
belongs-to or observes. In such situations "uncertainty" signals that the target group,
community or society is experiencing, collectively, above tolerance levels of surprise
or expected surprise, in relation to the degree of divergence of opinions or expecta-
tions elicited through processes of communication and social metacongition. There-
fore civil society uncertainty, which is the phenomenon that we wish to identify and
measure in this study, is therefore more precisely and robustly identified in tweets
using only the noun "uncertainty".
Twitter Uncertainty indexes are constructed by counting the number of messages
(tweets), per time interval (days), contained in subsets of the Tclean dataset. The
dataset is subsetted using token dictionaries as logical boolean functions conditions,
and using tokens (sequences of characters) contained in observations as boolean in-
puts to evaluate themembership of a given observation to a given subset of the Tclean
dataset. If the conditions of a dictionary are matched, i.e. the dictionary function ap-
plied to a given observation gives TRUE, then the observation belongs-to the data
subset represented by the dictionary. Tokens in the geographic-area dictionaries are
assumed to represent the necessary conditions for the imputation of a state of civil
society uncertainty, publicly declared through a tweet, to a specific geographic-area.
Dictionaries may contain three different types of textual tokens:
• *REGEX exactmatching tokens -for example: "United States" and "Great Britain";
• ** REGEX exact matching after tokenization tokens -for example: "US" and
"UK";
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• *** REGEX exact matching, preceded by white-space condition tokens - for
example: "U.K" and "U.S"; E.U;
To minimize the probability of including false positives in our dataset we volun-
tarily choose to exclude the use of quasi-synonyms of the word uncertainty (like
"doubt" or "confusion") or other words that frequently co-occur or are associated with
uncertainty (like "fear" or "anxiety") as signals for civil society uncertainty.
Index Validation by Upstreaming Information Cascades
To identify the information cascade processes that determined the peaks in our un-
certainty indexes we have upstreamed the information sources contained in our ob-
servations by searching for signals of the original source of the information men-
tioned by twitter users. We manually analyse the most-frequently observed con-
tents in messages that where posted in civil society uncertainty peaking days. We
have upstreamed these information cascades as much as possible, using the follow-
ing signals:
• URL links: these links often point to online articles from web-newspapers,
press agencies and blogs; as well as from official press releases or speeches by
Central Bank governors/personnel, national government cabinet officials and
executives of listed companies, NGOs, intergovernmental or international
organizations;
• Quotations: direct quotations -in brackets- of statements and fragments of
speeches, which predominantly come from members of the above-stated
categories; as well as from influential political, cultural, artistic and scientific
figures;
• Mentions: Explicit reference to a named entity (person, organization and place,
etc.) in a observation;
• Reference Citations: Explicit reference to the documentary sources of the
content/ideas expressed in a observation -without linking by URL to it-. This
technique is generally used to refer to information sources that are not
available on the Internet, that have been deleted or that the user is unable to
recover;
By so doing we wish to exploit the web as a digital historical archive of information
about uncertainty. Through which we can identify, retrieve and analyse the primary
sources to which our observations refer-to. We do so with a historical method and
approach. By exploring who relies on the different sources of information available
on the web, we can recognize the uncertainty signalling online authority and repu-
tation dynamics, and, disentangle the distribution of influence among information
providers, at a given moment in time or in relation to a given event or segment of
the population.
For the two TU indexes that we present and use in this work, the US-TU and the
UK-TU, we have included in the section 2.0.2 of the Appendix at the end of the
article the outcomes of the aforesaid index validation process.
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Twitter Uncertainty indexes: US-TU and UK-TU
As previously explained, Twitter Uncertainty (TU) indexes specialized by geographic-
area are derived by subsetting Tclean with a area-specific token dictionary, and then,
counting the number of observations per day. Here follow our TU by geographic-
area for the and the United Kingdom (UK-TU) and the United Stated (US-TU).
United Kingdom Twitter Uncertainty (UK-TU) index
The UK-TU index has been constructed using jointly two dictionaries of geographic-
area tokens, juxtaposed with an OR filter. Those of the United Kingdom and Great
Britain:
Figure 2.1. UK-TU geographic-area tokens dictionary
"United Kingdom"* OR "UNITED
KINGDOM"* OR "united kingdom"*
OR "UK"** OR "uk"** OR "U.K"***
OR "u.k"*** OR "U.K."*** OR "u.k."***
OR
"Britain"** OR "BRITAIN"**
OR "britain"** OR "gb"** OR
"GB"** OR "g.b"*** OR "G.B"***
OR "g.b."*** OR "G.B."***
REGEX are case sensitive
UNITED KINGDOM GREAT BRITAIN
We did so because from a semantic point of view these terms are very close to each
other. Even though strictly speaking Great Britain’s geo-political area corresponds
to the UK without Northern Ireland, they are often used in twitter posts and news
as alternative identifiers (labels) for the same geographic-area.
Figure 2.2. United Kingdom Twitter Uncertainty (UK-TU) index by day
The UK-TU index counts in total, from the first of April to the end of December, 69
372 observations. The index’s time series, represented in figure 2.2, evidences the
extraordinary uncertainty impact of the British EU-referendum outcome. The un-
certainty effects of this event are the largest in the period covered by this study by
several orders of magnitude, with more that 4 000 observations in the day of the
referendum results announcement. Brexit is clearly also the more persistent uncer-
tainty shock we observe. Till July the 14th the index stays above 400 observations
per day.
United States Twitter Uncertainty (US-TU) index
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Our uncertainty index for the United States of America, named US-TU index has
been computed using the following terms as geographic-area identification tokens
for filtering the ATU database:
Figure 2.3. US-TU geographic-area tokens dictionary
"United States"* OR "UNITED
STATES"* OR "united states"*
OR "US"** OR "USA"** OR
"usa"** OR "U.S"*** OR "u.s"***
OR "U.S."*** OR "u.s."*** OR
"U.S.A"*** OR "U.S.A."***
OR "u.s.a"*** OR "u.s.a."***
UNITED STATES
REGEX are case sensitive
Figure 2.4. United States Twitter Uncertainty (US-TU) index by day
The US-TU has a total of 34 024 observations, which is about one half of UK’s num-
ber of observations. At a first glance, the US-TU index’s time series, represented in
figure 2.4, evidences recurrent small and mild uncertainty shocks in June and July,
especially in dates near to UK’s EU-referendum. Then a relatively long low uncer-
tainty period, from mid July to the beginning of October, with few isolated events.
Followed by increasingly recurrent and more persistent uncertainty events, some
with exceptionally high peaks. Major shock events start during the last two weeks
of the US presidential elections campaign, when the FBI enquiry on Clinton’s email
server is revived. US-TU reaches the maximum observed value the day after the US
elections, day in which the victory of Trump becomes known. This date represents
the positive extremum of US-TU and counts more than two thousand observations
in a single day. From this moment on Twitter users start signalling above average
uncertainty in the US, in relation to their political expectation, in particular in rela-
tion to US’s foreign and climate policy under Trump.
As we can see from the commented graphs of the time series of the UK-TU and US-
TU indexes, as well as, from the detailed analysis in section 2.0.2 of the Appendix:
our indexes are highly reactive and highly sensitive quantitative indicators of the
degree and dynamics of aggregate civil society uncertainty across time. Not only our
indexes respond almost instantaneously to major political, economic, financial in-
formation impulses that may affect the degree of uncertainty of civil society in these
two countries, but also, they appear to be short memory processes. By having a
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relatively short memory, our indexes can reveal the existence and magnitude of se-
quential/iterated (in the time dimension) civil society uncertainty impulses, also in
the period that follows major events. This latter characteristic is rare if not unique
among uncertainty proxy measures, like newspaper-based uncertainty indexes or
option implied volatility indexes, which generally exhibit higher hysteresis.
2.3 (Other) endogenous uncertainty variables
In relation to the model on uncertainty contagion, between and within the UK and
US, which will be estimated and analyzed in the next sections, besides the US-TU
and UK-TU indexes, which have been already described, four other endogenous
variables will be used. Two Economic Policy Uncertainty[386] indexes, called US-
EPU and UK-EPU, and, two option-implied volatility indexes, called VFTSE and
VIX.
Economic Policy Uncertainty indexes: US-EPU and UK-EPU
• Daily United States economic policy uncertainty index (US-EPU)[503]: the
daily value of the US-EPU index is obtained by using the Newsbank’s news-
paper archive service, called Access World News[504], to count the number
of article published by UK newspapers covered by this archive, containing at
least one token from each of the following topic dictionaries:
economy OR economic
legislation OR deficit
OR regulation OR
congress OR Federal
Reserve OR White House
uncertain OR uncertaintyAND AND
ECONOMIC
POLICY (US)
UNCERTAINTY
Figure 2.5. Token dictionaries used to construct the daily US-EPU index, by
Baker, Bloom and Davis
the values obtained through the daily count of articles matching the above-
stated filtering criteria are then rescaled, by dividing each daily value by the
count of the total number of articles from US newspapers published in the
corresponding day. This to take into account the fact that the number of news-
papers covered by the Newsbank archive increased across time. But also, be-
cause the number of articles per newspaper may also change from one day to
another. Finally, the index value is frequently renormalized to match the value
of the monthly EPU index in specific dates.
• Daily United Kingdom economic policy uncertainty (UK-EPU) index[505]:
the daily value of the UK-EPU index is also obtained by using Access World
News[504], to count the number of article published by UK newspapers cov-
ered by the archive, containing at least one token from each of the following
topic dictionaries:
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economy OR economic
spending OR deficit
OR regulation OR bud-
get OR tax OR policy
OR Bank of England
uncertain OR uncertaintyAND AND
ECONOMIC
POLICY (UK)
UNCERTAINTY
Figure 2.6. Token dictionaries used to construct the daily UK-EPU index, by
Baker, Bloom and Davis
As for the daily US-EPU, the values of the UK-EPU are also rescaled by divid-
ing each daily count by the total number of articles published by UK newspa-
pers in the corresponding day.
For what concerns the EPU indexes by Baker, Bloom and Davis, it has been found
that an upward 90 points innovation of the EPU index causes a "drop in industrial pro-
duction of about 1 percent and a rise in the unemployment rate of about 25 basis points"[386].
The authors of the EPU also find that economic policy uncertainty has "sizable [and
significant estimated] effects on the cross-sectional structure of stock-price volatilities, in-
vestment rates and employment growth"[386]. Even though formally the EPU indexes
are economic policy uncertainty indexes, they have been used as generic uncertainty
proxies in a great variety of studies:
• Asymmetric changes in risk premia: it has been empirically observed that,
when political uncertainty increases, i.e. when the EPU index of a country
experiences a positive shock, investors ask for an extra political uncertainty
premia to invest in the country that experienced the shock[506]. This extra
premia is increasing in the magnitude of the shock and in the riskiness of the
investment -i.e. decreasing in the credit rating-, and decreasing in the GDP
growth rate of the country that experienced the shock. As a result, the bigger
is the uncertainty shock and the worse is the economic situation of a country
that experienced it, the more investors will disinvest/flee from high-risk high
expected profitability investments in that country. Investors "will not reallocate
efficiently until market perceive uncertainty as completely normalized [EPU goes be-
low its average value]"[507]. Therefore, unexpected political uncertainty shocks,
proxied by the innovations in the EPU index, may cause investors’ hoarding
of safe havens -like gold and triple A sovereign among others- during periods
of political turmoil and uncertainty.
• Changes in the volatility and systemic risks of financial markets: it has been
found that when policy uncertainty increases in a country, prices in that country
becomemore volatile andmore correlated. Pastor and Veronesi[506], using the
EPU as proxy of policy uncertainty in a General Equilibrium model, find that
"volatility is more than 50% higher in bad conditions (21% versus 13.4%) and the
correlation [among equity prices] is 80% higher (78% versus 43%). The reason is that
political uncertainty is higher in bad economic conditions[... And] this uncertainty
affects all firms, so it cannot be diversified away".
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Option-implied volatility indexes: VIX and VFTSE
• Daily -opening and closing values- of the S&P500 option-implied volatil-
ity index (CBOE VIX)[508]: the VIX index is calculated with a model free
methodology, based on the work of Demeterfi et al.[509] on pricing variance
swaps. S&P500 put and call options are subdivided by expiring date and then
ordered/indexed by increasing strike price (index i). Only options with non-
zero bid price, with more than 23 days and less than 37 days to expiration are
considered. In addition, once two consecutive put options with zero bid prices
are found, no put options with lower strike price are considered. Similarly,
once two consecutive call options with zero bid prices are found, all calls with
higher strikes are excluded. VIX is constructed as a weighted average of the
aforesaid subset of options on a 14 days long rolling interval, centered on 30
days. Therefore ,VIX is a measure of volatility expectations of the S&P500 In-
dex for the next month. For more details on the methodology used to compute
the VIX we refer to the CBOE VIX White Paper[508].
• Daily -opening and closing values- of the FTSE100 option-implied volatil-
ity index (NYSE-Euronext VFTSE)[510]: the VFTSE index can be considered
the FTSE100 equivalent of the VIX index, as the VIX it is a proxy measure of
expected volatility of stock prices, for publicly traded firms. The VFTSE index
shares the same methodology of the VIX index. It is computed by using the
market pricing data of FTSE100 options. For a detailed overview of the calcu-
lation methodology and information content of the VFTSE index see the paper
by Siriopoulos & Fassan[510].
The above stated volatility indexes have been extensively employed, inmacro-economics
and finance literature, as uncertainty proxy measures. Prior studies have shown that
option-implied volatility measures, like the VIX and VFTSE, include "information
about future volatility beyond that contained in past volatility"[510].It has been found that
volatility indexes fall the day after monetary policy announcements. More specifi-
cally, the "VIX index (and hence the S&P 500 options market) reacts in a systematic manner
surrounding US monetary policy announcements.[...] The index falls on average by 2% on
the day of Federal Open Market Committee meetings. No significant movements on days
prior to or after the meetings have been identified[511].
In section 2.0.4 of the Appendix the time series of US and UK twitter uncertainty
(TU) indexes have been compared to the Economic Policy Uncertainty (US-EPU and
UK-EPU) and volatility (VIX and VFTSE) indexes of the corresponding country.
2.4 A structural VAR Model for the inference of uncertainty
contagion channels in the UK and the US
2.4.1 Model concept
Since the the EPU indexes and option-implied volatility measures are constructed
using different information sources compared to TU indexes, respectively news arti-
cles and stock option prices, they are ideal candidates, to be used in a VARmodelling
setting, to estimate eventual uncertainty dependencies, feedback mechanisms and
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granger causation structures between the following sources of uncertainty, within
and between countries:
1. Degree of market uncertainty in the US and UK reflected by option prices:
proxied through option-implied volatility indexes (VIX and VFTSE);
2. Degree of policy uncertainty in the US and UK assessed by professional
journalists and experts: proxied through the daily Economic Policy Uncer-
tainty indexes developed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (US-EPU and UK-EPU);
3. Degree of civil society uncertainty in the US and in UK perceived by the
online community: proxied through the daily Twitter Uncertainty indexes by
geographic-area (US-TU and UK-TU);
Here follows a diagrammatic representation and description of known and expected
relations among our endogenous variables:
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Figure 2.7. Interactions among uncertainty variables
A- Financial Uncertainty feedback mechanisms: option-implied volatility pro-
cesses are often considered (medium term) mean or median reverting pro-
cesses, subject to gamma-like distributed shocks. Therefore, we expect that
after a impulse option implied volatility (if no additional relevant perturbation
occurs) slowly converges back to its prior average/median long-term station-
ary level. The empirical distributions of option-implied volatilities indexes are
both leptokurtic and right skewed (see Fig. 2.25 and Fig. 2.26);
B- Civil Society Uncertainty feedbackmechanisms: uncertainty information dif-
fusion processes in social networks, like online reactions to uncertainty related
events, are generally assumed to be short memory processes. Our TU index
time series appear, to exhibit this kind of behaviour (see Fig. 2.23 and Fig.
2.24). The empirical distributions of TU indexes are very leptokurtic and right
skewed. As we can see from section 2.0.2 of the Appendix, our indexes are
very reactive to information about uncertainty coming from an great variety
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of sources. As a result, they exhibit short term peaking and decaying pat-
terns, and eventually, rapidly dissipating positive feedback effects, responsi-
ble for inter-day information cascades, clearly visible duringmajor uncertainty
shocks, like the Brexit vote in the UK and the election of Trump in the US;
C- Policy Uncertainty feedback mechanisms: we expect policy uncertainty, mea-
sured through the EPU indexes, to have a larger hysteresis, and more per-
sistent peaking patterns than our twitter uncertainty measures. This because
the content of published articles is generally richer -in terms of quantity and
quality of the information therein contained- compared to messages about un-
certainty posted by people on online social networks, therefore news articles
(EPU observations) require more time to be written, understood, and even-
tually re-elaborated before being diffused by other newspapers, which rarely
"copy and past" policy uncertainty signals delivered by other agents, like insti-
tutions, politicians and other media. Therefore, published policy uncertainty
news cascades should be smaller in scale -relative to the average values of the
index- and produce more durable effects than their social network based coun-
terparts. The fact that the empirical distribution of our the EPU indexes (see
Fig. 2.21, and Fig. 2.22) is also right skewed and leptokurtic, but less lep-
tokurtic and right skewed compared to our TU indexes is compatible with the
aforementioned hypothesis;
D- Inter-country interaction between market uncertainty variables: empirical
studies have shown that, uncertainty spillover effects, i.e. the relation between
option-implied volatility indexes for stock markets of different countries, de-
pends on the level of integration among the capital markets of those coun-
tries, the more capital markets are integrated the higher is the correlation co-
efficient between volatility indexes. The magnitude of this relation may vary
across time, it often increases during periods of economic and political uncer-
tainty[512]. According to Rahmaniani et al.[513] US and UK investors’ expec-
tations about future uncertainty are highly integrated: from 2004 to 2014 the
value of the time varying conditional correlation coefficient between VIX and
VFTSE has oscillated within the [0.4, 0.6] interval.
E- Inter-country interaction between civil society uncertainty variables: in nor-
mal times we expect our US and UK civil society uncertainty variables -proxied
with TU indexes- to exhibit weak or statistically null lagged interdependence
coefficients. In general, excluding exceptional events, there is no evident rea-
son to hypothesize that an increase in civil society uncertainty in a country should
cause an increase in civil society uncertainty in another country. However, as we
have seen in the first section, during extreme shocks with potentially global
repercussions, like the EU-referendum and the US presidential elections, civil
society uncertainty did propagate from one country to the other becoming a rel-
evant uncertainty contagion channel among countries. This channel may be-
come particularly important when the source of uncertainty are supranational
or not geographically bounded or circumscribable, like for example:
• uncertainty concerning climate change mitigation policies of the US after
the election of Trump;
• uncertainty related to the outcome Syrian conflict;
• uncertainty related to possible development and use of nuclear weapons
by North Korea;
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• uncertainty generated by terrorism, which recurrently propagates across
borders from the civil society in which the last attack took place to -at
least- all allied countries and their civil societies;
F- Inter-country interaction between policy uncertainty variables: since the proxy
used for policy uncertainty are based on newspapers articles filtered by source
(geographic location of the newspapers’ headquarters) the US policy uncer-
tainty index reacts not only to uncertainty news concerning the US, but to all
news articles published by US newspapers containing at least a token from
each filtering dictionary. Therefore articles counted by the US-EPU may there-
fore report about uncertainty in other countries, like the UK. The same reason-
ing applies to UK policy uncertainty, the UK-EPU may well contain signals of
uncertainty concerning the US. As a result we expect the two EPU indexes to
have a high positive instantaneous correlation coefficient. Since the share of
articles concerning foreign countries in each EPU index is unknown and may
change across time, becoming larger when a foreign country experiences a ma-
jor policy uncertainty shock while the situation in the home country is calm. We
cannot distinguish the effects of these different policy uncertainty sources that
are contained in each EPU index;
G- Intra-country interaction between market and civil society uncertainty vari-
ables: if option prices instantaneously reflect, in all moments in time, all avail-
able information, including information concerning civil society uncertainty, then
the lagged values of US/UK civil society uncertainty shouldn’t be informative
predictors for US/UK market uncertainty. Whether the aforementioned effi-
cient markets hypothesis is true or false, it is probable that the lagged values
of US/UK market uncertainty are informative predictors for US/UK civil society
uncertainty. The reason behind this hypothesis is very simple, the TU indexes
used as proxies for civil society uncertainty contain discussions, remarks and
comments concerning uncertainty in markets, like changes in option-implied
volatility, and since people may mention some of these happenings in the days
that follow the market event, market uncertaintymay well positively influence,
from a causal point of view, civil society uncertainty in the corresponding coun-
try;
H- Intra-country interaction between market and policy uncertainty variables:
the same remarks made for the interaction betweenmarket uncertainty and civil
society uncertainty apply to the relation between market uncertainty and policy
uncertainty. If markets are efficient, lagged values of US/UK policy uncertainty
shouldn’t be informative predictors for US/UK market uncertainty. Whereas
lagged values of US/UKmarket uncertainty are expected to be informative pre-
dictors for US/UK policy uncertainty.
I- Intra-country interaction between Policy and civil society uncertainty vari-
ables: as we have seen in the first section, our TU index often mention or cite
online news articles about uncertainty. Therefore we may expect that lagged
values of US/UK policy uncertainty are informative predictors for US/UK civil
society uncertainty. However, since TU indexes are potentially more reactive to
real world events compared to EPU indexes, it is also possible that lagged val-
ues of US/UK civil society uncertainty are informative predictors for US/UK pol-
icy uncertainty. Therefore, we hypothesize the existence of a bilateral granger
causation relation (with feedback mechanisms) between policy and civil society
uncertainty variables of the same country.
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J- Inter-country interaction between market and civil society uncertainty vari-
ables: we have no a priori knowledge about the relation between market and
civil society uncertainty of two different countries;
K- Inter-country interaction between market and policy uncertainty variables:
we have no a priori knowledge about the relation between market and policy
uncertainty of two different countries;
L- Inter-country interaction between policy and civil society uncertainty vari-
ables: we have no a priori knowledge about the relation between civil society
and policy uncertainty of two different countries;
Given the numerous possible interaction channels between our variables, we believe
the use of a VAR modelling setting is the appropriate methodological choice to es-
timate the relevance of the aforementioned uncertainty contagion and amplification
channels. We model the interactions between our variables, at a daily frequency,
including all trading days common to the US (VIX) and the UK (VFTSE) markets.
All our time series have been rescaled to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation
of 1, i.e. they have been standardized. Since all our variables have rather similar
-gamma like- empirical distribution shapes, once standardized it will be easier for
us to compare the time series and interpret the values of estimated coefficients from
our VAR models.
2.4.2 VAR model specification
VAR process models[514–516] have been widely adopted for the analysis of multi-
variate time series in which the present value of the endogenous variables is deter-
mined in large part by their own history, apart from deterministic regressors, like a
constant and trend, and, if necessary, exogenous variables, like seasonal dummies.
A V AR(p) process for a set of K endogenous variables and N exogenous dummy
variables can be defined as:
yt = A0 +
p∑
i=1
Aiyt−i +
N∑
j=1
Bjej,t + ut (2.4.1)
Where:
yt is aK-dimensional vector with endogenous variables at time t;
Ai areK ∗K coefficients matrices, with i ∈ {1, ..., p} ;
ut is a white noise K-dimensional process s.t. E(ut) = 0 and E(utu>t ) = Σu is a
time invariant positive definite covariance matrix;
A0 is aK-dimensional vector with constant terms;
Bj (with j ∈ {1, ..., N}) is aK-dimensional vector containing the coefficients of the
j’th exogenous dummy variable;
ej,t (with j ∈ {1, ..., N}) is a one-dimensional vector containing the value of the j’th
exogenous dummy variable at time t;
In our model we have six endogenous standardized variables:
yt = (UK-TUt,US-TUt,VFTSEt,VIXt,UK-EPUt,US-EPUt)
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For stationarity and unit root tests on endogenous variables’ time series see section
2.0.4 of the Appendix.
In addition to endogenous variables we have a set of 4 exogenous day of the week
dummy variables:
• Tuesday (e1,t) : a binary one-dimensional vector, whose element is equal to one
if day t is Tuesday and equal to zero otherwise;
• Wednesday (e2,t) : a binary one-dimensional vector, whose element is equal to
one if day t is Wednesday and equal to zero otherwise;
• Thursday (e3,t) : a binary one-dimensional vector, whose element is equal to
one if day t is Thursday and equal to zero otherwise;
• Friday (e4,t) : a binary one-dimensional vector, whose element is equal to one
if day t is Friday and equal to zero otherwise;
Since three out of four information criteria tell us that the optimal lag order is two
(see section 2.0.5 of the Appendix) we estimate a VAR(2)model which can be written
as follows:
yt = A0 +A1yt−1 +A2yt−2 +
4∑
j=1
Bjej,t + ut (2.4.2)
Given the relatively small sample size (182 observations), our lack of prior knowl-
edge about the structure of error variance/covariance matrix and the fact that we
do not impose restrictions on our equations -they all have the same explanatory
variables-, we choose to estimate the model using OLS.
2.4.3 VAR(2) Estimates and residuals analysis
Since all roots of the characteristic polynomials of our model lie inside the unit cir-
cle, our VAR equation system is stable/stationary. As we can see from the Table
2.2, more than half of the estimated coefficients of endogenous variables (37 out of
72) are not statistically significant at the 0.1 confidence level. About one third of
the estimated coefficients of endogenous variables (29 out of 72) are statistically sig-
nificant at the 0.05 confidence level. Finally, only sixteen estimated coefficients of
endogenous variables are statistically significant at the 0.01 confidence level.
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Table 2.2. VAR(2) model estimates
VFTSE at close prices (4:30PM UTC); VIX at open prices (2:30PM UTC); all endogenous variables
have been standardized
L means once lagged variable, L2 means twice lagged variable
Dependent variables:
UK-TU US-TU VFTSE VIX UK-EPU US-EPU
L UK-TU 0.45∗∗∗ −0.13 0.10∗∗∗ 0.07 0.37∗∗∗ 0.15
(0.09) (0.11) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10)
L2 UK-TU 0.09 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.03 −0.15
(0.10) (0.12) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11)
L US-TU −0.12 0.32∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.12∗∗∗ 0.05 0.12
(0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
L2 US-TU 0.08 0.15∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.07 0.06
(0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)
L VFTSE −0.73∗∗∗ −0.39 0.86∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗ −0.45∗∗ −0.31
(0.20) (0.24) (0.08) (0.12) (0.17) (0.21)
L2 VFTSE 0.94∗∗∗ 0.26 0.18∗∗ −0.04 0.65∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗
(0.21) (0.25) (0.08) (0.13) (0.18) (0.21)
L VIX 0.33∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.04 0.77∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.25∗
(0.14) (0.17) (0.05) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14)
L2 VIX −0.33∗∗ −0.08 −0.15∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.44∗∗∗ −0.28∗
(0.14) (0.17) (0.05) (0.09) (0.12) (0.15)
L UK-EPU −0.06 0.01 0.01 −0.07 0.22∗∗ −0.03
(0.10) (0.12) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11)
L2 UK-EPU 0.05 0.03 −0.08∗∗ −0.06 0.15∗ 0.07
(0.09) (0.11) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10)
L US-EPU 0.07 −0.02 −0.03 −0.01 0.04 0.22∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
L2 US-EPU 0.02 −0.01 −0.06∗∗ −0.06 0.05 0.37∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
Const 0.05 −0.06 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.24∗
(0.13) (0.16) (0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14)
Tuesday −0.15 0.03 −0.04 −0.22∗∗ 0.14 −0.13
(0.18) (0.21) (0.07) (0.11) (0.15) (0.19)
Wednesday 0.07 0.37∗ −0.03 0.02 0.15 −0.32∗
(0.18) (0.22) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.19)
Thursday 0.03 0.01 −0.16∗∗ −0.07 −0.21 −0.39∗∗
(0.18) (0.22) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.19)
Friday −0.19 −0.11 −0.11 0.02 −0.11 −0.27
(0.18) (0.22) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.19)
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182
R2 0.51 0.30 0.93 0.81 0.63 0.47
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.24 0.92 0.79 0.60 0.42
Resid. SE (df=165) 0.74 0.88 0.28 0.46 0.64 0.77
F Stat. (df=16;165) 10.69∗∗∗ 4.51∗∗∗ 134.05∗∗∗ 43.99∗∗∗ 17.86∗∗∗ 9.04∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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As we can see from the VAR(2) regression table (Table 2.2) and its summary dia-
gram (Fig. 2.8), while Adjusted R2 of volatility indexes are very high (0.92 for the
VFSTE and 0.79 for the VIX) the ones of twitter uncertainty indexes rather low (0.42
for the UK-TU index and 0.22 for the US-TU index). The high adjusted R2 of both
option implied volatility indexes, which are used as proxies of UK and US market
uncertainty, show that, in the timespan of our study, which contains both the EU-
referendum and US presidential elections, market uncertainty variability in the UK
and the US appears to be in large part explainable through non-market uncertainty
proxies’ variations. Whereas, through our model, it is more difficult to explain ob-
served oscillations in non-market uncertainty variables through the swings of market
uncertainty proxies. Furthermore, we observe that a relatively larger share of the
variance of US market uncertainty (VIX) remains unexplained by our model com-
pared to its UK counterpart (VFTSE). This finding may be partially explained by the
higher degree of interdependence between market and non-market uncertainty prox-
ies in UK (UK-TU, UK-EPU, VFTSE) compared to US (UK-TU, UK-EPU, VIX). The
three UK endogenous variable have higher R2 compared to their US counterparts,
this could be due to a higher interdependence between the three uncertainty prox-
ies in UK compared to US, a higher signal/noise ratio for UK uncertainty variables
with respect to US variables, or, to the higher relevance of omitted variables for US
compared to UK. This finding may be linked to the peculiar situation that UK ex-
perienced after the EU-referendum, when, given the intensity and rapid succession
of several disruptive events/shocks, uncertainty in UK may have been reinforced
through positive inter-source feedback effects and propagation mechanisms among
market and non-market uncertainty variables that are endogenized in our model. In
addition, only for the VFTSE (column 3), VIX (column 4) and US-EPU (column 6)
indexes at least one day of the week dummy variable is statistically significant. This
means that only these three time series exhibit constant day of the week cyclical
trends. Finally, for what concerns uncertainty spillover effects, the coefficients that
describe US variables’ lagged dependency on UK variables are in general terms less
significant, from a statistical point of view, with respect to UK (Market and Policy)
uncertainty lagged dependency on US uncertainty variables.
Figure 2.8. Statistically significant inter-day dependency relations among
endogenous variables
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The residuals of the UK-TU index fluctuate close to zero until a week before the EU-
referendum, after this point they appear to be more autocorrelated and distributed
in a non-normal way for at least two weeks. Successively UK-TU residuals fluctuate
again very close to 0, until a week before the US-elections. The gamma like dis-
tributed residuals observable after the EU-referendum may represent unexpected
civil society uncertainty in UK, caused by the vote result in favour of Brexit. Similarly,
residuals of the US-TU fluctuate close to zero until a week before the US-elections,
after this point residuals appear to be autocorrelated and right skewed for almost
three weeks. Successively they fluctuate again very close to 0. Like for the UK-TU
index, gamma like distributed residuals observable around the US elections repre-
sent unexpected civil society uncertainty in US, which was caused by higher election
uncertainty just before the vote and by "Trump related" uncertainty after the vote.
The two civil society uncertainty variables -proxied with TU indexes- appear to be less
dependent on other lagged uncertainty measures compared to the EPU and volatil-
ity indexes. Partial autocorrelation among the residuals of UK-TU and US-TU is
probably due to the aforementioned periods of exceptional unexpected civil society
uncertainty.
Figure 2.9. Standardized VFTSE fit, residuals and residuals’ autocorrelation
As we can see from Fig. 2.9, the fitted regression curve of VFTSE remains very close
to the observed value of VFTSE in almost the whole period under study. Residuals’
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation values never come out from the confi-
dence interval, therefore we do not refuse the null hypothesis of absence of auto-
correlation and partial-autocorrelation. The residuals of the VIX index (Fig. 2.10)
also oscillate rather close to 0 during the entire period of study, with two exceptions
around observations number 50 and 105. Around these two points residuals appear
to have a higher variance and are more right skewed.
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Figure 2.10. Standardized VIX fit, residuals and residuals’ autocorrelation
Finally, the residuals of the UK-EPU index and those of the US-EPU indexes are
halfway between those of the volatility indexes and the ones of the TU indexes. With
very few exceptions they appear to have a constant variance across time. The resid-
uals’ autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation coefficients are, all but one (PACF
for the UK-EPU residuals, for lag 5), in the confidence intervals.
The distributions of the residuals of the VIX, VFTSE, US-EPU and UK-EPU appear
to be almost normal when plotted against a normal distribution. It was rather sur-
prising for the author to see to which degree, by using four extremely leptokurtic
and right skewed, gamma-like distributed variables (the TU and EPU indexes) as
regressors, we were able to obtain almost normally distributed residuals, especially
for what pertains to the residuals of the volatility indexes (VIX and VFTSE).
For an in-depth analysis of the stability of estimated coefficients and other robust-
ness checks we refer to subsection 2.0.8.1 of the Appendix.
2.4.4 Structural impulse-response functions
In the following subsection we compute the impulse response (IR) functions of our
estimated system of equations. As Tsay[515] points out, in VAR models, error terms
can "be correlated, that is, Σu is not a diagonal matrix". Since error terms consist of all the
influences and variables that are not directly included in the endogenous variables vector [...]
correlation of the error terms [-estimated through the residuals variance-covariance matrix-]
may indicate that a shock in one variable is likely to be accompanied by a shock in another
variable. In that case, setting all other residuals to zero [while computing impulse-response
functions] may provide a misleading picture of the actual dynamic relationships between the
variables [and] obscure the actual relation between the [endogenous] variables"[517]
By looking to the residuals variance-covariance matrix Σuˆ we can see that our es-
timated VAR(2) model appears to have non-null covariance relations among error
terms.
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Table 2.3. Σuˆ Residuals Variance Covariance Matrix
UK-EPU US-EPU VFTSE VIX UK-TU US-TU
UK-EPU 0.406 0.076 -0.019 0.078 0.245 0.113
US-EPU 0.076 0.587 -0.018 0.057 0.123 0.195
VFTSE -0.019 -0.018 0.079 0.036 -0.009 -0.027
VIX 0.078 0.057 0.036 0.210 0.144 0.085
UK-TU 0.245 0.123 -0.009 0.144 0.544 0.057
US-TU 0.113 0.195 -0.027 0.085 0.057 0.770
The covariance among endogenous variables’ residuals appears to be particularly
high and positive for the EPU indexes. We could expect shocks to the two EPU vari-
ables to be highly and positively interdependent -from an instantaneous point of
view- because both variables are based on Newspapers’ content, and, even though
this content comes from information sources of two different countries, the US for
the US-EPU and the UK for the UK-EPU, it may -and certainly will- occur that news-
papers from the two countries of the same day talk about the same subjects or world-
wide relevant events, like UK’s EU-referendum and the US presidential elections.
To a lesser extent, we observe that for both geographic-areas there is a positive co-
variance of residuals of the EPU and TU indexes considered by country. This in-
stantaneous relation was also expected since Civil Society instantaneously reacts to
information stimuli about policy uncertainty concerning the same geographic-area.
To embed in the impulse-response functions the non-null instantaneous dependency
relations evidenced by the residuals’ variance-covariance matrix. We must perform
our impulse-response analysis in terms of orthogonalized MA (Moving Average)
representation of our VAR system:
yt =
∞∑
i=0
Θiωt−i
Where ωt = (ω1,t, ω2,t, ..., ω6,t) are orthogonalized innovation terms with unit vari-
ance: Σω = IK and the Θi = (Θ1,i,Θ2,i, ...,Θ6,i) coefficients are the dynamic MA
responses to orthogonalized innovations. In practice, we can orthogonalize the in-
novations through a Choleski decomposition of the residuals’ variance covariance
matrix Σuˆ.
The results of the Choleski decomposition depend upon the ordering of our en-
dogenous variables, also called Wold causal ordering. The Wold causal ordering
co-determines the orthogonalized IR functions and is therefore critical for the inter-
pretation of our estimated system. It cannot be determined with statistical meth-
ods, and must be specified -by the authors- through a recursive technique based
on a-priori beliefs and theoretical knowledge about which endogenous variables
may have an instantaneous effect on other endogenous variables. Such that, innova-
tions of the first variable y1 have a potential immediate impact on all other variables
(y2, y3, y4, y5, y6); the ones of the second variable have a potential immediate impact
on all other variables except the first one (y3, y4, y5, y6), and so on.
We choose to place the EPU indexes before all other endogenous variables in our
Wold causal ordering for the following reasons:
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• By being based on printed newspapers their daily content is determined -once
and far all- at the beginning of the day.
• Markets and twitter users "consume" newspapers as information sources dur-
ing the day, hence daily agents’ activity on markets and twitter is likely in-
fluenced by newspapers contents whereas the effect of volatility and twitter
uncertainty innovations may have an impact only on next-day printed news-
papers, and therefore the EPU indexes are by construction not sensible to intra-
day twitter and market uncertainty.
We chose to place option-implied volatility indexes after the EPU indexes and be-
fore the TU indexes -in our Wold causal ordering-. This because, from a chronolog-
ical point of view, daily TU activity concerning markets pursues after the closing of
markets and may have as object daily market events, like volatility shocks. Whereas
markets cannot instantaneously react to daily TU information published after their
closing.
In addition, for each group of variables -EPU indexes, TU indexes and volatilities-
we choose to put the United Kingdom variable before the United States one, for the
following reasons:
• EPU indexes: given that days are identified through UTC time, we will have
that UK daily newspapers are generally printed/distributed before US news-
papers. It is therefore very unlikely that the content of daily US newspapers
may influence the content of UK ones -since when the latter are published the
first may have still to be written-, while the inverse relation may be true;
• Option-implied volatilities: when US’s S&P 500 market opens UK’s FTSE100
market has already undergone six hours of trading; therefore it is more likely
for US markets’ option-implied volatility at opening to be influenced by UK’s
option implied-volatility near closing compared to the possibility of the re-
verse relationship being true;
• TU indexes: TU observation concerning UK are more frequently written dur-
ing UK daylight/working hours whereas TU observation about US are more
frequently written during US daylight/working hours. Therefore the distribu-
tion (by hours - UTC time) of TU activity concerning UK is centered at the left
of TU activity concerning US; it is therefore more probable that daily innova-
tions in UK-TU activity may influence innovations in US-TU rather than the
reverse relationship being true;
The chosen Wold causal ordering used to orthogonalize the innovations -through
Cholesky decomposition/factorization of Σuˆ- is the following:
(UK−EPU,US−EPU,VFTSE,VIX,UK−TU,US−TU)
We obtain the following lower triangular matrix T , s.t. Σuˆ = T ∗ T t:
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Table 2.4. Choleski factorization of the Residuals Variance Covariance Matrix (T )
UK-EPU US-EPU VFTSE VIX UK-TU US-TU
UK-EPU 0.637 0 0 0 0 0
US-EPU 0.120 0.756 0 0 0 0
VFTSE -0.029 -0.019 0.279 0 0 0
VIX 0.122 0.056 0.144 0.414 0 0
UK-TU 0.385 0.102 0.017 0.216 0.581 0
US-TU 0.177 0.230 -0.061 0.142 -0.111 0.806
By multiplying both sides of the equation of our VAR(2) estimates by T we obtain
a structural form VAR model, with orthogonalized error terms. Orthogonalized IR
and cumulative IR functions are simulated up to 40 steps ahead (2 months) using
the structural estimated model. Bootstrapped 68% confidence bands (CBs) -based
on 1000 bootstrap replications- are obtained through the use of Hall’s percentile
method[517, 518]. For reasons of space constraints we include only the plots of the
cumulative impulse-response functions of market uncertainty variables, to impulses
of civil society uncertainty variables. The cumulative IR functions plots and comments
for all other variables have been included in section 2.0.6 of the Appendix. Cumu-
lative IR (y-axis) are functions of time (x-axis) in working-week days. They should
be interpreted as the sum of the responses, from time 0 to t, of the variable j to a
unitary shock (one standard deviation) of the impulse variable i that has occurred t
working days ago.
Figure 2.11. Cumulative responses of UK market uncertainty (VFTSE) to one
standard deviation (SD) impulses of civil society uncertainty variables
Bootstrapped 68% confidence bands (in red)
As we can see from Fig. 2.11, an impulse to the UK-TU causes a positive bell shaped
cumulative response of the VFTSE index in the first week after the shock. The cu-
mulative response then becomes statistically equivalent to 0. An impulse to the US-
TU causes a positive and increasing cumulative response of the VFTSE index. The
cumulative response tends to a close to unitary value about one month after the
impulse. The lower confidence band approaches 0 as the time-distance from the
impulse increases.
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Figure 2.12. Cumulative responses of US market uncertainty (VIX) to one
standard deviation (SD) impulses of civil society uncertainty variables
Bootstrapped 68% confidence bands (in red)
For what concerns the VIX index, as we can see from Fig. 2.12, an impulse to the US-
TU index, causes a small and negative cumulative response of the VIX the first day
after the impulse. The cumulative response then becomes positive and statistically
different from 0 between eight and fourteen days after the US-TU impulse. Whereas,
an impulse to the UK-TU index causes a bell shaped positive cumulative response
of the VIX index in the short run (first five days), which then becomes statistically
equivalent 0.
2.4.5 Next-day forecasting of uncertainty variables
In the following subsection we sequentially compute and analyze the one step ahead
(next-day) forecasts for each endogenous variable in our estimated VAR(2) model.
The scope of this subsection is not to compare the forecasting performance of our
VAR(2) specification relative to forecasts obtained under alternative functional forms,
but, more simply, to appraise in which terms and to which degreemarket uncertainty,
policy uncertainty and civil society uncertainty fluctuations may be anticipated -the
day before- thanks to our -rather simple- daily re-estimated and unrestricted VAR(2)
model. Moreover, we wish to verify if, as we expect, for all types of uncertainty it is
more difficult to anticipate positive -compared to negative- daily variations, i.e. to
predict the occurrence/intensification of uncertainty events compared to their dissi-
pation/attenuation. We verify this hypothesis by looking to our daily variation sign
prediction performance, as well as other forecasting performance indicators. One of
the advantages of using a vector autoregressive model, is that -by construction- once
estimated this type of model is well-suited to sequentially forecast next day values
of the endogenous variables. Imagine to be at time t-1, we could use the estimates
of our VAR(2) model, estimated using all observations available until time t-1, to
forecast -with great precision- the values at time t of the endogenous variables. This
because, in our VAR(2) model, the values at t are based on the observed values of
endogenous variables at t-1 and t-2, and, on the present value of exogenous vari-
ables. Since at t-1 we have already observed the values of the endogenous variables
at time t-1 and t-2, and since we used as exogenous variables only day of the week
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dummies, whose values are known in advance: at time t-1 we have all the informa-
tion required to forecast -using the model estimates obtained at time t-1- the value
of our endogenous variables at time t. By construction, the only thing that we do not
and cannot observe in at time t-1 are the innovations at t.
Following the above-stated process, we sequentially forecast the one step ahead
(next working day) values of our endogenous variables: the first VAR(2) model is
estimated using the first five weeks of data (25 observations) and with the estimated
model we forecast the value of the 26th observation. Then, we estimate again our
VAR(2) model using 26 observations and use it to forecast the 27th observation, and
so on. As a result our one-step ahead forecast interval, called I, goes from May the
13th to December the 31st 2016.
Since our VAR(2) model is estimated using standardized variables, to obtain mean-
ingful and comparable forecasts from our re-estimated VAR(2) model, for each t
belonging to I, we must:
1. Subset the time-series of the endogenous variables, keeping only the first t-1
observations for each time-series;
2. Save two vectors, one containing the means:
mt−1 = (m1,t−1, ...,m6,t−1)
the other containing the standard deviations:
sdt−1 = (sd1,t−1, ..., sd6,t−1)
of the subsetted time-series;
3. Standardize the values of the subsetted time-series;
4. Estimate the V AR(2)model using the (t−1)∗6matrix containing standardized
subsetted time-series:
std(y) = (std(y)1, ..., std(y)6)
5. Use the estimated model ̂V AR(2)t−1 to forecast the standardized values of the
endogenous variables at time (observation) t:
ŝtd(y)t|t−1 = (ŝtd(y)1,t|t−1, ..., ŝtd(y)6,t|t−1)
6. Transform the forecast vector ŝtd(y)t|t−1 back to level values ŷt|t−1, by multi-
plying it by the transposed vector of standard deviations sdtt−1 and by adding
to it the transposed vector of means mtt−1 of the time-series used to estimate
the model ̂V AR(2)t−1;
By doing so, we obtain the next-day (one step ahead) level forecasts’ time-series
for each endogenous variable, which can be compared to observed (level) values to
evaluate the forecasting performance of our VAR(2) model. Table 2.5 summarizes
the forecasting performance of our VAR(2) unrestricted model.
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Table 2.5. One Step Ahead Sequential Forecasting - Summary Statistics
Correctly Correctly Correctly
predicted predicted predicted
sign of positive (∆ > 0) negative (∆ < 0)
variations variations variations
(% total) (% N positive) (% of N negative)
UK-TU 63% 72% 56%
US-TU 73% 68% 78%
VFTSE 84% 77% 92%
VIX 79% 77% 81%
UK-EPU 73% 66% 79%
US-EPU 72% 68% 76%
Mean
Mean Absolute Pseudo
Error Error R2
UK-TU 34.305 239.784 0.532
US-TU -47.343 91.278 0.540
VFTSE -0.128 0.730 0.914
VIX -0.097 0.715 0.821
UK-EPU -48.801 176.505 0.350
US-EPU -7.981 29.821 0.381
As we can see from Table 2.5, given the simplicity of our model, the frequency of
observations and the limited lag order our civil society uncertainty forecasting per-
formance are reasonable satisfying, especially for US-TU, for which in 73% of cases
we correctly predict the sign of the daily variations (differenced observation values).
Especially in dates in which the fluctuations are small we tend to overestimate the
magnitude of civil society uncertainty fluctuations. We tend to overestimate UK-TU
and underestimate US-TU, this is probably due to the fact that the EU-referendum
takes place at the beginning of our observed sample and the US-elections close to the
end, between the two events the determinants of the fluctuations of US-TU (the co-
efficients of the US-TU equation) are probably underestimated compared to the ones
of UK-TU, which reacted to (integrated the information of) extreme uncertainty dur-
ing EU-referendum event in the coefficients’ value.
The performance of our VAR(2) model in forecasting (one step ahead) market uncer-
tainty is particularly good, especially for VFTSE (Fig.2.14):
• In 84% of cases our model correctly forecasts the sign of the daily variations;
• The performance is asymmetric, the model predicts better negative variations
(92% of observed cases are correctly predicted) with respect to positive ones
(77% of observed cases are correctly predicted)
• The mean error is very small and negative, in average we slightly underesti-
mate UKmarket uncertainty; however the values of VFTSE in the days just after
the EU-referendum are overestimated by our model, VFTSE under-reacted in
those dates compared to its explanatory variables, i.e. other non-market uncer-
tainty proxies;
• Themean absolute error (0.730) is smaller than themean variation of the VFTSE
time series (0.922);
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Figure 2.13. VFTSE Index next day out-of-sample forecasts
The forecasting performance for VIX (Fig.2.13) is slightly inferior to that of VFTSE,
but still very good:
• In 79% of cases our model correctly forecasts the sign of the daily variations of
VIX;
• The performance is still asymmetric, we more often correctly predict negative
sign variations (81% VS 77%), but the performance gap is smaller for VIX com-
pared to VFTSE.
• The mean error is very small and negative, in average we slightly underesti-
mate UK market uncertainty; however the values of VIX in the days just after
the EU-referendum are overestimated by our model, in dates close to the US
elections the model performs well in forecasting next day values of VIX;
• Themean absolute error (0.730) is smaller than themean variation of the VFTSE
time series (0.922);
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Figure 2.14. VIX Index next day out-of-sample forecasts
The forecasting performance of our model for policy uncertainty variables is inferior
to that ofmarket uncertainty and similar to that of US civil society uncertainty. For UK-
EPU we correctly predict in 73% of cases the sign of the variation, the for US-EPU
the performance is very similar (72% of correctly predicted variation signs). Both
policy uncertainty variables are in average underestimated. It looks like policy uncer-
tainty variables exhibit, after extreme uncertainty events a very large hysteresis: the
values of US-EPU and UK-EPU decline very slowly to their pre-event steady state
values after major shocks. It looks like market uncertainty and civil society uncertainty
processes have a shorter memory and are less "noisy" after these events, therefore no
linear combination of these variables’ values appears to be appropriate to anticipate
the recurrently high post-event values and variations exhibited by policy uncertainty
indexes in the time-frame of this study. It is also possible that the autoregressive
coefficients of policy uncertainty may vary -increasing- during extreme uncertainty
events, and then slowly re-converge to their log-term pre-event values.
In this subsection we have shown that our VAR(2) model is able to correctly antici-
pate in at least 63% of cases the sign of the daily variations of our six endogenous un-
certainty measures. Excluding UK-TU, our model correctly predicts more frequently
the sign of negative variations compared to positive ones, this performance gap is
particularly large for US and UK policy uncertainty and for US civil society uncertainty.
Market uncertainty appears to be more easily predictable compared to policy uncer-
tainty and civil society uncertainty, like if the key determinants of market uncertainty
during the year 2016 were included in the model and more stable across time com-
pared to those of policy uncertaintyand civil society uncertainty; or more simply, be-
cause market uncertainty processes are less "noisy" and volatile with respect to polit-
ical and societal ones. In addition, it looks like the forecasting performance of our
model was better around the US elections with respect to the EU-referendum. This
could be due to various reasons:
• More observations are used to predict the values of uncertainty variables close
to the US elections compared to the EU-referendum. Given that the latter event
is rather close to the starting date of our observation sample, the estimated
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coefficients could be highly volatile or imprecise (they haven’t yet stabilized)
at this point (EU-referendum), whereas when the US-elections occur we are
almost at 2/3 of our sample;
• Uncertainty innovations during the EU-referendum were more difficult to an-
ticipate (more erratic or larger in magnitude) compared to those innovations
that occurred close to the US-elections;
• Some unobserved or omitted variable, like monetary policy response, may be
particularly important close to the EU-referendum, and, the fact that we do not
include such a variable in our model may cause our forecasting performance
to drop in the time interval in which this variable is probably more relevant,
during and just after an extreme uncertainty event;
Or, more simply, uncertainty dynamics close to the EU-referendum aremore difficult
to anticipate. If this was true, close to the EU referendum we may have been facing
a situation of irreducible Knightian uncertainty.
2.4.6 Historical decomposition of uncertainty by source
In this subsection we will comment the historical Historical Decomposition (HD) of
endogenous civil society uncertainty, policy uncertainty and market uncertainty vari-
ables. Historical decomposition allows us to impute observed endogenous vari-
ables’ fluctuations to the joint cumulative effects across time, of the sequence of
-estimated- disturbances to which the endogenous variables have been subject to,
i.e. the lagged and contemporaneous effects of innovations, represented in our struc-
tural VAR(2) estimated model by the lagged and recursive (infraday) propagation of
residuals to the various endogenous variables in the system. Therefore HD can be
used to appraise the contribution of -model derived- sequences of innovations, to
each endogenous variable, on the other endogenous variables’ structural equations.
Showing us which were the drivers of fluctuations of civil society uncertainty, policy
uncertainty and market uncertainty in US and UK across the year 2016. In particular,
it allows us to look to specific intervals of dates, in which major events occurred, to
gauge the contribution each variable’s prior innovations to the observed values of a
given variable of interest in that particular day.
HDs have been obtained by using the innovation-accounting technique first pro-
posed by Burbidge & Harrison[519], which exploits the MA representation of the
structural VAR estimated model, to compute the estimated contribution of prior
-sequences of- innovations to each endogenous variable, on observed values of the
selected endogenous variable of the model. We compute the contribution of innova-
tions to each standardized endogenous variable, for each day from April the 12th to
December the 30th 2016, for each standardized endogenous variable in our orthogo-
nalized VAR(2) model. As for impulse-response functions, results are dependent on
the selected Wold causal ordering (UK-EPU, US-EPU, VFTSE, VIX, UK-TU, US-TU).
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Figure 2.15. UK-TU Historical Decomposition
As we can see from Fig. 2.15 the contribution to UK-TU of innovations to other
endogenous variables varied substantially across the time interval of this study. In-
novations to VFTSE (UK market uncertainty) have been relatively more relevant for
UK-TU (UKCivil-Society Uncertainty) from the beginning of theweek that preceded
the EU-referendum to the second ballot of the Conservative Party leadership elec-
tions on July the 7th. Their contribution was particularly large and positive in this
interval of time and almost negligible out of it. Whereas the role of innovations to
the UK-EPU index (policy uncertainty) have been particularly relevant for the UK-TU
in the two months that followed the EU-referendum. Until the beginning of august
their effect on UK-TU has been positive and very large, then, until the end of august
it became negative. VIX (US market uncertainty) played a positive -peak reinforcing-
role on UK-TU during the week after the EU-referendum, from the 12th to the 16th
of September and during the week before the US elections. Elsewhere US market un-
certainty innovations had either a negative or a almost null effect on UK-TU. US-TU
(US civil society uncertainty) had a negative effect on UK civil society uncertainty from
late September to mid October; whereas, its contribution to UK-TU has been posi-
tive during the whole month of November, i.e. during the week that preceded the
US presidential elections and during the three weeks that followed this event.
Figure 2.16. US-TU Historical Decomposition
US Civil-Society Uncertainty exhibits country-inverted endogenous variable shock
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dependence dynamics compared to UK-TU. Aswe can see from Fig. 2.16 the innova-
tions played the major role for US Civil-Society Uncertainty -besides innovations to
US-TU itself- were those of VIX (US market uncertainty). The contribution of US mar-
ket uncertainty innovations to US civil society uncertainty has been negative or close
to null during the three months that preceded the EU-referendum. It then became
positive -and rather large in magnitude- during the two weeks that followed the
EU-referendum. VIX contribution turned again negative or close to zero from mid
July to the 9th of September. Then, until the election of Trump, it became again
positive. VIX innovations have been particularly relevant, in terms of magnitude of
their effects, for US civil society uncertainty during the two weeks that preceded the
US-elections. Similarly, innovations to VFTSE (UK market uncertainty) had a partic-
ularly relevant positive effect on US civil society uncertainty from the week before to
the week after the EU-referendum. For what pertains to policy uncertainty, the con-
tribution of innovations to US-EPU on US-TU has been positive during the two days
that followed the US elections. Whereas UK-EPU played a similar role on US civil
society uncertainty the three days after the EU-referendum. Finally, UK-TU (UK civil
society uncertainty) innovations had a positive effect on US civil society uncertainty
during the week before the EU-referendum, from 12th to the 23rd of September and
from the beginning of November to mid December. Elsewhere, the contribution of
UK civil society uncertainty on US civil society uncertainty has been either negative or
close to zero.
Figure 2.17. VFTSE Historical Decomposition
As we can see from Fig. 2.17 fluctuations of UK market uncertainty were predomi-
nantly driven by the innovations to the variable itself. The contribution of innova-
tions to VIX (US market uncertainty) on VFTSE has been -almost every day- positive
from the beginning of April to the beginning of September, and has then turned neg-
ative until the end of the year 2016. UK-EPU (UK policy uncertainty) innovations had
a large positive effect on UK market uncertainty during the three months before the
EU-referendum and also during the two weeks that followed this event. The con-
tribution of UK-EPU innovations then became negative for almost all the following
days of the year 2016. With the exception of observations in the two weeks that fol-
lowed the EU-referendum and those from the second half of November to the end
of the year 2016, US-EPU (US policy uncertainty) innovations had a positive effect on
UK market uncertainty. The relevance of US-EPU contribution increased closer to the
date of the US presidential elections. Innovations to UK-TU (UK civil society uncer-
tainty) had a non negligible positive effect on UK market uncertainty only during the
three weeks after the EU-referendum, effect which declined progressively from the
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27th of June to the 13th of July. Whereas US-TU (US civil society uncertainty) impulses
had a rather large positive effect on UK market uncertainty during the whole month
of November and during the first decade of December.
Figure 2.18. VIX Historical Decomposition
Fig. 2.18 reveals that fluctuations of USmarket uncertaintywere predominantly driven
by market uncertainty innovations. However the contribution of VFTSE innovations
to VIX during the EU-referendum was larger in magnitude and opposite in sign
compared to that of VIX innovations on VFTSE during the US elections. More specif-
ically, the contribution of innovations to VFTSE (UK market uncertainty) on VIX has
been positive and particularly large in dates from June the 9th to July the 11th, and
also positive but smaller in magnitude during the month of November. UK-EPU
(UK policy uncertainty) innovations had a large positive effect on US market uncer-
tainty during the three months before the EU-referendum, until the 5th of July. The
contribution of UK-EPU innovations then became negative for almost all the follow-
ing days of the year 2016; with the exception of the twoweeks before the US elections
and the second half of December. As for VFSTE, innovations to US-EPU had positive
effects on VIX from the second half of July until the week after the US presidential
elections. US-EPU innovations’ contribution increased in magnitude from the be-
ginning September to the end of October, and reached its positive extremum during
the two days that followed the US presidential elections (9-10 November). If on one
side innovations to UK-TU (UK civil society uncertainty) had a non negligible positive
effect on US market uncertainty only during the week after the EU-referendum, inno-
vations to US-TU (US civil society uncertainty) had a more pronounced and enduring
effect on US market uncertainty: during the whole month of November, especially in
the first decade, the positive contribution of US civil society uncertainty has been one
of the main drivers of US market uncertainty.
BRIEF EXCURSUS: the observed asymmetries of inter-market uncertainty innovations’
contributions is -also- determined by the selected Wold causal ordering of the endogenous
variables. Although we have justified this ordering with logical and practical motivations,
and it appears to be the most appropriate one. The instantaneous dependency relations are
constrained by such an ordering, which determines how innovations are recursively propa-
gated across the system’s equations, allowing a one-way instantaneous infraday propagation
of disturbances from UK uncertainty variables to the corresponding US ones. Creating a
infraday dependency asymmetry between UK and US uncertainty variables.
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Figure 2.19. UK-EPU Historical Decomposition
For what pertains to the historical decomposition of policy uncertainty in the United
Kingdom (Fig.2.19) and United States (Fig.2.20), both variables had been influenced
in a similar way by innovations tomarket uncertainty variables. Innovations to VFTSE
(UKmarket uncertainty) had a large positive contribution on policy uncertainty in both
countries from mid June to mid July. Whereas innovations to VIX (US market uncer-
tainty) produced, smaller in magnitude but still relevant, positive effects on policy
uncertainty in both countries during the two weeks that follow the EU-referendum,
during the week that preceded the US elections, and between the 12th and 16th of
September, when US stocks’ prices experienced their biggest decline since the UK’s
referendum. UK-EPU (UK policy uncertainty) innovations had a particularly large
positive effect on US policy uncertainty during the six weeks after the EU-referendum,
and, from the 21st to the 29th of November, when the OBR published its Economic
and Fiscal Outlook for UK. Whereas, US-EPU (US policy uncertainty) innovations
contributed positively to UK policy uncertainty from late September until mid De-
cember. Innovations to UK-TU and US-TU (civil society uncertainty) had rather dif-
ferent contributions, both in terms of sign andmagnitude, to US andUK policy uncer-
tainty. US-TU innovations had large positive effects on both US-EPU and UK-EPU
from the beginning of November to the first decade of December 2016. Whereas
US-TU played a minor role, with a relevant positive contribution only after the EU-
referendum. Positive contributions of UK civil society uncertainty innovations to pol-
icy uncertainty lasted for a longer period for UK (two weeks) with respect to US (two
days).
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Figure 2.20. US-EPU Historical Decomposition
In this subsection we have identified a lower bound for imputable contributions of
our TU indexes to the observed values of other uncertainty variables. We found that
civil society uncertainty innovations played a relevant role in post EU-referendum/US-
elections events, and have co-determined market uncertainty and policy uncertainty
peaks and slow recovery observed patterns. The cumulative effect of UK civil soci-
ety uncertainty innovations on UK market uncertainty (VFTSE) reaches its maximum
value (0.35SD of VFTSE) three days after the EU-referendum (June the 27th). Sim-
ilarly, the cumulative contribution of US civil society uncertainty innovations to US
market uncertainty touched its maximum value (0.73 SD of VIX) six days after the
US-elections. Given the chosen Wold causal ordering, these contribution values -of
US-TU and UK-TU - on other uncertainty variables are lower bounds. These effects
are therefore worthy of interest, they legitimize our effort to construct our TU mea-
sures and are motivations for further and deeper analysis and investigation on the
topic of uncertainty contagion among market and non-market uncertainty variables.
For what pertains to the dependencies between civil society uncertainty and policy un-
certainty, we find that the contributions and effects of the first (UK-TU and US-TU)
on the latter (UK-EPU and US-EPU) are long lasting. Hence our TU indexes allow
us to improve our forecasting capacity and enrich our understanding of market un-
certainty dynamics in the short run, and, of the dynamics of policy uncertainty both in
the short but also in the medium-long term.
2.5 Conclusion
In this article we have used Twitter Uncertainty data to develop some new civil soci-
ety uncertainty proxy measures for the United Kingdom and the United States. Our
two civil society uncertainty indexes, called UK-TU and US-TU, have been used in a
structural VARmodelling setting to infer the dependencies among civil society uncer-
tainty, policy uncertainty and market uncertainty, in the United Kingdom and United
States, during the unfolding of the Brexit-Trump Era, i.e. the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarter
of the year 2016. Our unrestricted VAR(2) model estimates show that these three dis-
tinct sources of geographic-area specific uncertainty exhibit statistically significant
interdependencies, within and across these two countries. Both in terms of lagged
dependencies -Granger causality- and from a recursive infra-day -Wold causality-
point of view.
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As we have seen in the impulse-response subsection, the cumulative responses of
market uncertainty variables (VIX and VFTSE) to civil society uncertainty (US-TU and
UK-TU) impulses are -almost always- positive and exhibit bell shaped lower confi-
dence bands. As a result, in the medium term (more than two months) the cumu-
lative effects of civil society uncertainty impulses on market uncertainty variables tend
to dissipate: they are either statistically equivalent to zero or their lower confidence
band is close to zero. The observed dependency between civil society uncertainty and
market uncertainty is somehow comparable to the relation between monetary policy
and aggregate output, effect which is often hypothesized to be positive in the short
term and neutral in the long run. Our estimated model clearly evidences that these
dependencies are bidirectional and that during the year 2016 there have been intra-
area inter-source loop effects among the three sources of uncertainty considered in
this study. Especially in the short term, these feedback effects are relevant -from
an economic point of view- and statistically significant. It appears that UK market
uncertainty depends both on US’s and UK’s policy uncertainty and civil society uncer-
tainty; whereas, United States’market uncertainty depends relativelymore on internal
(intra-area) civil society uncertainty and policy uncertainty.
The dependency of market uncertainty (VIX and VFSTE) on non-market uncertainty
variables (UK-TU, US-TU, UK-EPU, US-EPU) appears to be both stronger and more
significant for civil society uncertainty variables (UK-TU, US-TU)with respect to policy
uncertainty variables (UK-EPU, US-EPU), for which the intra-area Granger causality
relation withmarket uncertainty is significant -at the 0.05 level- and bidirectional only
for the United Kingdom.
When considering also infra-day dependencies, given the Wold causality order-
ing, we observe through the Historical Decomposition of the time series of option-
implied volatility indexes (market uncertainty proxies) that the contribution of policy
uncertainty variables on market uncertainty variables is -in general- more persistent
and -in average- larger through the time span of our study, compared to that of civil
society uncertainty innovations, which, nevertheless are relevant in the week(s) that
follow major uncertainty events, like the EU-referendum and the US-elections. Else-
where the contribution of civil society uncertainty innovations on market uncertainty
(VIX and VFTSE) appears to be small.
In both unrestricted and restricted versions of our VAR model, whose estimates
are contained in subsection 2.0.8.2 of the Appendix, it appears that the strongest
spillover effects between the two studied areas, the United Kingdom and the United
States, are market driven. Markets are inter-area contagion and propagation chan-
nels not only for market uncertainty phenomena, but also for civil society uncertainty
and policy uncertainty. Only to a lesser extent, given estimated coefficients and impulse-
response functions, inter-area contagions of uncertainty between the US andUK also
occurred, in an assymmetric way, through non market-to-market uncertainty depen-
dencies. From our structural model estimates it appears that UK market uncertainty
was rather vulnerable to US civil society uncertainty impulses close to the US pres-
idential elections and during the three weeks that followed the victory of Trump;
whereas, close to UK’s EU-referendum and after the vote in favour of Brexit the es-
timated contribution to US market uncertainty of UK civil society uncertainty impulses
was more limited.
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Descriptive statistics
Figure 2.21. United Kingdom Economic Policy Uncertainty (UK EPU) by day
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Figure 2.22. United States Economic Policy Uncertainty (US EPU) by day
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Figure 2.23. United Kingdom Twitter Uncertainty (UK-TU) by day
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Figure 2.24. United States Twitter Uncertainty (US-TU) by day
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Figure 2.25. CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) by day
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Figure 2.26. FTSE100 Volatility Index (VFTSE) by day
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Index validation and decomposition by topic
In addition to the validation of the index by upstreaming information cascades. We
have here disaggregated the UK-TU and US-TU according to an additional Topics
dimension, a polytomous variable with four possible outcomes:
• "ECON and POL" - observations that belong to this category must have: one or more to-
kens that belong to the "economics" dictionary AND one or more tokens that belong
to the "politics" dictionary;
• "POL" - observations that belong to this category must have: one or more tokens that
belong to the "politics" dictionary AND NO tokens that belong to the "economics"
dictionary;
• "ECON"- observations that belong to this category must have: one or more tokens that
belong to the "economics" dictionary AND NO tokens that belong to the "politics"
dictionary;
• "OTHER" - observations that belong to this category must have: Neither tokens from the
"economics" dictionary NOR tokens from the "politics" dictionary
Unites Kingdom Twitter Uncertainty (UK-TU)
Figure 2.27. United Kingdom Twitter Uncertainty (UK-TU) index by topic and by
day
• April 14 (744): Day after the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
meeting. The MPC’s monetary policy summary [520], published the 14th of April,
states that "uncertainty relating to the EU referendum has begun to weigh on certain areas
of activity, as some decisions, including on capital expenditure and commercial property
transactions, are being postponed pending the outcome of the vote", the reporting of this
information is the subject of the majority of twitter posts about UK uncertainty that
day.
• April 27 (545): The OECD’s Secretary-General Angel Gurría, delivers a speech at
the London School of Economics titled "To Brexit or not to Brexit: A Taxing Decision".
She predicts that "from the moment of a Brexit vote until the arrangements for divorce
are definitively settled -years later- there would be heightened economic uncertainty, with
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damaging consequences. [...] Taking into account the effects of heightened uncertainty and
the less favourable trading environment while new arrangements are negotiated, we put
the Brexit tax at some 2200 pounds per household by 2020"[521]. The same day UK’s
Office for National Statistics delivers a statistical bulletin with the new projections
of the GDP for the first quarter 2016: "GDP is estimated to have increased by 0.4%"[522]
which is equivalent to a growth slowdown of 0.2% compared to the previous quarter.
These news are quickly rebounded and commented by the medias[523, 524] and
extensively mentioned throughout twitter posts regarding uncertainty in the UK.
• May 5 (559): UK economic growth is "near stalling", partly due to uncertainty over
the EU referendum, according to a closely-watched survey.
As we approach the EU-referendum vote, changes in the UK-TU index appear to
be both, highly correlated to, and caused by, community-wide reactions to news
and consequent updates of expectations, following the disclosure to the public and
medias of new technical assessments and economic forecasts regarding both the eco-
nomic effects of the referendum per se, and the implications of an eventual exit of
Britain from the EU. More specifically, the more it is claimed, by British -Bank of
England, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Office for National Statistics, among others- and
international -OECD, ECB, World Economic Forum , IMF, World Bank, among others-
economic and financial institutions that the referendum or the prospects of victory
of the exit front increase uncertainty and that uncertainty can hamper UK’s growth,
investments and employment, the more the UK-TU index rises as a result of the
sharing and discussions of these news through Twitter. In addition, the UK-TU ap-
pears to grow in dates in which the exit front seems to be ahead in polls[525] and
therefore when the prospect of an exit from the EU becomes more concrete, in partic-
ular in working weekdays from June the 6th to June the 16th, day in which the MP
Joe Cox was murdered. After that date and up to the voting day, the polls’ voting
intention shares reversed and the pro-European front appeared to be again slightly
ahead. However, despite the claimed advantage of the Europeanists in polls, during
the five days that preceded the EU-referendum the UK-TU index raised slowly but
constantly from 38 observations per day to slightly more than 400 in June the 23rd,
the voting day.
The uncertainty shock due to the EU-referendum outcome begins in June the 24th,
the day after the vote. Throughout the morning it becomes known that the British
voted (52% against 48%) in favour of leaving the European Union, reason why that
very day D. Cameron announced his intention to resign from the role of Prime Min-
ister. The uncertainty effects of this event are the largest in the period covered by
this study by several orders of magnitude, with more that 4 000 observations in the
day of the referendum results announcement. Brexit is clearly also the more persis-
tent uncertainty shock we observe throughout our area-specific indexes: The UK-TU
index stays above its average value (220) for more than three weeks, until mid July.
During the week that follows the EU-referendum vote we count more than 17 000
observations referring about uncertainty in the UK. After a first apparent recovery
during the first weekend of July, with 274 and 404 observation respectively the 2nd
and 3rd of July, the value of the UK-TU index increases again to 1421 the 5th of July,
day of the First ballot of the Conservative Party leadership elections. Till July the
14th the index stays above 400 observations per day. After a few "calm" days, the
UK-TU index value approaches again 500 observations in July the 20th and 21st:
• July 20 (478): The rating agency Moody’s publishes a Banking System Outlook for
the UK, titled "United Kingdom: Uncertainty Following Brexit Vote Will Weaken Credit
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Fundamentals"[526]. Carlos S. Duarte, Senior Vice President at Moody’s, affirms that
"increased uncertainty about the UK’s future trade relationship with the EU will likely lead
to reduced confidence and lower investment and consumer spending in the UK"[527], rea-
son whyMoody’s decided to leave unchanged its negative outlook for UK’s banking
system. Outlook that was modified to negative after the vote. Moody’s twitter user-
name is mentioned in 79 observations that day. Other posts mention information
contained in the update by the IMF of the World Economic Outlook, titled: "Uncer-
tainty in the Aftermath of the U.K. Referendum"[528], published the day before (July the
19th).
• July 21 (451): Mario Draghi has a press conference at the ECB. During the confer-
ence[529] he affirms that: "Following the UK referendum on EU membership, our assess-
ment is that euro area financial markets have weathered the spike in uncertainty and volatility
with encouraging resilience. [...] Given prevailing uncertainties, the Governing Council will
continue to monitor economic and financial market developments very closely and to safe-
guard the pass-through of its accommodative monetary policy to the real economy. [...] Large
uncertainties prevail, because first of all these figures will in the end depend on how long is
going to be the stretch of time for these negotiations to be completed and therefore to give a
certain outlook, which we don’t have with us today [...] it’s very difficult to understand how
these big geopolitical uncertainties would affect the recovery, because the channels are not
obvious. [...] The message that will probably come out -well, the message that will come out,
the message that I can foresee or expect to come out, will be a message of stability, and the
message that will come out specifically from the eurozone will be a message of a recovery that
continues, though at a slower pace, in the midst of great uncertainties. Uncertainties that
are not only or not especially, actually coming from the eurozone, but they come from vari-
ous parts of the world. And in this climate of general uncertainty, not necessarily economic
uncertainty but probably mostly geopolitical uncertainty, it’s very important that a message
of stability comes out of the G20. Policies are everywhere very accommodative. The financial
system and the banking system are stronger than they were before, and so it’s very impor-
tant that a message like that comes out." That day a great number of observations refer
to the above mentioned press conference, some of these observations are retweets
of posts by the ECB twitter profile, which refer to a particular part of the speech of
their President, as follows: "Draghi: After UK referendum euro area financial markets
have weathered the spike in uncertainty and volatility with encouraging resilience"[530].
The previous content has been posted (Id: 756104446464159745) by the ECB twitter
account (@ecb). Given the content of the tweet we hypothesize that the ECB choose
this part of the speech by Draghi to lower the general feeling of uncertainty due
to Brexit. Since Draghi speaks about a "weathering of uncertainty" we could think
that our, rather naive, UK-TU index does not correctly reflect the uncertainty in UK
that specific day. However, the peaking behavior of our TU index in this situation
reveals to be helpful, because it allows us to reveal the successful communication
tentative, given the number of retweets and the diffusion of Draghi’s citation in the
medias, of the European monetary governance system that desires to mitigate the
perception of uncertainty also through its communication policy, which mentions
uncertainty. Speeches and conferences may be more effective economic and mone-
tary policy levers than it has been hypothesized by contemporary economic theory.
These communication policy levers can be used at relatively low costs, if not at the
expenses of the reputation and authority of the declaimer in the event that the ex-
pectations and forecasts he expressed turn out to be too far from perceived reality,
and, if people are able to remember the author of the latter.
After that, from the July the 27nd to September the 21st, the UK-TU index stays
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below 400 observations per day. We cannot say if this is due to the "natural" mit-
igation and previous discounting of the uncertainty effects of Brexit metioned by
Draghi during his press conference, or to any other factor. Nevertheless the miti-
gation of uncertainty after his speech would certainly deserve a separate in-depth
analysis.
Subsequently, from the end of September on, the UK-TU peaks again, with values
above 500 (observations per day) in the following dates:
• September 22 (724): The Bank of England (BoE) publishes on its website the state-
ments of the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) meeting that took place in September
the 20th[531], which states that:"The financial system has demonstrated resilience to spikes
in uncertainty and risk aversion. [...] Although financial stability has been maintained in
the United Kingdom through a period of volatility, and a number of economic indicators
have picked up from their post-referendum low points, the United Kingdom faces a challeng-
ing period of uncertainty and adjustment. [...] Heightened uncertainty about the near-term
macroeconomic outlook and the United Kingdom’s future relationship with the EU is rein-
forcing domestic risks. [...] There remains a high degree of political and policy uncertainty in
many advanced economies". That day, the high number of posts quoting the content or
retweeting news regarding the above statements by the BoE’s FPC determined the
high value of the UK-TU index.
• October 17-18 (605 and 893): "The 3 million" initiative[532], "a grassroot organisation
for EU citizens living in the UK offering practical guidance, lobbying the government to pro-
tect the rights of EU citizens in the UK"[533] is the dominating topic discussed in the
observations counted by our UK-TU index in these two days. The following words:
"I’m one of 3 million EU citizens in the UK. This uncertainty is unbearable", said by one
of the founders of the initiative, Anne-Laure Donskoy, are quoted, mentioned, or re-
ferred to, in more than six hundred tweets, posted during the 48 hours. The initiative
rapidly attracts the attention of national and international television networks and
newspapers who devote articles and twitter posts to this subject[534–536]. Other
contents among the most shared in these two days include:
1. An article[537] titled "UK car industry fears effects of Brexit tariffs on supply chain"
published by the Financial Times and menitioned by the FT’s twitter profile
(@FT) through a tweet (Id: 787670212007067649), which states that "suppliers
to UK car industry say uncertainty over trade agreements may force them to relocate
overseas", this content is retweeted by almost a hundred users between October
the 17th and 18th.
2. An article of the Foreign Policy (FP) magazine[538] titled: "Britain Is Becoming
an Emerging Market", which is directly mentioned through FP’s twitter account
(@ForeignPolicy). The text content of the tweet (Id: 788131737163423745) is the
following: "With a plunging pound and economic uncertainty, the UK is now looking
a lot like the developing world".
• October 24 (554): The British broadcaster ITV announces it will have to cut more
than a hundred jobs as Brexit uncertainty damages UK’s TV ad market. Major
newspapers and news agencies publish articles on the issue[539–543]. In a sigle
day, on twitter the ITV topic is mentioned in almost four hundred twitter observa-
tions considered in our UK-TU index. The most retweeted post on the ITV subject
(Id: 790555236737875968):"ITV cuts 120 jobs as uncertainty over Brexit slows UK TV ad
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market", is posted by the user @Scientists4EU, a campaigning profile by UK scien-
tists to keep the UK in the EU, this tweet also contains a link to an article from The
Guardian[540].
• November 3 (676): After the decision of the British High Court that "has ruled that
the Government does not have power to trigger Article 50 without parliamentary approval
and a vote from MPs[544]. Mark McFadden, a notorious broadcaster and journalist
at ITV, expresses all his doubts and uncertainty through the following tweet:""After
the Brexit vote, UK was left with uncertainty. Now we don’t have the certainty of uncer-
tainty. Even our uncertainty is now uncertain", referring to the possible implications of
the above mentioned High Court’s decision. The post (Id: 794198371644899330) is
retweeted by about four hundred observations.
The 8th and 9th of November, which correspond to the voting day of the US pres-
idential elections and the day in which the results are revealed to the public, the
UK-TU index remains below 500 observations per day. We infer that the election of
Donald Trumpwas not considered at that date, by English speaking twitter users, as
a relevant source of uncertainty for the United Kingdom, under the specific circum-
stances generated by the Brexit vote in UK. Brexiteers and pro-brexit newspapers
and tabloids, especially far-right ones, welcomed the Trump’s presidency[545, 546],
believing it will benefit the UK, both in its negotiations strategy with the EU and by
reinforcing the historical cultural, trade and political relation among the two coun-
tries in the post-brexit era. An article in The Sun claims that: "Trump’s win could also
mean victory for Brexit Britain when it comes to trade deals with the United States"[547].
While according to the Daily Express the benefit will derive from the possibility of
imitating the "non green" energy policy envisaged by Trump: "Trump presidency could
benefit the world at large and could be very good news for the UK in particular [...] This could
help reset the UK Government’s attitude to climate change [...] The UK could perhaps follow
suit on this front and will benefit from exploiting the mountain of carbon fuel we sit on. More
jobs and cheaper energy could give our economy an enormous boost." [548]. Among spe-
cialized commentators and analysts, there are widely varied opinions regarding the
uncertainty effects for the UK due to the election of Trump. The Economist weekly
magazine considered the election of Trump an obstacle for UK’s negotiations with
the EU: "Meanwhile the British economy was already in a fragile state before last night’s
result, with the pound weakened, business uncertainty mounting and some evidence of slow-
ing investment. The economic shock of a Trump presidency may exacerbate these trends. It
will also harden politics in the mainland European countries with which Britain will shortly
start negotiating, where populists emboldened by his win will reduce mainstream leaders’
freedom to approve a pragmatic deal with Britain" [549]. While more recently, Benjamin
Broadbent, Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy at the Bank of England, affirmed
that the election of Trump had benefited UK’s economy. The FT reports Broadbent’s
words as follows: "the new White House administration had already led to improving
business and financial market conditions, boosting the UK’s economic prospects on the mar-
gin"[550]. Between the second half of November and the end of the year 2016 the
UK-TU peaks four times, at the following dates:
• November 20 (606): Three days before the official release of the November Eco-
nomic and Fiscal Outlook[551] by the UK Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR),
Peter Hammond is guest at the Andrew Marr Show on BBC One[552]. During the
talk Marr and the Chancellor of the Exchequer discuss about OBR’s "difficulties" in
modeling and forecasting UK’s economic situation given the uncertainty around the
UK government negotiating strategy:
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– Marr: "Have you had a conversation with the OBR? because it is a very strange
situation, they have to forecast what happens to the British economy over five years,
which means after Brexit, so on what basis can they possibly make a forecast given that
the government doesn’t know how you’re going to deal with that?"
– Hammond: "Clearly that’s why there is a large degree of uncertainty than usual
about the economy over the next couple of years. It will be for the OBR themselves to
explain in their report how they dealt with that higher degree of uncertainty. But of
course we don’t know exactly where we are going to end up, at the end of that period
of negotiation..." [overlapping voices]
– Marr: "It’s an almost meaningless process if you haven’t given them specific private
information about what you intend to do, then they are just making the same kind
of guess that anybody watching this program could make, and therefore there is no
particular reason to think that their 100 billion pound black-hole -if that’s what it is-
is real, or anything else they say"
– Hammond: "It isn’t about us giving them information. The fact is we’re going to en-
ter into a negotiation with our EU partners, about the terms of our future relationship
with them. It’s not about the Government’s view of the outcome, it’s about where those
negotiations end up over a period of a couple of years of hard fought negotiations. We
will get the very best possible deal that we can for Britain, but the OBR will have to
make its own judgment about where we are likely to end up and how that’s likely to
affect the economy."
Hammond successively suggests an alternative interpretation of uncertainty con-
cerning the negotiation strategy of the UK government. Hammond claims that UK’s
Brexit plans must be kept confidential, because their secrecy is a strategic advantage
for UK in its negotiations with EU countries: "Those who are urging us to reveal our
tactics are inviting us to undermine our own negotiations". UK-TU observations preva-
lently refer to Hammond’s warnings about UK uncertainty caused by negotiations
over the next two years.
• November 23 (921): Kristin Forbes, external member of the BoE Monetary Policy
Committee, gives a presentation[390] at a conference titled "Uncertainty about Uncer-
tainty", at J.P. Morgan Cazenove, in London. During her speech Forbes explains the
many difficulties in capturing signals of uncertainty through existing proxy mea-
sures and why, in her opinion, the effects of uncertainty have been overestimated.
She proposes the joint use of multiple proxy measures of uncertainty, trough a prin-
cipal component analysis, as a best practice to proxy unobservable uncertainty. She
also illustrates the interaction mechanisms between uncertainty and aggregate eco-
nomic variables, highlighting the confounding risks deriving from the use of single
uncertainty proxies. Especially when proxies are used to estimate empirical models,
she claims it is dangerous to assume that a single uncertainty proxy canmimic the la-
tent variable uncertainty. Therefore, the proxy’s estimated coefficients should not be
straightforward interpreted as if they were those of the latent variable uncertainty.
Forbes also hypothesizes the existence of an inflating "uncertainty" bubble, where
the term "uncertainty" is misused by economists, governance institutions, medias
and policy experts, which label as "uncertainty" all phenomena with negative socio-
economic effects that is strategically claimed to be uncontrollable or unforeseeable.
Forbes name is mentioned by more than fifty UK-TU observations. The same day
the OBR publishes its November Economic and Fiscal Outlook[551], which contains
forecasts of UK’s public finances and economic situation for the upcoming 5 years.
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The OBR’s outlook mentions the word uncertainty more than one hundred and fifty
times, about once every two pages. In the executive summary of the OBR’s report
it’s written that[551]:
– "Given the uncertainty surrounding the choices and trade-offs that the Government
may have to make, and the consequences of different outcomes, we have not attempted
to predict the precise end result of the negotiations. Instead we have made a judgement
consistent with most external studies that over the time horizon of our forecast any
likely Brexit outcome would lead to lower trade flows, lower investment and lower
net inward migration than we would otherwise have seen, and hence lower potential
output.[...]"
– "In the near term, as the negotiations get under way, we assume that GDP growth
will continue to slow into next year as uncertainty leads firms to delay investment
and as consumers are squeezed by higher import prices, thanks to the fall in the pound.
[...] Our forecasts are currently somewhat less pessimistic than those in the Bank
of England’s November Inflation Report and the Treasury’s published pre-referendum
analysis, but in current circumstances the uncertainty around them is even greater
than it would be in normal times.[...]"
– "The referendum result and forthcoming post-Article 50 negotiations have generated
uncertainty for firms that will lead to some investment being postponed or cancelled.
We have revised business investment down relative to our March forecast in all years,
which also reduces trend productivity growth due to slower capital deepening.[...]"
– "The monetary policy easing announced by the Bank of England in August is likely to
have reduced the impact of post-referendum uncertainty on GDP growth. This implies
a faster effect on the economy than is typical in economic models, but is consistent with
the Bank having acted to head off a drop in activity before signs of it appeared in actual
data.[...]"
– We expect the economy to be running 0.7 per cent below full capacity by the end of 2017
(compared to 0.2 per cent in the third quarter this year), with above-trend growth then
closing this output gap by mid-2021. At this stage we have not assumed any further
uncertainty-related hit to growth in 2019 when the UK’s exit from the EU is assumed
to be completed.
– We do not, at this stage, forecast that Brexit-related uncertainty will prompt more
aggressive job-shedding.[...]"
The summary of the OBR outlook finally points out that: "For this and subsequent
forecasts, there are numerous risks and uncertainties associated with the period leading up to
and following the UK’s exit from the EU, related to policy setting and the response of house-
holds and firms, with little by way of precedent to guide the assumptions in this forecast.[...]
The uncertainties around our central forecast reflect those regarding the outlook for the econ-
omy and those regarding the performance of revenues and spending in any given state of the
economy." About one hundred UK-TU observations mention or quote OBR’s outlook
and more than fifty other observations tell about Hammond’s Autumn Statement at
the House of Commons[553]. During his speech to the Parliament Chancellor Ham-
mond summarizes OBR’s previsions and briefly illustrates his economic and fiscal
policy plan[554, 555].
• December 12 (547): The British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) publishes an update
of the UK’s Economic Forecast (EF). The online version of the EF update[556] states
that: "the current level of economic momentum is set to slow over the next two years, as
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continued uncertainty around the UK’s future relationship with the EU and higher inflation
are expected to dampen growth in the medium term.[...] While some firms see significant
opportunities over the coming months, many others now see increasing uncertainty, which
is weighing on their investment expectations and forward confidence.[...] As the Brexit ne-
gotiations commence, steps will need to be taken to help ambitious firms overcome the risks,
real and perceived, borne out of political uncertainty.[...] Higher inflation and continued
uncertainty over Brexit will weigh on the UK’s growth prospects, with consumer spending
and business investment likely to be hardest hit.[...] Uncertainty remains over the longer-
term outlook, but the UK’s structural imbalances, including the over reliance on services
and household spending as drivers of growth, continues to leave the UK vulnerable to rapid
changes in economic conditions". In addition, many tweets about UK refer to a news ar-
ticle from The Guardian[557]. The article, titled "End Brexit uncertainty for EU citizens
in the UK, report urges", explains why, according to a study financed by the British
Future thinktank[? ], "the government should end uncertainty for EU nationals living in
Britain by promising that those based in the UK when article 50 is triggered can stay".
• December 29 (616): Like every end of the year, newspapers formulate their expecta-
tions for what will await UK in the year 2017. According to the FT[558] "Uncertainty
will shape the UK economy in 2017". Following this trend, among the most mentioned
twitter contents related to UK uncertainty for this day there is a BBC news article
titled "UK firms’ finance bosses say uncertainty is new normal". The article[559] is based
on a survey by Deloitte, in which 119 finance directors working in UK where ques-
tioned about the future of their firm. The survey[560] shows that "despite the rebound
in business confidence, most finance bosses expect more economic and financial uncertainty
following Brexit.[...] half of those surveyed plan to cut spending [...] 48% also expect hiring
and mergers and acquisition activity to slow down".
Unites States Twitter Uncertainty (US-TU)
beginfigure[h]
Here follows a chronological analysis of events occurring in the days in which the
US-TU peaks, and most frequently mentioned contents in twitter posts about US
uncertainty for each peak. In the first four months, between April and July the
US-TU index daily value exceeds two hundred and fifty observations, in the
following dates (in brackets the daily value of the index):
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• June 2 (344): A great majority of the posts about US uncertainty refer to a speech
by B. Obama to US Air Force Academy graduates[561]. The speech took place in
Colorado Springs at 10:20AM MDT, and was rapidly covered by newspapers and
TV broadcasters[562–564]. During his talk President Obama referred to the role of
the US in international conflicts as follows:"As we navigate this complex world, America
cannot shirk the mantle of leadership. We can’t be isolationist. It’s not possible in this
globalized, interconnected world. In these uncertain times, it’s tempting sometimes to pull
back and try to wash our hands of conflicts that seem intractable, let other countries fend
for themselves. But history teaches us, from Pearl Harbor to 9/11, that oceans alone cannot
protect us.[...] Weak public health systems on the other side of the world allow diseases to
develop that end up reaching our shores. So we cannot turn inward. We cannot give in to
isolationism. That’s a false comfort. Allowing problems to fester over there makes us less
secure here"[561]. The most frequently observed sentence referring to this speech,
considering only posts from our US-TU database, states:"Obama to address Air Force
grads amid uncertainty on US role" followed by links to the news.
• June 21-22 (546, 280): The FED chair Janet Yellen is asked to report to both cham-
bers of the US Congress about the monetary policy and US’s economic situation and
outlooks, during the Federal Reserve’s Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the
Congress[565]: to the Senate the 21st[566] and to the House of Representatives the
22nd[567] of June. During these two days US medias extensively mention in their
economic news updates the FED’s report and Yellen’s statement to the Senate Bank-
ing Committee[568–571]. In her prepared oral comments[572] Yellen refers that: "the
economic outlook is uncertain, so monetary policy is by no means on a preset course and
FOMC participants’ projections for the federal funds rate are not a predetermined plan for
future policy. The actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on economic and financial
developments and their implications for the outlook and associated risks [...] Considerable
uncertainty about the economic outlook remains. The latest readings on the labour market
and the weak pace of investment illustrate one downside risk - that domestic demand might
falter." About three hundred and fifty twitter posts considered by the US-TU index
explicitly mention or cite the part of the speech by Yellen that refers to uncertainty.
In the day in which the results of UK’s EU-referendum are known, medias[573–575]
and twitter users discuss the implications of Brexit for the US. Several twitter users
post messages saying that "US dollar is soaring" as Brexit induced uncertainty grows
worldwide. Some expect that with a stronger dollar the US commercial balance
could become more negative. On the subject, an article on Blomberg[576], titled "For
U.S. Exporters Who Profited From One Europe, New Uncertainty", explains potential
new difficulties for US firms to export their goods in a fragmenting European Union;
the article is mentioned in several posts. If on one side many twitter users focus on
the present affirming that "US stock market posed for massive losses this AM after UK vote
to leave EU", other users claim that there will soon be a rebound in US stock prices as
"US stocks [are the] only place to go amid Brexit uncertainty". The following summary of
the statement on Brexit vote by Hillary Clinton[577]:"Hillary Clinton on #Brexit: ’First
task’ is to ensure ’uncertainty created by these events does not hurt’ US economy", posted
(Id: 746348779566145537) by ABC News’s twitter profile (@ABCPolitics), is among
the most frequently retweeted posts about US uncertainty that day.
• July 9 (535): US government bonds yields, at that time of the year cosidered a
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safe-heaven by worldwide investors, touch record low as financial forecasters ex-
pect "more British Pound downside"[578] against the dollar. The Financial Times ded-
icates to the subject an article[579] titled:"US stocks and bond yields in record terri-
tory due to uncertainty". The title of the article is used as text content in twitter
posts and retweeted by several hundred users that day. In particular, the Domini-
can entrepreneur and businessman Luis de Jesus Rodriguez (@LuisRodriguezRD)
is among the first to tweet the content of the above mentioned FT article, his post
(Id: 751558280393007104) is the daily most retweeted among observations about US
uncertainty.
Then US uncertainty progressively raises as we approach the presidential elections
voting day. The month of October starts with a major uncertainty event, followed
by two minor events:
• October 4-5 (642, 738): During these two days, the most discussed topic related to
US uncertainty, is military trade relations between India and the US. In particular,
India’s government desires to strengthen military trade agreements and to hasten
the negotiations regarding their request for 22 US Predator Guardian drones to set-
tle a binding agreement before the US elections[580, 581]. More than two hundred
observations mention an article published by Reuters[582] on this subject. A great
number of tweets referring to Reuters’s article use as textual content the title of the
article: "India tries to hasten US defence deals amid election uncertainty". Several other
posts refer to recent developments in the turbulent diplomatic relations between the
Philippines and the US[583]. After having threatened to expel US soldiers from the
Philippines[584, 585] the President R. Duterte finally gives the go-ahead to joint mil-
itary drills with the US army[586, 587]. Many posts refer to this news as follows:
"US, Philippines launch war games amid uncertainty over ties".
Then, from October the 31st, several major uncertainty shocks closely follow each
other during the last two weeks of the election campaign:
• October 31 - November 4 (1064, 374, 1385, 524, 470): During the weekend (29th and
30th of October) the Democrat candidate Clinton sees her edge in polls over Trump
narrowed as the FBI "reveals it has revived an inquiry"[588] into Hillary Clinton’s email
server, after having discovered the presence of Clinton’s emails, containing poten-
tially classified information, on a computer belonging to the former congressman A.
D. Weiner[589]. As a result, uncertainty grows in the following trading days and
impacts stock markets prices worldwide[590]. On Monday our US-TU index peaks
to 859 observations per day, due to a great number of posts referring to uncertainty
about US elections outcome as the cause of the stock markets "negative" closings.
This post(Id: 793055632668655616) by Yahoo Finance (@YahooFinance):"World shares
mostly lower as FBI probe raises US uncertainty", represents very well the general feel-
ing expressed in US-TU observations that day. On Tuesday, negative effects of elec-
tion uncertainty on financial markets persist[591]. In particular, it is claimed by sev-
eral news articles[592–595] mentioned by twitter users, that election uncertainty is
causing the depreciation of US dollar against the Japanese Yen and the Euro among
others. On Wednesday, the FED’s Board of Governors "left unchanged the interest
rate paid on required and excess reserve balances at 0.50 percent ... [and] took no action
to change the discount rate (the primary credit rate), which remains at 1.00 percent"[596].
However, several twitter posts that refer to financial news articles[597–599] claim
that decisions by the FED will not invert or slowdown previous days’ worldwide
market trends caused by increasing uncertainty regarding US elections result. On
122 Ca’Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics
2.0. Appendix - Index validation and decomposition by topic
Thursday twitter users focus on news about the recent effects of US elections un-
certainty on gold and safe heavens prices[600, 601], which increased or maintained
their value during this turbulent week. On Friday numerous posts focus on the re-
cent rise of the US’s "fear index": The CBOE’s VIX is at a two-month high. The index,
which tracks the price of futures contracts for the S&P 500 stock index, is used as a shorthand
for volatility in the markets.[...] While the VIX has risen sharply in recent weeks, the increase
comes after a relatively quiet summer after the EU referendum"[602] says an article cited
in many US-TU observations. Observations which frequently quote the following
text: "Clinton or Trump? Uncertainty the only safe bet for markets ahead of US elections",
which is the title of the article.
• November 7-8 (382,264): Discussions about the effects of US elections uncertainty on
stock markets, which are well summarized by the following twitter post:"#Finance
week ahead: US election uncertainty continues to dominate markets" are still the prevalent
topic among US-TU observations in these two days. Another frequently mentioned
topic is uncertainty emerging in climate change policy discussions during the United
Nations’ Marrakech Climate Change Framework Convention Conference[603]. The
following post content:"US election uncertainty overshadows climate talks in Morocco",
which is a citation of a news article by France24[604], is among the most frequently
observed posts on the subject.
The day in which the electoral victory of Trump becomes known we observe the
positive extremum of our US-TU index, with more than two thousand observations
in a single day:
• November 9-11 (2453, 1373, 340): During the first hours of November the 9th, while
US votes are still being scrutinized, twitter users start expressing their worries re-
garding US’s future and talk about an uncertainty without precedent in recent US
History. AWall Street Journal’s article[605], cited in numerous tweets, goes even fur-
ther, by claiming that: "The presidential race has increased small-business uncertainty to
a 42-year high". While The Boston Globe writes through its Twitter profile (@Boston-
Globe):"Welcome to the United States of Uncertainty. And division. And recrimination
[URL LINK TO: Boston Globe][606]", referring to foreseen consequences for US in
case of Trump’s win. Once it became clear that Donald Trump would be the 45th
President of the United States of America twitter users start expressing great anxi-
ety and fears about US’s future through a record high number of tweets about US
uncertainty, almost two thousand in a single day. A great number of first moment
reaction posts are personal thoughts, they do not mention news or cite other users’
posts. The following observations can serve as examples to illustrate the kind of
worries expressed in US-TU observations at first, when people come to know about
Trump’s election:
– "Its not the end of the world but uncertainty is a bad thing. The US electorate has tied
our horse to an unknown."
(From: @SteevSimmonds, Post Id: 796244636993929217)
– "Trump election shock & associated rise in uncertainty just might put the US into
recession... with no policy options except yet more debt!"
(From: @jandehn, Post Id: 796254603478237184)
– "The US has the ability of making anyone that is remotely different become terrified of
their own uncertainty."
(From: @CataGuimaraes, Post Id: 796241728210632705)
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Then came the moment for the "rational" evaluation of the implications of Trump’s
election. The moment in which people looked to media to interpret reality and
form a coherent judgement about likely consequences of this event. Here follow
two among the most frequently retweeted posts, which illustrate this situation:
– "Paris climate deal thrown into uncertainty by US election result [URL LINK TO:
The Guardian][607]"
(From: @Guardian, Post Id: 796329601916080128, 253 retweets)
(From: @GuardianEco, Post Id: 796328164616065024, 107 retweets)
(From: @ClimateDesk, Post Id: 796389493171359744, 27 retweets)
(From: @GuardianWorld, Post Id: 796331285870362624, 26 retweets)
(From: @GuardianAus, Post Id: 796329899103490049, 21 retweets)
(From: @NatureClimate, Post Id: 796357060359233536, 20 retweets)
– "Trump victory heralds uncertainty and market volatility. Longer-term, US remains
on steady growth path. #USElections"
(From: @CreditSuisse, Post Id: 796267615228481536, 39 retweets)
The most discussed topic associated to US uncertainty is the "Trump effect" on US’s
foreign policy, energetic policy and environmental policy.
In the following two days the US-TU index is still high but progressively decreases
from 2453 to 340 posts per day. The most retweeted post among our US-TU obser-
vations is about foreign leaders reaction to Trump’s victory.:
– "World leaders have mixed reactions to Trump’s election as US president, from men-
tioning a "period of uncertainty" to calling it "great news"
(From: @AFP, Post Id: 796515420689879040, 387 retweets)
Despite the numerous and somehowunexpected post-election endorsements of Don-
ald Trump by worldwide leaders, the above-mentioned tweet contains the term "un-
certainty" that was mentioned by the French President François Hollande[608] when
asked to give his opinion about likely consequences of Trump’s victory.
During the days that follow the victory of Trump demonstrations and protests
against policy reforms envisaged by the neo-elected President rapidly surge across
the US[609–614]. The business magnate and philanthropist George Soros, a major
donor to Democrat’s 2016 elections campaign[615], whose name is mentioned in
more than 604 TU observations, is blamed by Trump supporters[616, 617] for
financing and organizing many of these protests through his NGOs and media
partners. November the 10th, Trump publicly affirms in a tweet (Id:
796900183955095552) that:"Now professional protesters, incited by the media, are
protesting. Very unfair!"
During an interview for CBS News[618] he reaffirms this belief. At fist, claims re-
garding Soros’s financing of protesters are labeled as "fake news" by major US and
international newspapers[619, 620]. Only few US medias[621, 622], Russian news
agency Sputnik[623, 624] and RT[625] support Trump’s claims about protesters be-
ing paid by political opponents. Nonetheless, at the end of November Trump sup-
porters move to action "in defense" of the new presidency: "billionaire investor and
philanthropist George Soros has become a target of Donald Trump supporters, who began
organizing protests against the prominent Democratic donor they accuse of contributing to
civil unrest in the wake of the elections" says an article of USA Today[626] referring to
Trumpist’s move against Soros.
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• November 27 (485): One of Trump’s most influential twitter supporters, Bill Mitchell
(@mitchellvii), considered by theMITMedia Lab[627] among the top 30 US elections
influencers, enters the "anti-Soros" media campaign arena tweeting the following
message (Id: 802862614820823041): "Rumor was Soros heavily shorted the US markets
prior to this election. Perhaps he is funding this to add uncertainty and slow the rally?" The
afore-cited post is retweeted by several hundred users that day.
It appears that the hypothesis, according to which during the election campaign and
after the victory of Trump, uncertainty in US markets was "voluntarily fabricated"
by Soros through financial and media operations, with the purpose of generating a
crisis in the US, first to hinder the election campaign of Trump and once elected to
create governance difficulties to the new presidency, exerted and still exerts great ap-
peal on pro-Trump twitter users and is intensively debated in the medias[628–645],
fomenting a post-truth "info-war" among opposing US political factions. Since orga-
nizations and individuals taking part to the uncertainty debate on Twitter may use
the term "uncertainty" strategically, our uncertainty indexes, as people, can be influ-
enced by all forms of "information stimuli", also strategically biased news containing
the term "uncertainty".
Comparative analysis
In the following subsection we compare the time series of US and UK twitter uncer-
tainty (TU) indexes with the Economic Policy Uncertainty (US-EPU and UK-EPU)
and volatility (VIX and VFTSE) indexes of the corresponding country.
Comovement analysis of civil society and policy uncertainty: UK-TU Vs UK-EPU
and US-TU Vs US-EPU
As we can see from the joint plot of the UK-EPU (in red) and UK-TU (in black)
standardized time series (Fig. 2.28) the two UK uncertainty measures exhibit at a
first look very similar dynamics in the time interval considered by this study. We
observe that while the UK-TU index exhibits extreme shocks as large as ten standard
deviations, the UK-EPU index never peaks above six standard deviations. After
large shocks the standardizedUK-TU index returns to values close to zero faster than
the standardized UK-EPU index. The UK-EPU exhibits lower positive peaks and a
lower average value compared to the UK-TU index during the three months before
the EU-referendum. Whereas, during the three months after the EU-referendum the
opposite relation is true, the UK-EPU exhibits higher volatility, more numerous and
higher positive peaks and a higher average value than the UK-TU index. In the last
week of the US presidential election campaign and in the month that follows the
US elections the UK-EPU index exhibits higher volatility, higher positive peaks and
a larger average value than the UK-TU index. In this range of dates the two UK
uncertainty indexes peak on the same dates. However, the UK-EPU index appears
to be more sensible to post Trump election uncertainty shocks.
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Figure 2.28. Standardized UK-EPU and UK-TU by day
Let us now compare the US-EPU (in red) and US-TU (in black) standardized time
series (Fig. 2.29). The two US uncertainty measures remarkably differ in the mag-
nitude and timing of their peaking dynamics. We observe that the US-EPU index
exhibits a seven standard deviations peak two days after the EU-referendum, this
peak dissipates only six days later during the first weak of July, whereas the US-TU
index exhibits a relatively small -two standard deviations- peak a few days before
the EU-referendum (July the 21st), this peak dissipates after only two days and is fol-
lowed by another -one standard deviation- peak the day after the EU-referendum.
Figure 2.29. Standardized US-EPU and US-TU by day
While the US-TU index exhibits two extreme shocks as large as four standard de-
viations during the last two weeks of the US election campaign the US-EPU index
never peaks during the last weeks of the US-election campaign. The day after the
US elections, when the victory of Trump is announced, the standardized US-TU in-
dex experiences a eleven standard deviations shock. The same day the US-EPU has
a value close to 2.5 standard deviations. The US-EPU touches its post-election ex-
tremum value one day later (November the 9th), and while the US-TU index returns
close to zero four days after the elections (November the 12th) the US-EPU index
experiences two other positive peaks, which dissipate as far as November the 21st.
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Finally, in December, the US-EPU exhibits more frequent and higher positive peaks
and a much larger average value compared to the US-TU index.
Comovement analysis of civil society and market uncertainty: US-TU Vs VIX and
UK-TU Vs VFTSE
By looking to the standardized time series of the VFTSE and UK-TU (Fig. 2.30) we
remark that in April and from mid-September to the end of October there is no ap-
parent correspondence between peaks in the VFTSE index and peaks in the UK-TU
index. From the beginning of May to mid-June, UK-TU peaks appear to anticipate
slightly or co-occur with VFTSE peaks, which dissipate more slowly than UK-TU
peaks. Three weeks before the EU-referendum the VFTSE index starts growing and
touches its maximum value five days before the voting day. Whereas, the UK-TU
index value slowly grows until the voting day and rapidly peaks in the following
day to its maximum observed value. Both indexes are close to zero or negative from
mid-July to mid-September. Finally, during the last week of the US election cam-
paign both indexes exhibit a -one standard deviation- peak, but the UK-TU shock
dissipates faster.
Figure 2.30. Standardized VFTSE and UK-TU by day
As we can see from Fig. 2.31, standardized VIX and US-TU exhibit rather different
dynamics. From April to mid-June the VIX index is very volatile and has a much
larger average value than the US-TU index. Then the VIX index peaks both oneweek
before the EU-referendum and the day that follows the referendum. Whereas, the
US-TU index peaks only two days before the referendum in UK. Both indexes exhibit
low -almost only negative- values during July and August. Then, from September
to the end of October, the VIX and US-TU peaks almost never co-occur, the two time
series exhibit very different patterns in this range of dates. Finally, both variables
peak the weak before and the day after the US presidential elections. However the
US-TU extremum is much higher than the VIX value in the corresponding date (11
VS 3 standard deviations);
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Figure 2.31. Standardized VIX and US-TU by day
Time series stationarity tests
In the following section we test for the stationarity of the time series used as endoge-
nous variables in our VAR models. We remark that in our framework stationarity is
important because applying a (least squares) regression on non-stationary variables
can give misleading parameter estimates[646, 647]: unit root processes may have
a non-finite variance and an ever changing mean. We suspect that, given the short
timespan of this study and the daily frequency of our time series, the hypothesis that
volatility indexes (VIX and VFTSE) have a unit root will be refused only for high sig-
nificance levels (α > 0.3). However, this doesn’t imply that option-implied volatility
indexes are not stationary mean reverting processes in a longer/different time inter-
val or at a lower frequency, as literature suggests[648]. Despite there are no evident
reasons for our twitter uncertainty indexes and for the EPU and TU indexes to be
non-stationary, it could be possible that, if we considered a longer termmodel, these
indexes could also depend on some omitted variables that may vary in the long run.
For example, the number of active users in Twitter or the share of BOTs active in the
social network, which are assumed to be constant in this study. Here follow (2.6) the
results of the following unit root and stationarity tests[649] on the levels and on and
first differences of all our time series:
• Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)[650, 651];
• Phillips-Perron (PP)[652];
• Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shinb (KPSS)[646];
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Table 2.6. Stationarity tests
all endogenous variables have been standardized; Dif stands for once differenced
ADF-stat lags pvalue PP-stat lags pvalue KPSS-stat lags pvalue
UK-TU -3.507 5 0.044 -7.107 13 <0.01 0.199 9 >0.1
Dif UK-TU -7.226 5 <0.01 -24.327 13 <0.01 0.035 9 >0.1
US-TU -3.388 5 0.059 -9.521 13 <0.01 0.416 9 0.070
Dif US-TU -8.757 5 <0.01 -31.363 13 <0.01 0.035 9 >0.1
VFTSE -2.787 5 0.247 -2.675 13 0.294 0.513 9 0.037
Dif VFTSE -5.465 5 <0.01 -14.020 13 <0.01 0.050 9 >0.1
VIX -3.186 5 0.092 -3.781 13 0.0214 0.209 9 >0.1
Dif VIX -7.037 5 <0.01 -15.213 13 <0.01 0.031 9 >0.1
UK-EPU -2.915 5 0.194 -6.615 13 <0.01 0.144 9 >0.1
Dif UK-EPU -7.204 5 <0.01 -23.001 13 <0.01 0.036 9 >0.1
US-EPU -3.755 5 0.023 -9.000 13 <0.01 0.348 9 0.100
Dif US-EPU -8.076 5 <0.01 -35.634 13 <0.01 0.035 9 >0.1
The augmented DickeyFuller test (ADF) stat has a unit root under the null hypothesis H0
Lags of the ADF test: lags = (N − 1)1/3
The Philips Perron (PP) test stat has a unit root under the null hypothesis H0
Lags of the PP test: lags = 12 ∗ (N/100)1/4
The KPSS test stat is "level" stationary under the null hypothesis H0
Lags of the KPSS test: lags = 10 ∗N1/2/14
For a significance level of 0.1 we reject the ADF test null hypothesis -presence of unit
root- for the following level variables:
• UK-TU, US-TU, VIX, US-EPU;
For a significance level of 0.1 we reject the PP test null hypothesis -presence of unit
root- for the following level variables:
• UK-TU, US-TU, VIX, UK-EPU, US-EPU;
For a significance level of 0.1 we reject the KPSS test null hypothesis -stationarity-
for the following level variables:
• VFTSE
Despite VFTSE appears to be non-stationary at a 0.1 significance level, the results of
the stationarity/cointegration tests are likely due to the changing trends before and
after the EU-referendum, and depend on the magnitude of this event. For similar
reasons, due to pre and post US election trends, stationarity test statistics suggest
that VIX and UK-EPU could also be non-stationary in the particular time interval
considered in this study. But, if we use the whole historical time series of the UK-
EPU, VIX and VFTSE to test the stationarity of these three processes (through ADF
and PP tests), we refuse the null hypothesis of unit root at the 0.05 significance level
for the three time series. Moreover, literature[648] suggests that volatility is a sta-
tionary mean-reverting processes in the medium term. Therefore, in this study we
assume that all our time series are stationary I(0) processes.
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Criteria for the choice of the number of lags of the VARmodel
To select the lag order of our VAR model, we have searched for the number of lags
that minimized the majority of the following four information criteria, given our
endogenous time series and conditional on exogenous day-of-the-week explanatory
dummy variables:
• Akaike information criterion (AIC) is minimized for L=2
• Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQC) is minimized for L=2
• Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is minimized for L=1
• Akaike final prediction error (FPE) is minimized for L=2
Max lag order = 5, which is equivalent to one week becuase we use only working days’
observations;
Since three out of four criteria give us that the optima lag order is two we choose
to model our system of endogenous variables with a VAR(2) model which can be
written as follows:
yt = A0 +A1yt−1 +A2yt−2 +
4∑
j=1
Bjej,t + ut (2.0.3)
Orthogonalized Cumulative Impulse-Response functions
Here follow a detailed description of orthogonalized impulse response functions.
[ As we can see from Fig. 2.36 the UK-TU index reacts as follows to unitary impulses:
• An impulse to the UK-TU index causes a rapidly increasing cumulative response in
the UK-TU index from 0 to 10 days from the impulse, which then stabilizes near to
a unitary response/impulse ratio;
• An impulse to the VFTSE causes an almost null cumulative response in the UK-TU
index at first. But then the response/impulse ratio increases logarithmically across
time;
• An impulse to the VIX causes a small positive cumulative response in the UK-TU
index in the first two weeks (10 days) and then becomes statistically equivalent to 0;
• An impulse to the US-EPU, or to the UK-EPU, causes a small positive cumulative
response in the UK-TU index in the two weeks (10-12 days) after the impulse, the
cumulative response then becomes statistically null in the long run;
• An impulse to the US-TU causes a small negative cumulative response in the UK-TU
index in the first three days and then increases logarithmically and becomes positive
from 15 to 40 days after the impulse;
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Figure 2.32. Response of Standardized UK-TU to one SD impulses
Bootstrapped 68% confidence bands (in red)
As we can see from Fig. 2.33 the US-TU index reacts as follows to unitary impulses:
• An impulse to the US-TU index causes an positive and cumulative response in the
US-TU index that tends to a value close to one in the long run;
• An impulse to the UK-TU index causes an increasingly negative cumulative re-
sponse in the US-TU index in the short run, which tends to a value close to 0.6;
• An impulse to the US-EPU, or to the UK-EPU, causes a small and positive cumula-
tive response in the US-TU index at first, which then becomes statistically equivalent
to 0 about one week after the impulse;
• An impulse to the VIX causes a positive and increasing cumulative response in the
US-TU index that stabilizes close to a unitary response value after two weeks;
• An impulse to the VFTSE causes a statistically null cumulative response in the US-
TU index;
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Figure 2.33. Response of Standardized US-TU to one SD impulses
Bootstrapped 68% confidence bands (in red)
As we can see from Fig. 2.34 the VFTSE index reacts as follows to unitary impulses:
• An impulse to the UK-EPU index, or to the US-EPU index, causes a increasingly
negative cumulative response of the VFTSE, which tends to values close to 2.5 about
two months after the impulse;
• An impulse to the VFTSE index causes a positive and increasing cumulative re-
sponse of the VFTSE index, that tends to a value close to 4 two months after the
shock;
• An impulse to the VIX causes a small positive cumulative response of the VFTSE in
the short run. The cumulative response then becomes negative and tends to a value
close to −1.5 about two months after the impulse;
• An impulse to the UK-TU causes a positive, bell shaped like, cumulative response
of the VFTSE index in the first week after the shock. The cumulative response then
becomes statistically equivalent to 0;
• An impulse to the US-TU causes a positive and increasing cumulative response of
the VFTSE index. The cumulative response tends to a close to unitary value about
one month after the impulse. The lower confidence band approaches 0 as the time
from the impulse increases;
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Figure 2.34. Response of Standardized VFTSE to one SD impulses
Bootstrapped 68% confidence bands (in red)
As we can see from Fig. 2.35 the VIX index reacts as follows to unitary impulses:
• An impulse to the UK-EPU index, or to the US-EPU index, causes a positive and
very small cumulative response of the VFTSE in the very short run. The cumulative
response then becomes increasingly negative and approaches -1.5 about one month
after the impulse;
• An impulse to the UK-TU index, causes a -bell shaped- positive cumulative response
of the VIX index in the short run (first five days), which then becomes statistically
equivalent 0;
• An impulse to the US-TU index causes a small and negative cumulative response of
the VIX index the first day after the impulse. The cumulative response then becomes
positive and statistically different from 0 between eight and fourteen days after the
impulse;
• An impulse to the VIX index, causes a -bell shaped- positive cumulative response of
the VIX index in the first thirty five days, which then becomes statistically equivalent
to 0;
• An impulse to the VFTSE index, causes a positive logarithmically increasing cumu-
lative response of the VIX index that tends to a response/impulse ratio of 3;
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Figure 2.35. Response of Standardized VIX to one SD impulses
Bootstrapped 68% confidence bands (in red)
Aswe can see from Fig. 2.36 the UK-EPU index reacts as follows to unitary impulses:
• An impulse to the UK-EPU causes a positive, bell shaped like, cumulative response
of the UK-EPU index. The highest cumulative effect is touched around two weeks
after the impulse. Then the cumulative response slowly decreases, but remains pos-
itive;
• An impulse to the VFTSE causes an almost null cumulative response of the UK-
EPU index the first week after the impulse. Then the cumulative response slowly
increases towards a value close to two, two months from the impulse;
• An impulse to the UK-TU, or to the US-TU, causes a positive and increasing cumu-
lative response of the UK-EPU index at first. But then the response/impulse ratio
slowly increases towards a value close to 0.8;
• An impulse to the VIX, or to the US-EPU, causes a positive, bell shaped like, cumu-
lative response of the UK-EPU index. After about ten days the cumulative response
becomes statistically equivalent to 0;
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Figure 2.36. Response of Standardized UK-EPU to one SD impulses
Bootstrapped 68% confidence bands (in red)
As we can see from Fig. 2.37 the US-EPU index reacts as follows to unitary impulses:
• An impulse to the UK-EPU causes a positive, bell shaped like, cumulative response
of the US-EPU index. The highest cumulative effect is touched around one week
after the impulse. Then the cumulative response slowly decreases and becomes sta-
tistically null after two weeks;
• An impulse to the US-EPU causes a positive bell shaped like- cumulative response
of the US-EPU index. The highest cumulative effect is touched around ten days after
the impulse. Then the cumulative effect slowly decreases to a close to unitary value;
• An impulse to the VFTSE causes a positive and increasing response of the US-EPU
index. That tends to a cumulative response value close to 1.5;
• An impulse to the VIX causes a positive, bell shaped like, cumulative response of
the US-EPU index in the first two weeks. The cumulative response then becomes
statistically equivalent to 0;
• An impulse to the UK-TU, causes a positive bell shaped like, cumulative response
of the US-EPU index in the very short run (first two days). The cumulative response
then becomes statistically equal to 0;
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• An impulse to the US-TU, causes a positive and increasing cumulative response of
the US-EPU index, that tends to a close to unitary value in the long run;
Figure 2.37. Response of Standardized US-EPU to one SD impulses
Bootstrapped 68% confidence bands (in red)
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Forecast error variance decomposition
In the following appendix section we analyze and comment on the generalized
forecast error variance decomposition (GFEVD)[517, 653] of our estimated uncon-
strained structural VAR(2) model equations. GFEVD allows us to appraise the pro-
portion of the n-steps ahead forecast error variance of an endogenous variable, ac-
counted for by innovations to the various equations (endogenous variables) in our
orthogonalized VAR system. Since GFEVD values are computed from the orthogo-
nalized impulse-response functions, they are not unique. The Wold causal ordering
-motivated and used in the previous sections- determines the outcome of GFEVDs.
By being the first couple of variables in the chosenWold causal ordering, innovations
to policy uncertainty (EPU indexes) are allowed to instantaneously affect -propagate
to- other endogenous variables. Therefore, the contribution of the EPU indexes on
other variables’ GFEVDs could potentially be overestimated if the selected Wold
causal ordering doesn’t correspond to reality. Whereas, by being the last couple of
variables in the Wold causal ordering, the contribution of our TU indexes could po-
tentially be underestimated if the Wold causal ordering is wrong. However, we pre-
fer to run the risk of underestimating the contribution of innovations to civil society
uncertainty (proxied by TU indexes) on market and political uncertainty variables’
forecast error variance, rather than risking to overestimate them. Similarly, since
-for each couple of endogenous variables- the UK variable precedes the US one in
the Wold causal ordering, we risk to overestimate the intra-type contribution of in-
novations to UK variables on the corresponding US variable, and to underestimate
the reverse relation. Since we are interested in identifying a lower bound for the
contribution of civil society uncertainty on market and policy uncertainty variables our
approach results directly from our identification objectives. Under/over estimation
risks are intrinsic to any GFEVD analysis and cannot bemitigated if not by analyzing
the outcomes under -plausible- alternative Wold causal ordering specifications.
Here follow, for each endogenous variable the GFEVD stacked bar-plots up to 20
steps ahead forecasts (4 weeks):
Figure 2.38. UK-TU Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
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As we can see from Fig.2.38, about 50% of the forecast error variance (FEV) of UK
civil society uncertainty (UK-TU) is explained by innovations to UK-TU itself. Inno-
vations to UK policy uncertainty (UK-EPU) also play a relevant role -about 25%- in
explaining UK-TU FEV. For what pertains to uncertainty innovations from the other
side of the Atlantic, innovations to US market uncertainty (VIX) have an almost con-
stant weight on UK-TU FEV, close to 10%. Whereas the contribution to UK-TU FEV
of innovations to UK market uncertainty (VFTSE) increases with the number of steps,
from about 2% to about 17% in four weeks ahead forecasts. US Policy (US-EPU) and
Civil Society (US-TU) uncertainty have relatively minor roles in explaining UK-TU
FEV, however their weight appears to increase from a forecast step to the next and
then stabilizes. In four weeks ahead forecasts, the contribution of UK-TU to the FEV
of UK-TU is about 3%, whereas that of US-EPU is a little above 6%.
Figure 2.39. US-TU Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
The FEV of US civil society uncertainty (Fig.2.39) is in large part explained by inno-
vations to US-TU, its contribution ranges from 85% to about 70% of US-TU’s FEV
and stabilizes around the latter value. Innovations to policy uncertainty play a minor
role for US -civil society uncertainty FEV- with respect to UK. US-EPU is accounted for
only about 7% of US-TU’s FEV, and, UK-EPU for about 4%. UK-TU plays a similar
role to UK-EPU, with a contribution to US-TU’s FEV close to 4%. Market uncertainty
(VFTSE and VIX) have both a minor contributions US-TU’s FEV at first, but their
weight increases with the number of steps ahead of the forecast. Touching respec-
tively 2% -for VFTSE- and about 12% -for VIX- in four weeks ahead forecasts.
138 Ca’Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics
2.0. Appendix - Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Figure 2.40. VFTSE Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
UK market uncertainty FEV (Fig.2.40) is in large part explained by innovations to it-
self, its contribution ranges from 98% to about 60% of VFTSE’s FEV and stabilizes
around the latter value. Innovations to policy uncertainty play a relevant contribu-
tion to VFTSE’s FEV, contribution which increases as a function of the number of
steps ahead of the forecast. UK-EPU and US-EPU tend to -FEV contribution share-
values respectively close to 10% and 18%. The contribution shares of civil society un-
certainty innovations on VFTSE’s FEV exhibit bell shaped dynamics. US-TU’s FEV
contribution touches its maximum (6%) in 7-days ahead forecasts of VFTSE, it then
decreases to values close to 5%. Whereas the FEV contribution of UK-TU touches
its maximum (2.5%) in the 3-days ahead forecasts of VFTSE and then decreases to
values below 1%. US market uncertainty (VIX) innovations play a minor contribution
to VFTSE’s FEV in short term forecasts, but their weight increases with the number
of steps ahead of the forecasts towards FEV contribution share values close to 6%.
Figure 2.41. VIX Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
The FEV of USmarket uncertainty (Fig.2.41) is -as for the other variables of the system-
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in large part explained by innovations to itself. FEV contribution that ranges from
81% to 33%. Innovations to policy uncertainty -as for VFTSE- also play a relevant
contribution to VIX’s FEV that increases with the time horizon of the forecasts. US-
EPU and UK-EPU tend to -FEV contribution shares- respectively close to 17% and
10%. The contributions of civil society uncertainty on VFTSE’s FEV exhibits a bell
shape dynamic. US-TU’s FEV contribution touches its maximum (4%) in 9-days
ahead forecasts of VFTSE, it then decreases to values close to 5%. Whereas UK-
TU reaches its maximum (1%) to VIX’s FEV in the 3-days ahead forecasts and then
decreases to values close to 0%. UK market uncertainty (VFTSE) innovations play an
important contribution to VIX’s FEV. VFTSE’s weight increases with the number of
steps ahead of the forecasts towards a FEV contribution share close to 36% in twenty
observations ahead forecasts.
The FEV of policy uncertainty in UK (UK-EPU) principally depends on disturbances
to UK-EPU itself. This contribution declines from the 100% (the full FEV depends
only on UK-EPU) for one-step ahead UK-EPU forecasts, to 59% in twenty-steps
ahead forecasts. The contribution of US-EPU to UK-EPU FEV is relatively minor
and increase as a function of the forecasts’ number of steps ahead from 2% to 7%. Ex-
cluding the one-step ahead forecast, the share of the contribution -to UK-EPU’FEV-
of US market uncertainty (VIX) ranges from 6% to 8%. Whereas the contribution of
VFTSE increases logarithmically from 0% to about 16%. civil society uncertainty plays
an important role on UK policy uncertainty. UK-TU contributes for about 8% of the
UK-EPU’s FEV and US-TU for about 3%.
Figure 2.42. UK-EPU Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
The contribution of US policy uncertainty on its FEV varies from 98% -in one step
ahead forecasts- to 77% -in twenty steps ahead forecasts- . The contribution of inno-
vations to UK-EPU for UK-EPU’s FEV is relatively stable across forecasting horizons
and close 5%. The share of the contribution -to US-EPU’FEV- of USmarket uncertainty
(VIX) ranges is 0% for the one-step forecasts, and close to 3% for other forecast hori-
zons. Whereas the contribution of VFTSE increases logarithmically across horizons
from 0% to about 7%. US civil society uncertainty (US-TU) plays an rather impor-
tant role for US policy uncertainty, it contributes up to 6% of the UK-EPU’s FEV from
ten-steps horizons onwards. Whereas the role of US-TU is limited, close to 1%.
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Figure 2.43. US-EPU Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
In this section we have identified a lower bound for the contribution of our TU in-
dexes to the forecast error variance of other uncertainty variables. As we have seen
in this section, by using TU indexes as proxies for civil society uncertainty, we find
that civil society uncertainty plays a minor but still relevant contribution in explain-
ingmarket uncertainty FEV, almost exclusively in the very short run. This because the
cumulative effects of civil society uncertainty innovations on market uncertainty vari-
ables either rapidly declines or totally dissipates across time, after about a month
their contribution is either very low or almost insignificant. On the side of the de-
pendencies between civil society uncertainty and policy uncertainty, we find that the
contributions and effects of the first (UK-TU and US-TU) on the latter (UK-EPU and
US-EPU) are long lasting. Hence our TU indexes allow us to improve our forecasting
capacity and enrich our understanding of market uncertainty dynamics in the short
run, and, of the dynamics of policy uncertainty both in the short but also in the long
term.
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Robustness checks and alternative VAR specifications
In this appendix section, we look if the estimated coefficients of the endogenous
variables are stable across the time interval of this study by using the CUSUM and
MOSUM tests (2.5). We then estimate three distinct restricted versions of our VAR(2)
model. To evaluate which are the losses, in terms of fitness and eventual violations
of the models’ assumptions, if we constrain some endogenous variables’ coefficients
to zero on the basis of theory based hypothesis and previous findings. By analyz-
ing the estimates and residuals of our restricted models we can also appraise if our
coefficients’ estimates are sensible, in terms of sign, size and variance, to the specifi-
cations of our VAR(2) model.
Structural changes and coefficients stability
To detect if eventual structural changes took place in the time span covered by our
sample of observations, as suggested by Krämer et al.[654], we analyze the least-
squares moving (MOSUM) and cumulative (COSUM) sums of residuals for the six
equations of our VAR(2) model, to test if our null hypothesis: absence of structural
change, must be rejected given the observed values of the COSUM/MOSUM em-
pirical fluctuation processes (efp(t)). The null hypothesis is rejected when the fluc-
tuation of the empirical process efp(t) gets improbably large compared to a bound-
aries of the limiting process, which is a Brownian Bridge process[655]. If one of the
MOSUM/COSUM efp(t) crosses one of the two boundaries at any t, then the null
hypothesis is rejected at the -previously- chosen confidence level α (here α = 0.05).
Here follow the plots of the least-square COSUM (2.44) and MOSUM (2.45) efps.
Figure 2.44. least-square COSUM
in red process Boundaries (at the α = 0.05 significance level)
The COSUM stability tests indicate moderate deviations from parameter constancy
during extreme uncertainty events. Only the OLS-COSUM of the UK-EPU crosses
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(once) the -α = 0.05 significance level- lower boundary, the day after the EU-referendum
(June 24). Given the u-shape of the UK-EPU COSUM efp in proximity to the EU-
referendum it appears that UK-EPU is underestimated by our VAR(2) model in dates
around this event. A similar, but not statistically significant, pattern is observable for
the US-EPU in dates around the US presidential elections (November 8).
Figure 2.45. least-squares MOSUM
Moving Window Bandwidth= 115N ≈ 12
in red CI (α = 0.05 significance level)
MOSUM efps never cross the -α = 0.05 significance level- boundaries. However,
moderate (negative) deviations from parameters stability are clearly visible during
periods of extreme uncertainty. Non-market US uncertainty MOSUM efps (US-TU,
US-EPU) exhibit moderate negative deviations around the US presidential elections,
whereas Non-market UK uncertainty MOSUM efps (US-TU, US-EPU) exhibit similar
deviations in dates close to the UK-referendum.
Given the shapes of the COSUM andMOSUM efps for the VIX and VFTSE, which are
never too close to the boundaries, we can -rather safely- accept the null hypothesis of
no structural change in the coefficient parameters of the VIX and VFTSE equations
of our VAR(2) system in the observations’ time-span here considered. Considering
that our major modeling interest consists in explaining market uncertainty through
non-market uncertainty proxies, our unrestricted VAR(2) model with time-unvarying
parameters appears to be a satisfactory representation of the dynamics of market
uncertainty (proxied through option-implied volatilities) during the 2nd, 3rd and 4th
quarter of the year 2016.
Talking About Uncertainty - Carlo R. M. A. Santagiustina 143
Chapter 2. Twitter uncertainty indexes and uncertainty contagion during the
unfolding of the Brexit-Trump Era
Alternative VAR model specifications
No inter-area dependencies
If UK and US uncertainty variables were independent, by restricting our VAR(2)
model in such away that there is (by construction) no inter-area dependencies among
endogenous uncertainty variables (see Fig.2.46), we should obtain a fit as good as
our previously presented unrestricted VAR(2): Both from the point of view of the
Adjusted R2 of the various fitted equations, and, for what pertains to the non refusal
of the hypothesis on the residuals of the model, like the absence of autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity. In the following subsection we estimate such a VAR(2) re-
stricted model and compare it to its unrestricted version. As we can see from Table
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Figure 2.46. Reduced Model: No inter-area dependencies
2.7 that contains the estimates of our VAR(2) restricted model without inter-area de-
pendencies, compared to the unrestricted model, the fit of all the equations in the
model worsens, the Adjusted R2 diminishes for all fitted equations. The magnitude
of the drop is larger the US-EPU indexes and for the VIX, this is an indication that US
market uncertainty and policy uncertainty variables are more interdependent on inter-
area uncertainty events compared to civil society uncertainty variables. It is interesting
to note that although some of the coefficients change value, they all maintain their
sign.The residuals of the restricted model are more heteroskedastic, especially EPU
indexes during the EU-referendum and US-elections. In addition, US-TU and UK-
EPU exhibit signs of non-null residuals’ autocorrelation that were already present
-but smaller- in the unrestricted model. By looking to residuals’ distributions we
remark that these lasts have more bumps in right tail and are more right skewed.
Given the aforementioned findings we refuse the hypothesis of absence of inter-area
dependencies among US and UK uncertainty variables.
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Table 2.7. Reduced VAR(2) model estimates;
Reductions: No inter-area dependencies
VFTSE at close prices; VIX at open prices; All endogenous variables have been standardized
L means once lagged variable, L2 means twice lagged variable
Dependent variables:
UK-TU US-TU VFTSE VIX UK-EPU US-EPU
L UK-TU 0.53∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.03) (0.08)
L2 UK-TU 0.04 −0.08∗∗ −0.13
(0.09) (0.04) (0.08)
L VFSTE −0.55∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ −0.28∗
(0.18) (0.07) (0.16)
L2 VFSTE 0.77∗∗∗ 0.05 0.43∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.07) (0.17)
L UK-EPU −0.06 0.02 0.28∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.04) (0.09)
L2 UK-EPU 0.05 −0.09∗∗ 0.16∗
(0.09) (0.04) (0.08)
L US-TU 0.37∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ 0.12∗
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
L2 US-TU 0.16∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
L VIX 0.23∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗
(0.14) (0.07) (0.12)
L2 VIX −0.06 −0.05 −0.21∗
(0.14) (0.08) (0.12)
L US-EPU −0.05 −0.02 0.26∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
L2 US-EPU −0.03 −0.09∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
const 0.11 −0.04 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.21
(0.13) (0.15) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) (0.14)
Tuesday −0.20 0.02 −0.07 −0.21∗ 0.07 −0.15
(0.18) (0.21) (0.07) (0.12) (0.16) (0.19)
Wednesday −0.04 0.35 −0.05 0.04 0.03 −0.33∗
(0.18) (0.22) (0.07) (0.12) (0.16) (0.19)
Thursday −0.06 −0.01 −0.17∗∗ −0.04 −0.24 −0.34∗
(0.18) (0.21) (0.07) (0.12) (0.16) (0.19)
Friday −0.25 −0.13 −0.09 0.04 −0.16 −0.16
(0.18) (0.21) (0.07) (0.12) (0.16) (0.19)
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182
R2 0.48 0.28 0.92 0.78 0.59 0.43
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.23 0.91 0.77 0.57 0.40
Resid. SE (df = 171) 0.74 0.88 0.29 0.48 0.66 0.78
F Stat.(df = 11; 171) 14.41∗∗∗ 6.05∗∗∗ 180.43∗∗∗ 56.65∗∗∗ 22.77∗∗∗ 11.91∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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No inter-area inter-source dependencies
It could be possible that even though UK and US uncertainty are not totally inde-
pendent, nevertheless there is no contagion between uncertainty variables of both
different sources (Market, Policy, Civil Society) and different geographic-areas (UK
and TU) . To verify this hypothesis we restrict our VAR(2) model in such a way that
inter-area dependencies among different uncertainty sources are not permitted (See
Fig.??), i.e. their coefficients are null by construction. As before, if this hypothesis
was true we should obtain a goodness of fit comparable to that of our unrestricted
VAR(2) model. In the following subsection we estimate such a restricted model and
compare it to the unrestricted one.
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Figure 2.47. Reduced Model: No inter-area inter-source dependencies
As we can see from Table 2.8 that contains the estimates of our VAR(2) restricted
model with no inter-area inter-source dependencies, the Adjusted R2 of market un-
certainty equations (VFTSE and VIX) are - at two digits precision- identical. For the
other endogenous variables the fit worsens compared to the unrestricted model. As
for the previous restricted model, the magnitude of the drop is larger for the EPU in-
dexes compared to TU indexes: policy uncertainty dependsmore on inter-areaMarket
and civil society uncertainty than civil society uncertainty depends on inter-area market
and policy uncertainty. Coefficients all maintain their sign. The autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity structure of residuals doesn’t appear to change in a remarkable
way compared to the baseline unrestricted VAR(2) model. The distributions of the
residuals of the EPU and TU indexes are slightly more right skewed. It is interest-
ing to remark that -in the EPU and TU equations-, the coefficients of uncertainty
variables of the same source but of the other geographic area are not statistically sig-
nificant. Given the above findings, it looks like for both geographic-areas (US or UK)
market uncertainty variables do not depend on the lagged values of non market un-
certainty variables of the other geographic-area. Whereas for non market uncertainty
variables (TU and EPU indexes) inter-area inter-source uncertainty dependencies
(especially with market uncertainty variables) may still play a relevant role.
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Table 2.8. Reduced VAR(2) model estimates;
Reductions: No inter-area inter-source dependencies
VFTSE at close prices; VIX at open prices; All endogenous variables have been standardized
L means once lagged variable, L2 means twice lagged variable
Dependent variables:
UK-TU US-TU VFTSE VIX UK-EPU US-EPU
L UK-TU 0.53∗∗∗ −0.11 0.07∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08)
L2 UK-TU 0.03 −0.03 −0.06 −0.14
(0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08)
L VFSTE −0.57∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗ −0.25
(0.19) (0.08) (0.12) (0.16)
L2 VFSTE 0.80∗∗∗ 0.12 −0.05 0.41∗∗
(0.19) (0.08) (0.12) (0.16)
L UK-EPU −0.05 0.02 0.25∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.10) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09)
L2 UK-EPU 0.04 −0.09∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.02
(0.09) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09)
L US-TU −0.08 0.35∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
L2 US-TU 0.04 0.14 0.17∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
L VIX 0.27∗ 0.05 0.82∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗
(0.15) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12)
L2 VIX −0.04 −0.11∗∗ −0.10 −0.22∗
(0.15) (0.05) (0.08) (0.13)
L US-EPU −0.02 −0.02 0.07 0.25∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)
L2 US-EPU 0.003 −0.09∗∗ 0.05 0.37∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)
const 0.10 −0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.26∗
(0.13) (0.16) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) (0.14)
Tuesday −0.19 0.02 −0.05 −0.22∗ 0.06 −0.18
(0.18) (0.21) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.19)
Wednesday −0.03 0.34 −0.02 −0.004 0.03 −0.44∗∗
(0.18) (0.22) (0.07) (0.12) (0.16) (0.19)
Thursday −0.03 −0.01 −0.18∗∗ −0.09 −0.22 −0.39∗∗
(0.18) (0.21) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.19)
Friday −0.25 −0.10 −0.09 0.05 −0.11 −0.22
(0.18) (0.21) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.19)
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182
R2 0.49 0.29 0.92 0.80 0.60 0.43
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.23 0.92 0.79 0.57 0.39
Resid. SE (df = 169) 0.75 0.88 0.29 0.46 0.66 0.78
F Stat. (df = 13; 169) 12.26∗∗∗ 5.28∗∗∗ 155.96∗∗∗ 53.15∗∗∗ 19.68∗∗∗ 9.99∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Inter-area dependencies only for market uncertainty
Given that, in the previously estimated restricted model (Table 2.8), the coefficients
of intra-source inter-area dependencies in the policy uncertainty and civil society un-
certainty equations were not significantly different from zero. More specifically:
• In the UK-TU estimated equation: Both coefficients of lagged US-TU were not sta-
tistically significant;
• In the US-TU estimated equation: Both coefficients of lagged UK-TU were not sta-
tistically significant;
• In the UK-EPU estimated equation: Both coefficients of lagged US-EPU were not
statistically significant;
• In the US-EPU estimated equation: Both coefficients of lagged UK-EPU were not
statistically significant;
We choose to further restrict the aforementioned model by constraining to zero TU
and EPU inter-area intra-source dependency relations’ coefficients. In such away we
obtain a model in which uncertainty may flow from a geographic-area to the other
only through (financial) markets’ uncertainty (VIX and VFTSE) that are the only en-
dogenous variables that have a non constrained to zero inter-area dependency coef-
ficient (see Fig.2.48). In the following subsection we estimate and comment this final
restricted VAR(2) model, which results the best among our three restricted models.
US
Market
Uncertainty
(VIX)
A
UK
Market
Uncertainty
(VFTSE)
A
US
Civil Society
Uncertainty
(US-TU)
B
UK
Civil Society
Uncertainty
(UK-TU)
B
US
Policy
Uncertainty
(US-EPU)
C
UK
Policy
Uncertainty
(UK-EPU)
C
D
G
H
G
H
I I
Figure 2.48. Reduced Model: Inter-area dependencies only formarket uncertainty
As we can see from Table 2.9 that contains the estimates of our VAR(2) restricted
model with inter-area uncertainty dependency only through market uncertainty, the
Adjusted R2 of all the endogenous variables’ equations are the highest among the
restricted models’ ones. Nevertheless the unrestricted model still appears to be
slightly superior from the point of view of the fitness and residuals’ non violations
of the assumptions. Also in this case coefficients of lagged endogenous variables
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maintain their sign. The autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity structure of residu-
als is rather similar to that of the baseline unrestricted VAR(2) model, but the resid-
uals’ distributions of EPU and TU indexes are slightly more right skewed. Some
extreme uncertainty events remain -relatively more- unexplained compared to the
baseline model, this is probably due to impossibility of inter-area inter-source conta-
gion among Policy and civil society uncertainty in the restricted model. It is possible
that, even though in normal times this channel of inter-area contagion between pol-
icy and civil society uncertainty has a relatively minor role with respect to other con-
tagion channels, its importance could grow during extreme uncertainty events and
in their trails. However -by being linear and with constant parameters- our model is
unable to integrate these -certainly plausible- nonlinear components of inter-source
inter-area uncertainty contagion.
We also remark that, in the estimated equations of US and UK civil society uncertainty
(US-TU and UK-TU), the coefficients of lagged policy uncertainty variables (UK-EPU
and US-EPU) are not statistically significant. However for both US and UK the resid-
uals of Policy and civil society uncertainty exhibit relatively high instantaneous inter-
area inter-source correlation coefficients, which range from 0.2 to 0.4. Therefore,
when it occurs, the contagion of policy uncertainty innovations to civil society uncer-
tainty must occur at a infra-day time-scale, this means that the twitter community
-that we exploit to build TU indexes- is very reactive to policy uncertainty news re-
porting -also coming from foreign countries- but then rapidly forgets foreign policy
uncertainty events -it is a short memory contagion process-. Whereas the impulse-
response of policy uncertainty to civil society uncertainty innovations is more persistent
and delayed, as the n-shape of the cumulative-impulse response functions confirms.
Finally, given that this last restricted model appears to be the best among the three,
we can rather safely claim that Markets are the primary inter-area contagion chan-
nel for uncertainty: VIX-VFSTE dependencies are the main uncertainty link between
uncertainty in UK and US. This link binds together the two systems in a unique in-
tegrated trans-national macro-uncertainty system, through which the effects of Pol-
icy and civil society uncertainty may flow, "exploiting" inter-area market uncertainty
dependencies as a vehicle through which non-market uncertainty impulses may be
propagated to foreign countries. Therefore Policy and civil society uncertainty im-
pulses, whose effects would otherwise be geographically limited, may become in-
ternational through their chain effect on dependent uncertainty variables: First, by
affecting local markets’ uncertainty; then from local markets to foreign countries’
markets, and finally -if the magnitude of the initial shock is sufficiently large-, to
foreign countries’ Policy and civil society uncertainty.
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Table 2.9. Reduced VAR(2) model estimates;
Reductions:Inter-area dependencies only for market uncertainty
VFTSE at close prices; VIX at open prices; All endogenous variables have been standardized
L means once lagged variable, L2 means twice lagged variable
Dependent variables:
UK-TU US-TU VFTSE VIX UK-EPU US-EPU
L UK-TU 0.53∗∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.04) (0.08)
L2 UK-TU 0.04 −0.06 −0.13
(0.09) (0.04) (0.08)
L VFTSE −0.55∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗ −0.28∗
(0.18) (0.08) (0.12) (0.16)
L2 VFTSE 0.77∗∗∗ 0.12 −0.05 0.43∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.08) (0.12) (0.17)
L UK-EPU −0.06 0.02 0.28∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.04) (0.09)
L2 UK-EPU 0.05 −0.09∗∗ 0.16∗
(0.09) (0.04) (0.08)
L US-TU 0.37∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
L2 US-TU 0.16∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
L VIX 0.23∗ 0.05 0.82∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗
(0.14) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12)
L2 VIX −0.06 −0.11∗∗ −0.10 −0.21∗
(0.14) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12)
L US-EPU −0.05 −0.02 0.26∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
L2 US-EPU −0.03 −0.09∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
const 0.11 −0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.21
(0.13) (0.15) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) (0.14)
Tuesday −0.20 0.02 −0.06 −0.21∗ 0.07 −0.15
(0.18) (0.21) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.19)
Wednesday −0.04 0.35 −0.03 0.02 0.03 −0.33∗
(0.18) (0.22) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.19)
Thursday −0.06 −0.01 −0.16∗∗ −0.08 −0.24 −0.34∗
(0.18) (0.21) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.19)
Friday −0.25 −0.13 −0.08 0.03 −0.16 −0.16
(0.18) (0.21) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.19)
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182
R2 0.48 0.28 0.92 0.80 0.59 0.43
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.23 0.92 0.79 0.57 0.40
Resid. SE (df) 0.74 (171) 0.88 (171) 0.29 (169) 0.46 (169) 0.66 (171) 0.78 (171)
F Stat. (df) 14.41∗∗∗ (11) 6.05∗∗∗ (11) 155.96∗∗∗ (13) 53.15∗∗∗ (13) 22.77∗∗∗ (11) 11.91∗∗∗ (11)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
VFTSE at close prices; VIX at open prices; All endogenous variables have been standardized
L means once lagged variable, L2 means twice lagged variable
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Chapter 3
The Worldwide Uncertainty
Network: mapping the global
dynamics and contagion channels
of civil society uncertainty
By Carlo R. M. A. Santagiustina
Abstract
In this article will develop an instrument to measure, visualize and analyse world-
wide dynamics of civil society uncertainty by sovereign-country. Our tool exploits de-
centralized signals of uncertainty elicited through Twitter, a global news and social
networking platform. By filtering Twitter posts in English containing the term "un-
certainty" and attributing them to single countries or relations among countries on
the basis of their textual content we are able to reconstruct a network which proxies
global civil society uncertainty, we call it Worldwide Uncertainty Network (WUN).
Such a network can be constructed and visualized at the desired frequency. In this
article we will illustrate the process of construction and analysis of the outcomes of a
static (S-WUN) and a rescaled dynamic (RD-WUN) projection of worldwide civil so-
ciety uncertainty discussions through Twitter, using our original methodology. Both
versions are based on the same dataset, which contains Twitter posts (textual obser-
vations) signalling states of civil society uncertainty, published across the 2nd, 3rd and
4th quarter of the year 2016. In the static version (S-WUN) observations are aggre-
gated for the entire period of study; whereas, in the rescaled dynamic version (RD-
WUN) observations are aggregated, re-weighted and analysed at a daily frequency.
As we will see, the static version (S-WUN) allows us to appraise which countries
where subject to major civil society uncertainty events that year and which where the
most relevant contagion channels for uncertainty among them, allowing us to rep-
resent and highlight through a time invariant framework the backbone of national
and international civil society uncertainty phenomena during unfolding of the Brexit-
Trump Era. Whereas, the rescaled dynamic version (RD-WUN) will allow us to ap-
praise the time-varying structure of contagion channels among countries as events
unfold, as well as country level dynamics of civil society uncertainty emerging in re-
lation to both local and international events, like elections, referendums, civil-wars
and international political or military conflicts. For example, to evaluate the local
and international civil society uncertainty impact dynamics of: UK’s EU-referendum,
the US presidential elections, the failed coup in Turkey, the Italian constitutional ref-
erendum and the Syrian civil-war, among many other major and minor events of
interest for our readers that occurred during the year 2016 and which have been
captured by ourWorldwide Uncertainty Network.
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3.1 Introduction
A great number of events that occurred in the year 2016, like the EU-referendum
vote in favour of Brexit, the election of Trump, the Syrian civil-war, the failed coup in
Turkey, the failed Italian constitutional reform and ensuing resignation of the Prime
Minister Renzi, have shown that the civil society uncertainty impact of geographi-
cally localized events may encompass the boarders of the country in which a given
event has physically occurred, and, influence the degree of civil society uncertainty in
neighbouring countries and beyond.
Differently from the method developed and used in this paper, in the second ar-
ticle of this collection the magnitude of contagion channels among civil society un-
certainty variables by country was not inferred from the textual content of agents’
online uncertainty signaling behaviour, through Twitter posts containing the term
"uncertainty", but was based on the lagged linear dependency relations among time
series of uncertainty variables for different countries. Twitter Uncertainty (TU) in-
dexes as well as other existing text-based uncertainty measures, like the Economic
Policy Uncertainty (EPU) indexes constructed by Baker, Bloom and Davis[386], do
not exploit the possibility of using co-occurrences of country labels in textual obser-
vations containing the term "uncertainty" as signals of the occurrence of civil soci-
ety uncertainty events that may concern several countries at the same time. Events
which encompass national boarders and which signal the existence of civil society
uncertainty contagion channels between them.
However, it is well documented fact[656–663] that civil society uncertainty generated
by economic, political and social events, even if geographically localized, may ripple
in other countries and areas of the world for a multiplicity of reasons. The simplest
one is that economic, social or political phenomena that generate civil society uncer-
tainty can be transnational or international by nature, for example: the UE referen-
dum in the United Kingdom appeared as soon as its date was fixed by Cameron, as a
transnational event. With expected disruptive political and economic effects -in case
of a vote in favor of Brexit- not only within the UK but also for other countries in the
European Union [664–667]. The EU-referendum was transnational to such an extent
that several analysts and commentators described it as a unilateral vote -by United
Kingdom’s people- on the survival of the "European dream"[668], i.e. the pursuit of
the European Union project of economic, political and socio-cultural integration.
Some specific post EU-referendum inter-area civil society uncertainty contagion chan-
nels have been already identified by literature, using a qualitative event study ap-
proach. In a recent paper Belke et al.[669] have claimed that "apart from direct economic
linkages, Brexit might also generate political and institutional uncertainty about the EU.
[... for example] the success of the Brexit movements might generate momentum for sim-
ilar movements in other countries increasing the probability of more countries leaving the
EU. [...] Political uncertainty may therefore spread across Europe, especially affecting coun-
tries whose sovereign solvency is closely linked to the existence of the EU and the euro area
namely Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece." More generally, all withdrawals, or threats
of withdrawals from multilateral or international agreements and treatises, like the
Paris climate agreement or the NAFTA, are by "nature" transnational/international
events, which may cause pikes in civil society uncertainty across several countries
concerned directly or through side-effects by the agreement/treatise. Therefore, it is
often sufficient that one of the parties menaces to withdraw from such agreements,
to produce an international uncertainty shock related to the degree of divergence of
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expectations concerning the possible effects of the withdrawal. A second category of
events, for which there can be inter-area uncertainty contagion, are collective belief
driven contagions of civil society uncertainty among countries. The latter situation
occurs when a great number of agents living in a given country/area, which we call
target, believe that, given the perceived similarities and interdependencies between
their own -economic, political, social, etc.- conditions and those of another country,
events that occur in the area object of the comparison, which we call source, could
"cross the borders" and produce -similar or identical- consequences in the target area.
Civil society uncertainty contagion processes are, as we will see, amplified by cultural
relatedness[670, 671], shared identification[672, 673] and social emulation[659, 674,
675]. The perceived degree of similarity between cultural, political, social and eco-
nomic scenarios occuring in different countries, as well as beliefs of cultural, politi-
cal, social and economic interdependence act as catalysers for civil society uncertainty
contagion processes. Through the diffusion across boarders of news and beliefs con-
cerning cause-consequence relations, civil societies of distinct areas that exhibit sim-
ilar conditions become interdependent in terms of expectations and ensuing civil
society uncertainty. Local uncertainty phenomena may hence "ripple" outside the
country from where they first emerged. For example the Arab Spring, which began
in Tunisia and then, through the reporting -in Arabic and through Social medias- and
emulation -of protesting and demonstration techniques- progressively extended to
other countries in North Africa and Middle-East, causing a transnational civil society
uncertainty phenomenon[676–679]. Another group of instances belonging to the lat-
ter category are general public’s reactions to terrorist attacks, especially within the
European Union. These -rather isolated- local violences give rise to Europe wide
situations of civil society uncertainty and security alert. Such uncertainty phenom-
ena are certainly accentuated by the worldwide integration of information systems
and media: by storytelling and reporting in great detail about terrorist attacks oc-
curring in foreign countries and dedicating huge spaces to these happenings, the
media -willingly or unwillingly- propagate signals capable of causing or stimulat-
ing feelings of uncertainty and unsafety across country borders. The above stated
information diffusion processes lead people to further identify themselves with the
local communities that actually suffered terrorist attacks and renders foreign pub-
lic empathetic, from an "uncertainty feeling" point of view, to the vicissitudes and
suffering of the local communities that experienced in first person these dreadful
experiences.
The existence of the aforesaid channels of contagion renders sovereign country sys-
tems vulnerable to the contagion of civil society uncertainty from other areas of the
world. Given the lack of adequate indicators for measuring and monitoring inter-
national civil society uncertainty phenomena and transnational contagions of uncer-
tainty among geographic areas, in this final article we choose to address this issue by
developing a tool for systemic uncertainty analysis and visualization, which is con-
structed in such a way that it can be updated in real time. This to appraise and visu-
alize the links among civil society uncertainty in the different countries of the world.
We consider this instrument the building block of a real-time civil society uncertainty
observatory that the author will try to further develop and improve in future works.
More specifically, in this final article we seek to measure, describe and analyse civil
society uncertainty dependencies among sovereign countries, using the subset of ob-
servations in the TU dataset that contain at least one token used to identify countries
from the list of dictionaries available in section 3.0.1 of the Appendix at the end of
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this article. In the next section, we start by analysing the counts by country of the
number of observations (tweets) in which country related labels occur or co-occur.
We use the term country occurrence to refer to the situations where only labels as-
sociated to a single country (tokens belonging to the same country dictionary) are
contained in a textual observation (tweet), and we use the term country co-occurrence
to refer to the situation where labels of two or more areas (tokens from multiple
country dictionaries) are contained in the same observation (tweet). Considering
the entire period of our investigation, which ranges from April the 4th to Decem-
ber the 31st 2016, we build the Static Worldwide Uncertainty Network (S-WUN),
by counting the number of occurrence for each country and co-occurrences of each
pair of countries, the latter values are computed through a weighted count that al-
lows us to ensure that every observation (tweet) has the same contribution on the
edges/node weight of the inferred network whatever is number of countries men-
tioned in a given observation. Successively, we apply the same technique to Twitter
data aggregated by day, to construct theDynamicWorldwide Uncertainty Network
(D-WUN), i.e. a three dimensional tensor representing the civil society uncertainty
dynamics and dependency relations, among countries, across time. Since all obser-
vations contained in our dataset are written in English and Twitter users capable of
writing in English are not uniformly distributed across the areas of the world, our
counts and weighted counts of node/edge specific daily observation sets that de-
termine the weights of the nodes and edges are -very likely- distorted measures of
the magnitude of civil society uncertainty events actually occurring worldwide, there-
fore they are not necessarily reliable for doing inter-area (among nodes’ weights),
or, inter contagion channel (among edges’ weights) comparisons of uncertainty lev-
els. In D-WUN, the relevance of events in countries in which only a small share of
the population speaks in English or have access to Internet/Twitter will likely be
underestimated, especially when compared to countries in which a majority of the
population are native English speakers, like the UK, the US, Canada and Australia
among others. To mitigate this data representativeness problem we rescale the con-
tent of ourD-WUN tensor, through three distinct transformations of the edge/nodes
weights contained in the original tensor. We obtain three distinct tensors that repre-
sent the following distinct features of civil society uncertainty in a given moment in
time, for a given node/edge:
1. The redundancy of the civil society uncertainty signal, which represents the variety of
the sources that created, in a given day, civil society uncertainty signals concerning a
specific edge/node. To show how reliable are the Twitter information sets on which
a daily node/edge civil society uncertaintymeasurements is based;
2. The intensity of present civil society uncertaintywith respect to past civil society uncer-
tainty in that node/edge;
3. The intensity of present civil society uncertainty in that node/edge compared to present
civil society uncertainty in all other nodes/edges;
By computing the Hadamard product of the three tensors we obtain a unique dy-
namic network representation of worldwide civil society uncertainty, for which the
weights are now more reliable for doing comparisons of civil society uncertainty lev-
els between countries and across time. We call it Rescaled Dynamic Worldwide
Uncertainty Network (RD-WUN).
We conclude the article by analysing main results and illustrating the advantages
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and limits of our Worldwide Uncertainty Network (WUN) tools for the measure-
ment of worldwide civil society uncertainty by country. We explain why the decom-
position of D-WUN in three distinct civil society uncertainty dynamic feature tensors
can facilitate and enrich the interpretation of crowd-sourced uncertainty signals, by
helping us to identify: the systemic importance of countries in terms of their civil
society uncertainty social percolation[680–686] role and major WUN changes across
time. Despite the fact that ourWUN is still in an early development phase, the pre-
liminary methods and findings here exposed may help us understand which could
be the potential contribution, to contemporary economic and sociological literature,
of studies based on textual data extracted from the web. In particular, for the mea-
surement, analysis and modelling of civil society uncertainty dynamics, at a world-
wide scale, for which, at the moment, there is no comparable alternative instrument.
3.2 From occurrences and co-occurrences of country labels
in tweets to a Static Worldwide Uncertainty Network (S-
WUN)
In this section we will describe the procedure that allows us to use Tweets in English
about uncertainty states, associated to one or more countries of the world, to ap-
praise and visualize -as a network- civil society uncertainty associated to one or more
countries; and, even more important, to differentiate among activity concerning civil
society uncertainty in a specific country from activity concerning international civil
society uncertainty events and civil society uncertainty contagion channels among dif-
ferent countries of the world.
To obtain the Static Worldwide Uncertainty Network, we start by subsetting our
population of tweets belonging to the Tclean dataset (see section 2.2.1 of the second
article) by keeping only those observations (tweets) that contain at least one token
that matches the conditions of (at least) one of the country dictionaries presented in
section 3.0.1 of the Appendix. We use only token dictionaries that identify sovereign
countries. For example, the European Union, Antarctica, Greenland as well as many other
geographic areas that are not sovereign countries are not considered in the following arti-
cle. We refer to this list of country dictionaries as DICT. DICT contains 163 different
dictionaries, representing 163 sovereign countries of the world. Each dictionary con-
tains a set of textual tokens used to identify a specific country in observations. Some
very small sovereign countries, in terms of population, geo-political and economic
importance at the global scale, haven’t been included in DICT, this to avoid having
a too large network, and, because the volume of Twitter activity concerning uncer-
tainty in these very small countries is either very close to zero or null. For example,
the Republic of San Marino, The Principality of Monaco, Liechtenstein, the Principality of
Andorra, as well as other very small autonomous islands, like the Republic of Kiribati and
Nauru, do not belong to DICT and are therefore not considered in this study. In addition,
as we did in the second article of this collection, we group together the United King-
dom and Great Britain, and hence their dictionaries. We refer to this area through
the labelGB/UK. The resulting list of countries whose country dictionaries have been
included in DICT, is shown in section 3.0.1 of the Appendix.
Country dictionaries contained inDICT are boolean functions which can be applied
to textual observations. As explained in section 2.2.1 of the second article, dictionar-
ies’ conditions are sequences of characters or regular expressions used to mention
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-and hence identify- countries to which tweets about uncertainty refer to. For exam-
ple, "U.K" is one of the ways used to mention the United Kingdom in tweets, for this
reason it has been included in the United Kingdoms’ token dictionary. As a result
of our subsetting, the dataset of tweets that we will use in the remainder of this arti-
cle contains 170 806 observations -from Tclean-, which match the boolean conditions
of at least one of the country dictionaries in DICT, all other observations have been
dropped. This subset of Tclean is called Tcountry. Observations in our Tcountry dataset
have been published between April (the 4th) and December (the 31st) 2016. We then
categorize Tcountry observations in two groups on the basis of their textual content:
• In the first groupwe have those observations in which a single country is mentioned,
in isolation. We call this group of observations country occurrences, they will jointly
determine the weights of the country nodes in the Static Twitter Uncertainty Net-
work.
• In the second group we have all observations in which several (two or more) coun-
tries arementioned together. We call this group of observations country co-occurrences,
they will jointly determine the weights of the country edges in the Static Twitter Un-
certainty Network.
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Table 3.1. Geographic Areas (countries) whose country dictionaries have been
included in DICT
A-C D-L L-P Q-Z
afghanistan denmark latvia qatar
albania ecuador lebanon romania
algeria egypt lesotho russian federation
angola el salvador liberia rwanda
arab emirates eritrea libya saudi arabia
argentina estonia lithuania senegal
armenia ethiopia luxembourg serbia
australia finland macedonia singapore
austria france madagascar slovakia
azerbaijan gabon malawi slovenia
bahrain gambia malaysia somalia
bangladesh GB/UK mali south africa
belarus georgia malta south korea
belgium germany mauritania south sudan
belize ghana mexico spain
benin greece moldova sri lanka
bhutan guatemala mongolia suriname
bolivia guinea montenegro swaziland
bosnia and herzegovina guinea-bissau morocco sweden
botswana guyana mozambique switzerland
brazil haiti myanmar syria
brunei honduras namibia tajikistan
bulgaria hong kong nepal tanzania
burkina faso hungary netherlands thailand
burundi iceland new zealand timor-leste
cambodia india nicaragua togo
cameroon indonesia niger trinidad and tobago
canada iran nigeria tunisia
cape verde iraq north korea turkey
central african republic ireland norway turkmenistan
chad islamic state oman uganda
chile israel pakistan ukraine
china italy palestine, state of united states
colombia jamaica panama uruguay
congo japan papua new guinea uzbekistan
costa rica jordan paraguay venezuela
côte d’ivoire kazakhstan peru vietnam
croatia kenya philippines yemen
cuba kuwait poland zambia
cyprus kyrgyzstan portugal zimbabwe
czech republic laos puerto rico
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To analyze observations in Tcountry , we sequentially apply each country dictionary
in DICT, to each observation (tweet) in Tcountry. By so doing we obtain a obser-
vation/feature matrix -of size 170806 ∗ 163-, called F, containing uniquely boolean
values (zeros and ones). Each row of F corresponds to an observation, each col-
umn column of F corresponds to a feature (country dictionary in DICT). For any
i ∈ {1, ..., 170806} ⊂ Z>0 and j ∈ {1, ...163} ⊂ Z>0, the fi,j element of F represents
the output of the boolean function of dictionary j, applied to observation i. If the
output of the boolean dictionary function j applied to observation i is TRUE fi,j will
be equal to 1, if the output is FALSE fi,j will be equal to 0. For a given observa-
tion (row) the ones represent the countries that are mentioned in that observation,
whereas the zeros represent those countries that are not mentioned in that particular
observation.
Figure 3.1. Observation/Feature matrix F
f1,1 ... f1,163
...
. . .
...
f170806,1 ... f170806,163


afghanistan
... zimbabwe
1
...
170 806
 DICT (countries)

Observations
For example, if a tweet mentions a unique country (one or more times), like the fol-
lowing text:"Great political uncertainty in the United Kingdom after the resignation of PM
Cameron...Growth forecasts for the UK could be reviewed!" it will be considered a coun-
try occurrence. Whereas, if a tweet mentions multiple countries (one or more times),
like the following text "Geo-political uncertainty grows worldwide as Russia, China and
the United States do not find any agreed solution to the North-Korean crisis" it will be
considered a country co-occurrence.
Therefore, from a formal point of view, the country co-occurrences set Tcountry,CO ⊂
Tcountry is composed by all those observations for which the corresponding row sum
is strictly larger than one:
Tcountry,CO =
{
i ∈ Tcountry
∣∣∣∣∣
163∑
j=1
fi,j > 1
}
Whereas, the country occurrences set Tcountry,OC ⊂ Tcountry contains all those obser-
vations for which the corresponding row sum is equal to one:
Tcountry,OC =
{
i ∈ Tcountry
∣∣∣∣∣
163∑
j=1
fi,j = 1
}
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By construction we have that:
Tcountry,OC ∩ Tcountry,CO = ∅
and
Tcountry,OC ∪ Tcountry,CO = Tcountry
In the Table 3.2, that follows, we use the above defined Tcountry,CO and Tcountry,OC
sets to count, for each country, the number of observations in which that country
occurs alone or cooccurs with other countries. More specifically:
• The third column (occurrences) , is computed as the cardinality of the, by country,
subsets of observations from Tcountry,OC . We call these country specific occurrence
sets Tcountry,OC,k, where k ∈ DICT identifies the country. We can compute the car-
dinality (card) of these sets as follows:
card (Tcountry,OC,k) = card
({
i ∈ Tcountry,OC
∣∣∣∣∣fi,k = 1
})
• The fourth column (co-occurrences) , is computed as the cardinality of the, by coun-
try, subsets of observations from Tcountry,CO. We call these country specific cooccur-
rence sets Tcountry,CO,k, where k ∈ DICT identifies the country. We can compute the
cardinality (card) of these sets as follows:
card (Tcountry,CO,k) = card
({
i ∈ Tcountry,CO
∣∣∣∣∣fi,k > 1
})
In addition we further differentiate cooccurrences in two subcategories, for which
we also compute the set cardinality by country:
– The fifth column (2 cliques), shows us, for each country k ∈ DICT , the car-
dinality of the subset of Tcountry,CO,k that contains only those observations
in which exactly two countries are mentioned together, we call this subset
Tcountry,CO,k,2 and compute their cardinality as follows:
card (Tcountry,CO,k,2) = card
{i ∈ Tcountry,CO,k
∣∣∣∣∣
163∑
j=1
fi,j = 2
}
– The sixth column (3+ cliques), shows us, for each country k ∈ DICT , the
cardinality of the subset of Tcountry,CO,k that contains only those observations
in which more than two countries are mentioned together, we call this subset
Tcountry,CO,k,3+ and compute their cardinality as follows:
card (Tcountry,CO,k,3+) = card
{i ∈ Tcountry,CO,k
∣∣∣∣∣
163∑
j=1
fi,j > 2
}
• The second column (N. Total), shows us the the cardinality of Tcountry,k, which is the
subset of Tcountry in which a given country k ∈ DICT is mentioned. Tcountry,k is the
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union of Tcountry,CO,k and Tcountry,OC,k:
card (Tcountry,k) = card (Tcountry,OC,k ∪ Tcountry,CO,k)
= card (Tcountry,OC,k) + card (Tcountry,CO,k)− card (Tcountry,OC,k ∩ Tcountry,CO,k)
= card
({
i ∈ Tcountry,CO
∣∣∣∣∣fi,k = 1
})
+card
({
i ∈ Tcountry,CO
∣∣∣∣∣fi,k > 1
})
+card (∅)
= card
({
i ∈ Tcountry,CO
∣∣∣∣∣fi,k > 0
})
Table 3.2. Number of observations (tweets) in which country related tokens
co/occur, by country and by typology of co/occurrence
Geo-Area N. total N. (only) N. (only) // //
Name (number of occurrences co-occurrences
observations only only
by country) 2 cliques 3+ cliques
GB/UK 69349 66253 3096 2774 322
united states 34015 28108 5907 5228 679
china 8750 5689 3061 2767 294
india 5848 4459 1389 1310 79
spain 4721 4385 336 294 42
italy 3981 3623 358 287 71
canada 3545 2870 675 637 38
france 3142 2485 657 494 163
turkey 3022 2713 309 257 52
colombia 2804 2779 25 21 4
australia 2705 2370 335 296 39
thailand 2695 2592 103 77 26
japan 2268 1408 860 601 259
greece 2064 1944 120 62 58
ireland 2029 1633 396 336 60
syria 1976 1693 283 188 95
germany 1634 793 841 421 420
brazil 1622 1499 123 68 55
singapore 1452 1191 261 249 12
russian federation 1304 802 502 373 129
philippines 1253 750 503 396 107
mexico 1236 1056 180 174 6
nigeria 1147 1012 135 118 17
south africa 1121 1020 101 66 35
pakistan 1076 943 133 125 8
iran 1051 954 97 66 31
ukraine 1003 709 294 60 234
cuba 991 534 457 383 74
south korea 862 787 75 64 11
islamic state 720 498 222 180 42
indonesia 703 237 466 455 11
hong kong 674 509 165 117 48
iraq 661 590 71 51 20
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uganda 597 483 114 109 5
iceland 517 472 45 44 1
haiti 432 353 79 56 23
israel 423 263 160 154 6
zimbabwe 412 376 36 6 30
kenya 409 318 91 75 16
uzbekistan 389 343 46 40 6
nepal 344 280 64 55 9
north korea 340 236 104 92 12
saudi arabia 334 265 69 67 2
croatia 324 297 27 5 22
egypt 275 246 29 21 8
chad 267 247 20 20 0
new zealand 257 228 29 11 18
switzerland 245 217 28 10 18
jamaica 244 124 120 50 70
argentina 237 212 25 3 22
macedonia 230 227 3 1 2
georgia 228 196 32 6 26
bangladesh 226 93 133 133 0
jordan 222 203 19 18 1
south sudan 220 175 45 44 1
norway 214 108 106 94 12
libya 211 160 51 43 8
malaysia 191 142 49 26 23
venezuela 187 153 34 10 24
afghanistan 187 88 99 91 8
gambia 179 172 7 6 1
congo 179 169 10 2 8
ghana 177 154 23 22 1
vietnam 148 111 37 30 7
somalia 143 116 27 22 5
puerto rico 142 138 4 4 0
sweden 141 116 25 17 8
palestine, state of 133 40 93 93 0
qatar 129 120 9 7 2
cambodia 129 59 70 68 2
ethiopia 127 113 14 14 0
panama 120 68 52 52 0
poland 119 71 48 47 1
chile 117 100 17 16 1
austria 109 70 39 17 22
netherlands 108 71 37 16 21
zambia 105 101 4 1 3
bulgaria 105 93 12 10 2
morocco 101 16 85 66 19
belgium 95 50 45 24 21
cyprus 95 40 55 48 7
portugal 91 66 25 21 4
finland 91 57 34 11 23
algeria 90 84 6 5 1
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yemen 88 79 9 6 3
myanmar 86 65 21 15 6
lebanon 85 49 36 32 4
gabon 81 72 9 9 0
serbia 76 26 50 50 0
rwanda 69 61 8 3 5
guinea 65 64 1 1 0
denmark 57 55 2 1 1
hungary 49 22 27 25 2
tanzania 48 37 11 6 5
mozambique 48 14 34 6 28
peru 46 42 4 3 1
romania 45 36 9 7 2
kazakhstan 44 42 2 2 0
bosnia herzegovina 42 4 38 38 0
burundi 41 35 6 1 5
sri lanka 40 36 4 2 2
niger 31 30 1 1 0
latvia 31 9 22 0 22
luxembourg 30 30 0 0 0
slovakia 29 22 7 6 1
tunisia 29 19 10 10 0
moldova 29 7 22 1 21
malawi 26 24 2 2 0
angola 26 14 12 6 6
malta 25 17 8 7 1
bhutan 25 2 23 23 0
liberia 24 23 1 0 1
mongolia 21 18 3 3 0
eritrea 21 15 6 6 0
kuwait 21 13 8 4 4
ecuador 19 19 0 0 0
guyana 19 3 16 16 0
lithuania 18 18 0 0 0
lesotho 17 17 0 0 0
bahrain 17 11 6 0 6
cameroon 17 7 10 2 8
czech republic 16 14 2 2 0
namibia 15 13 2 2 0
senegal 15 7 8 8 0
madagascar 14 14 0 0 0
mauritania 14 14 0 0 0
slovenia 14 13 1 0 1
armenia 14 12 2 2 0
laos 14 12 2 2 0
nicaragua 14 12 2 1 1
estonia 14 10 4 4 0
belarus 13 2 11 11 0
bolivia 10 9 1 0 1
guatemala 10 6 4 3 1
costa rica 8 7 1 0 1
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honduras 8 7 1 1 0
arab emirates 7 7 0 0 0
burkina faso 7 5 2 0 2
mali 6 6 0 0 0
trinidad tobago 6 6 0 0 0
uruguay 6 3 3 3 0
albania 6 2 4 3 1
botswana 5 5 0 0 0
oman 5 2 3 2 1
azerbaijan 4 3 1 1 0
cape verde 3 3 0 0 0
montenegro 3 3 0 0 0
el salvador 3 2 1 1 0
benin 2 2 0 0 0
central african republic 2 2 0 0 0
kyrgyzstan 2 2 0 0 0
timor-leste 2 2 0 0 0
papua new guinea 2 1 1 1 0
swaziland 2 1 1 1 0
brunei 1 1 0 0 0
côte d’ivoire 1 1 0 0 0
guinea-bissau 1 1 0 0 0
suriname 1 1 0 0 0
tajikistan 1 1 0 0 0
togo 1 1 0 0 0
belize 1 0 1 1 0
paraguay 1 0 1 0 1
turkmenistan 1 0 1 1 0
GAs have been ordered, in decreasing order, by N.Total, and, for equal N.Total by N. oc-
currences
As we can see from Table 3.2, the ten countries most mentioned -in Tweets about
uncertainty- during the year 2016 are the United Kingdom, the United States, China,
India, Spain, Italy, Canada, France, Turkey and Colombia. We remark that for each
of these countries N. occurrences and N. co-occurrences represent rather different
shares of N.Total. For example, both in absolute terms and relative to the value
of N.Total, the United States have much more co-occurrences with other countries
compared to GB/UK. This evidence supports the hypothesis that the the election of
Trump as President of the United States, is considered -by English speaking Twitter
users- a relatively more global/international uncertainty phenomenon with respect
to the uncertainty implications of the EU-referendum results, whose expected effects
appear to be concentrated within the European Union. This table also allows us to
appraise that countries like Columbia (FARC referendum held on October the 2nd), Italy
(constitutional referendum held on December the 4th), Spain (general elections held on June
the 26th), Turkey (tentative of coup the 15th of July), Brazil (impeachment of Dilma Rouss-
eff), Australia (general elections held on July the 2nd), Pakistan (Panama papers leak) and
Syria (civil war), for which N. cooccurrences is relatively low compared to N. oc-
currences, have been mainly subject to local (internal) phenomena/events causing
uncertainty. Whereas countries like Germany, Russia, Cuba, North Korea and Israel,
for which N. cooccurrences is relatively high compared to N. occurrences, appear
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to have been particularly subject to international uncertainty, or, uncertainty conta-
gion from other countries during the period under investigation. Another important
stylized fact that we can derive from this table, is that there are huge differences in
terms of volume of Twitter activity in English concerning uncertainty among coun-
tries. At least some of these differences in Twitter activity by country could not be
due to factual dissimilarities in the level of civil society uncertainty experienced in
these countries, but to demographic factors (size of countries), language factors (share
of the population able to write in English), as well as technological (share of the population
which has access to Internet), legal (for example Twitter is censored in China) and cultural
factors (like the habit of writing online about local and international facts), which may
influence the level of Twitter activity about uncertainty for a given country.
The main reason for which, in Table 3.2, we distinguished co-occurrences in two
subcategories of observations (2 cliques and 3+ cliques), is that, we would like each
observation in Tcountry to have equal influence, in terms of overall contribution to
the weights of S-WUN. Therefore, we cannot simply build our static network from
the Fmatrix, using the counts of cooccurrences -by pairs of countries- to determine
the edges’ weights and counts of occurrences -by single country- to determine the
nodes’ weights, because by doing so, observations that mention a great number of
countries (>2) would have a greater overall influence on the weights of our (S-WUN)
network with respect to observations in which a single country or a pair of countries
are mentioned.
Therefore, to obtain the desired final result: equal overall contribution of each obser-
vation; we must weight our observations’ counts by edge/node. In such a way that
each observation, whatever is the number of countries it refers to, may contribute to
S-WUN for a mass (sum of effects on weights) equal to one (1). Our solution works
as follows:
• Occurrence observations, i.e. those in which a single country is mentioned (one
or several times), contribute to our network by adding one (1) to the mass of the
country node to which the observation refers to.
For example, if the first observation in Tcountry had the following textual content:
"Great political uncertainty in the United Kingdom after the resignation of PMCameron...Growth
forecasts for the UK could be reviewed!" the first row in Fwould have a single non null
element that corresponds to the to the UK/GB area, all other being zero. Since the
dictionary of GB/US is the 53st element of theDICT list, the non null element would
be f1,53:
f1,j = 0 for j ∈ {1, ..., 163} − {53}
and f1,j = 1forj ∈ {53}
Such an observation would affect the weight of the corresponding country node
(GB/UK) by increasing its value by one (1). Call w53,53 the weight of the GB/UK
node in our static network, which is mathematically represented by the weighted
matrix W of size 163 ∗ 163. The effect of the aforementioned observation, whose
textual content is called 1stOb, in terms of variation of W’s elements would be the
following:
1Ob =⇒ f1,53 = 1 and f1,j = 0for j ∈ {1, ..., 163} − {53} =⇒ ∆w53,53 = (+)1
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Which can be summarized in terms of network visualization of GB/UK node in S-
WUN before and after discounting the effects of the observation 1stOb as follows:
GB/UK node of S-WUN before considering 1stOb:
w53,53 = x
GB/UK node of S-WUN after considering 1stOb:
w53,53 = x+ 1
• 2 clique cooccurrence observations, i.e. those in which two countries are mentioned
(one or several times), contribute to our network by adding one (1) to the weight of
the country edge that connects the two mentioned countries.
For example, if the second observation in Tcountry had the following textual content:
"Uncertainty reigns supreme in diplomatic relations between Italy and Egypt after the as-
sassination of Giulio Regeni in Cairo" the second row in F would have two non null
elements, the ones that correspond to Egypt and Italy areas, all other being zero.
Since the dictionary of Egypt and Italy are respectively the 44th and 74th elements
of DICT, we would have:
f2,j = 0 for j ∈ {1, ..., 163} − {44, 74}
and f2,j = 1forj ∈ {44, 74}
Such observationwould affect theweight of the corresponding country edge (GB/UK)
by increasing its value by one (1). Call w44,74 the weight of the edge between Italy
and Egypt in our static network. The effect of the aforementioned observation,
whose textual content is called 2ndOb, in terms of variation of W’s elements would
be the following:
2Ob =⇒ f2,44 = 1, f2,74 = 1 and f2,j = 0 for j ∈ {1, ..., 163} − {44, 74}
=⇒ ∆w44,77 = ∆w77,44 = (+)1
We have that both w74,44 and w44,77 change identically because S-WUN is an undi-
rected network, therefore matrix W is symmetric. We can summarize the effect of
2ndOb in terms of network visualization of the Egypt-Italy edge in S-WUN before and
after discounting the effects of this observation:
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Egypt-Italy edge of S-WUN before considering 2ndOb:
w44,44 w74,74
Egypt Italy
w74,44 = w44,77 = y
Egypt-Italy edge of S-WUN after considering 2ndOb:
w44,44 w74,74
Egypt Italy
w74,44 = w44,77 = y + 1
• 3+ clique co-occurrence observations, i.e. those in which more than two countries
are mentioned (one or several times), contribute to the weight of each edge between
pairs of countriesmentioned in the observation,i.e. all possible 2-combinations of the
observation’s countries. It is like if each observation represented a n-clique, where n
is the number of countries mentioned in that observation. Since the number of edges
in a n-clique can be obtained by using the triangular number function (tri), we can
obtain the number of edges in a n-clique observation as follows:
tri (n) =
n ∗ (n− 1)
2
Hence the weight contribution of the observation to edges of the network, which
must sum to one, will be split in equal parts among all the edges that constitute
the n-clique, representing the n countries mentioned in the observation. Each edge
weight contribution being equal to the inverse of the triangular number function
previously defined:
tri−1 (n) =
2
n ∗ (n− 1)
For example, if the third observation in Tcountry had the following textual content:
"Geo-political uncertainty grows as Russia, Turkey, Syria and the United States do not find
any agreed solution for the establishment of a Kurdish State" the second row in F would
have four non null elements, the ones that correspond to Russia, Turkey, Syria and
the United States, all other being zero. Since the dictionary of these four areas are
respectively the 126th,152th, 144th and 156th elements of DICT, we would have:
f3,j = 0 for j ∈ {1, ..., 163} − {126, 144, 152, 156}
and f3,j = 1forj ∈ {126, 144, 152, 156}
Such observation would affect the weight of the corresponding 4-clique’s edges, by
increasing each edges’ weight by one sixth (1/6). Call w126,144, w126,152, w126,156,
w144,152 ,w144,156 and w152,156 the weights of the edges in our static network belong-
ing to this 4-clique. The effect of the aforementioned observation, whose textual
content is called 3rdOb, in terms of variation ofW’s elements would be the following:
3Ob =⇒ f3,126 = 1, f3,144 = 1, f3,152 = 1, f3,156 = 1
and f3,j = 0 for j ∈ {1, ..., 163} − {126, 144, 152, 156}
=⇒ ∆w126,144 = ∆w126,152 = ∆w126,156 = ∆w144,152 = ∆w144,156 = ∆w152,156
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= ∆w144,126 = ∆w152,126 = ∆w156,126 = ∆w152,144 = ∆w156,144 = ∆w156,152 = (+)
1
6
We can summarize the effect of 3rdOb, in terms of network visualization of the corre-
sponding 4-clique in S-WUN before and after discounting the effects of this obser-
vation, as follows:
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corresponding 4-clique of S-WUN after considering 3rdOb:
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We can compute the W matrix that represents S-WUN, including the weighing of
cooccurrence observations as above specified, through the following procedure:
• We compute the row sums of each row of matrix F:
si =
163∑
j=1
fi,j for i ∈ {1, ..., 170806}
and obtain the vector ~S, which contains the 170806 si’s. We transform the elements
of vector ~S as follows:
for i ∈ {1, ..., 170806}
sti =
{
1 if si = 1√
tri−1 (si) =
√
2
si∗(si−1) if si > 1
The vector which contains all the sti’s is called
−→
ST .
• We then multiply each column of the Fmatrix (element-wise) by the vector
−→
ST :
F−→ST = (fi,j · sti) =
 f1,1 · st1 · · · f1,163 · st1... . . . ...
f170806,1 · st170806 · · · f170806,163 · st170806

=
 f
′
1,1 · · · f ′1,163
...
. . .
...
f ′170806,1 · · · f ′170806,163
 = F′
• To obtainW we must multiply the transpose of the F′ matrix by F′ itself, and then,
subtract from the elements in the diagonal of the resulting (163∗163) matrix the sum
by row of out-of diagonal values of the same matrix (F′T ∗ F′):
W =
 w1,1 · · · w163,1... . . . ...
w1,163 · · · w163,163

where wi,j =
{∑170806
k=1 f
′
k,if
′
k,j −
∑170806
k=1|k∈Tcountry,CO f
′
k,if
′
k,j if i = j∑170806
k=1 f
′
k,jf
′
k,i if i 6= j
By so doing we subtract from each element in the diagonal, which corresponds to
a node of S-WUN, the weights of the edges that link to that node that are due to
co-occurrence observations and therefore should not influence our node’s weights.
and since for any i ∈ {1, .., 163} :
170806∑
k=1
f ′k,if
′
k,i −
170806∑
k=1|k∈Tcountry,CO
f ′k,if
′
k,i
=
170806∑
k=1|k∈Tcountry,OC
f ′k,if
′
k,i
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we can rewriteW as follows :
W =

∑170806
k=1|k∈Tcountry,OC f
′
k,1f
′
k,1 · · ·
∑170806
k=1 f
′
k,163f
′
k,1
...
. . .
...∑170806
k=1 f
′
k,163f
′
k,1 · · ·
∑170806
k=1|k∈Tcountry,OC f
′
k,163f
′
k,163

The resulting S-WUN undirected network, represented by the symmetric matrixW,
is our first - and less sophisticated - tool to identify local, and transnational/interna-
tional uncertainty events that occurred in the period under investigation: the 2nd,
3rd and 4th quarters of the year 2016. The main limit of this instrument are its static
nature and the fact that weights of nodes and edges for countries which are more
populated, or where a larger share of the population speaks in English and/or uses
Twitter, will likely be overestimated compared to those areas in which the popula-
tion size is smaller, or, where the share of English speaking Twitter users is smaller.
Differently from standard co-occurrence matrices used in text mining applications,
by being based country token dictionaries, the S-WUN network isn’t a simple count
of the number of occurrences and co-occurrences of a list of words in our set of ob-
servations (tweets) about uncertainty. But, it is a weighted matrix of the occurrences
and co-occurrences of -more than one hundred and sixty- features, the countries
contained inDICT , each of which is identified trough a different dictionary used to
identify signals related to a country in Twitter observations. Another major differ-
ence compared to "classical" cooccurrence matrices is that the values in the diagonal,
which represent the weights of the country nodes, have been pruned from the ef-
fects of those observations (Tcountry,CO) in which several geographic area cooccur.
This point also distinguishes the methodology used build the TU indexes in the sec-
ond article, from that presented in this article. As a result of the latter choice, through
S-WUN nodes’ weights we can appraise the relevance of internal/local uncertainty
phenomena. Whereas, through edges’ weights, we can appraise the relevance of
international/transnational uncertainty phenomena, i.e. the percolation/contagion
channels.
S-WUN has 163 nodes and 789 (non-null) undirected edges, i.e. the contagion chan-
nels. It is constituted by a big cluster (largest connected component) with 137 nodes,
two (2) small clusters of size two (2) and 22 isolated nodes. The density of S-WUN is
0.05975915, while its transitivity is 0.3367068, this result shows clearly that S-WUN
is very different from what would be a random network with the same density. As
we can see at a first look from the representation of the whole static network (Fig.
3.2), the United States and the United Kingdom (GB/UK) were clearly the most cen-
tral nodes of S-WUN during the year 2016. Both from the point of view of their
connections and for the respective weights of their nodes, which represent local/in-
ternal uncertainty. Three distinct node centrality measures (betweenness, closeness
and eigenvector) are available in section 3.0.4 of the Appendix. These centrality
measures can be used to identify the nodes that played prominent roles in S-WUN
during the year 2016. Here follow the list of the top10 countries (nodes) from the
point of view of the (weighted) closeness centrality score:
(1) United States; (2) Cuba; (3) Morocco; (4) South Africa; (5) GB/UK; (6) Saudi Arabia;
(7) Afghanistan; (8) North Korea; (9) Russian Federation (10) Turkey;
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Many of the countries in this ranking, like Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and
North Korea have strong uncertainty dependency relations with the United States.
By being very close to the most central node of the network they rank high from
the point of view of closeness centrality, which is a function of the shortest-path dis-
tances with respect to other non isolated nodes. These nodes represent potentially
"hot" areas of the world, in terms of U.S. international affairs and conflicts, under
the upcoming/new presidency. This finding supports our hypothesis that civil so-
ciety uncertainty levels heavily depend on agents’ expectations and their degree of
divergence, and not simply on factual events.
The ranking of Morocco, in terms of closeness centrality, could at a first look seem
surprising. However, in Morocco occured one of the most important global debates
of the year 2016: the country hosted the UN Climate Change Conference (COP22) just
after the the US presidential elections; as a result, the name of the country has been
extensively and globally associated to uncertainty concerning climate change de-
bates and expected worldwide policy changes under the Trump presidency.
From the point of view of the (weighted) betweenness centrality score, the top10
ranking countries are the following:
(1) United States; (2) GB/UK ; (3) India; (4) Russian Federation; (5) China; (6) Poland; (7)
Turkey; (8) Germany; (9) Hungary; (10) Thailand;
Most of the aforementioned top ranking countries -with the exception of Poland,
Hungary and Thailand- represent worldwide civil society uncertainty hubs, they are
seen as the key (political and economic) global/regional players in relation to those
major events that raised globally civil society uncertainty in 2016. Hungary ranks
high in relation to the Euoropean migration crisis and the Hungarian referendum
on the European Union’s migrant relocation plans, which was held on October the
2nd. The rank of Poland is due to uncertainties in relation to the future geopolitical
role and foreign policy strategy of Poland; being Poland a member of the NATO
and given the rising military tensions with Russia around the Baltic Sea area in 2016.
Whereas, the rank of Thailand is linked to rising geopolitical tensions in South-East
Asia, in particular with China, after the proactive strengthening of diplomatic and
commercial relations between Japan and Thailand.
Finally, the ten countries with the highest (weighted) eigenvector centrality score are
the following:
(1) United States; (2) China; (3) GB/UK; (4) India; (5) Canada; (6) Japan; (7) Indonesia; (8)
Cuba; (9) Philippines; (10) Ireland;
Aswe could expect, there is a clear overlapping between eigencentrality top ranking
countries and countries in the aforementioned (top-ranking) lists. Canada appears
in the aforesaid rank in relation to civil society uncertainty emerging in North America
after the threats to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) made by
the new US presidency; but also, in relation to delays in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Ireland ranks so high in
relation to possible problems and difficulties in the Northern Ireland-Republic of
Ireland commercial relations, after UK’s EU-referendum vote in favour of Brexit.
Whereas the presence of China, together with the Philippines, Indonesia and Japan
is mostly due to territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
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Given the observed characteristics of the S-WUN network, the EU-referendum and
US-elections seem to have played a major worldwide disturbance effect on expec-
tations of civil society members, all over the globe. We can safely claim that these
two extreme uncertainty events propagated their civil society uncertainty effects at a
worldwide scale: a very large group of countries, represented by the inner densely
connected subnetwork in Fig.3.2, are attached to both the US and UK. This group
of nodes constitutes the most highly connected component of S-WUN. Edge be-
tweenness centrality measures, available in section 3.0.3 of the Appendix, show
that among the ten most important edges of S-WUN, in terms of civil society un-
certainty international percolation role, we find the following contagion channels:
GB/UK - United States, Russian Federation - United States, India - United States,
China - United States, Russian Federation -Turkey, and, India - Pakistan. The coun-
tries belonging to the inner circle of Fig.3.2, appear to be highly interdependent
and therefore potentially more vulnerable, with respect to others, to the internation-
al/transnational propagation of uncertainty shocks. The edges among these coun-
tries are the most relevant channels of contagion, through which major uncertainty
shocks were propagated globally. Their edges’ weights and betweenness centrality
scores, appear to be especially large when compared to those between countries at
the periphery of S-WUN, which are very poorly and loosely connected to the rest of
the world compared to this (inner circle) group. Finally, at the center of the network,
as represented in Fig.3.2, there is a group of countries, arranged like an half-moon,
which (with one exception) appear to be totally disconnected from the rest of the
world from the point of view of uncertainty phenomena dependencies, these are
the countries listed at the end of Table 3.2, like Tajikistan, Togo, Suriname, Brunei
and many other "isolated" areas, with respect to international civil society uncertainty
shocks identified through S-WUN.
Figure 3.2. Static Worldwide Uncertainty Network (S-WUN)
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Here follows the empirical distribution of the degree of the nodes of our static net-
work (Fig. 3.3).
Figure 3.3. Histogram of the empirical distribution of S-WUN nodes’ degree
As we can see from Fig. 3.3, excluding isolated nodes (those with a degree=0), the
empirical distribution of the degree of S-WUN’s nodes appears to follow either a
power law or an exponential distribution: S-WUN has a few very large hub nodes
and a great share of nodes with very few connections. We remind that, if the empir-
ical distribution of the degree of nodes follows a power law, S-WUN is scale free. In
Fig. 3.4 we fit, through MLE estimation, four distribution families: power-law, dis-
cretized log-normal, poisson and discretized exponential; to see which distribution
among the four better approximates our empirical distribution, we exclude nodes
with a degree equal to zero (0). The estimated parameter of the power-law approxi-
mation is α = 1.422871, which means that the first and second moments of the fitted
power law distribution are not finite. However, according to the Akaike informa-
tion criterion, the fitted discretized exponential distribution (dots in green in Fig.
3.4) with parameter Λ = 0.09360418 approximates better than all other families our
empirical distribution.
Figure 3.4. Empirical and fitted CDFs of S-WUN’s nodes degree
Among nodes with the highest degree (degree value in brackets) in S-WUN, we find
again the United States (84), followed byGB/UK (75), China (46), Russia (41), Turkey
(40), India (38), Germany (37), France (37), Italy (34), Canada (34), Japan (31), Brazil
(30), Syria (28) and Greece (28). These countries can be considered the hubs of un-
certainty contagion during the year 2016. They bind together almost the 90% of the
remainder countries (with lower node degrees), constituting the skeleton of a world-
wide integrated uncertainty system, through which international/transnational un-
certainty events propagate.
Here follow two network visualizations, showing the neighbourhood of the United
States (Fig. 3.5) and United Kingdom (Fig. 3.6) nodes in S-WUN.
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Figure 3.5. S-WUN neighborhood of the United States’ node
Differently from the visualization of the whole S-WUN network, which was too
large to allow us to plot the values of edges’ weights, in the latter visualizations, by
neighbourhood of a node, we can appraise the weights of edges and nodes in the
neighbourhood of the United States and the United Kingdom.
As we can see from Fig. 3.5 the heaviest edges attached to the United States node
are those that go towards the United Kingdom, China, India, Canada and Cuba.
More reduced in terms of weight but still relevant are the edges that connect the
United States to Russia, Japan, the Philippines and Singapore. Explanations of the
possible causes of these heavy edge weights have been already stated. Many of the
other relations are easily interpretable, for example the connection with Russia is
certainly due to the conflict in Syria, in which both the US and Russia intervened,
and, to the FBI inquiry on the intervention of Russia’s intelligence and funding dur-
ing the US elections in which Trump prevailed. Other uncertainty contagion chan-
nels, like that with Japan are linked to the expected/possible use of US bases in
the Japanese archipelago under the Trump presidency, together with the (apparent)
unpredictability of Trump’s foreign policy and ensuing risks for the geopolitical sta-
bility of the North East Asia region.
Talking About Uncertainty - Carlo R. M. A. Santagiustina 175
Chapter 3. The Worldwide Uncertainty Network: mapping the global dynamics
and contagion channels of civil society uncertainty
Figure 3.6. S-WUN neighborhood of GB/UK’s node
Some of the most relevant edges for the United States are also among the most im-
portant ones for the United Kingdom. For example, as we can see from Fig 3.6
besides the US itself, China and -to a lesser extent also- India share an important
contagion channel with the UK. Most of the uncertainty contagion channels of UK
point to different countries with respect to US’ edges. Among the most relevant
edges for the UK we find those towards Ireland, Australia, France, Germany, Nor-
way and Uganda. The UK shares also some uncertainty contagion channels with
countries in southern Europe, like Italy, Spain and Greece, however the weights of
these uncertainty contagion edges are smaller compared to those that are shared
with northern European countries. Many countries in central Africa are also asso-
ciated to UK, and to the effect of Brexit in states like Uganda, Chad, South Africa,
Ghana and other countries in Africa. In these areas Brexit is seen both as a threat
and an opportunity for the development of new trade agreements between the UK
and African countries.
To give to the reader the possibility of exploring the various countries in S-WUN
that couldn’t be directly inserted in this document for reasons of space constraints,
we have included here below a video stream from the Youtube channel of the author.
The video 3.7 contains the visualizations of the neighbourhoods of all countries in
S-WUN that have at lest one neighbour.
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Figure 3.7. [Video] S-WUN, Neighborhood by Country (in alphabetic order)
CLICK ON THE IMAGE ABOVE TO START THE VIDEO
(You must be connected to the Internet)
If your PDF reader doesn’t support flash video direct streaming, the video can be
directly viewed at the following (Youtube) URL-link:
youtube.com/embed/AOLoPTpfEY0
By looking in detail to the neighbourhoods of countries we can appreciate the capac-
ity of S-WUN of representing -rather correctly according to our prior knowledge- the
occurrence and interdependencies of uncertainty phenomena in the real world.
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3.3 Dynamic Worldwide Uncertainty Network (D-WUN)
The Dynamic Worldwide Uncertainty Network (D-WUN) is obtained by using the
same methodology used to construct S-WUN, but instead of inferring a unique net-
work for the entire period covered by the study, with a single matrixW, as we did in
the previous section, we will build a matrix and hence a network for each day of the
time interval of this study, from April the 5th to December the 31st 2016. By doing
so we obtain a tensor that contains (side by side) the variousWd where the d stands
for the temporal dimension of the tensor, our first observed day (d = 1) being April
the 5th 2016;
The analysis of this tensor will allow us to identify and appraise the dynamics of
local and international events that cause uncertainty. As S-WUN, also this tool is
potentially vulnerable to the overestimation bias for those countries whose popula-
tion contains a larger share of English speakers, Twitter users, or for countries which
are simply more populated compared to others. In addition, since twitter activity is
on average less intense on weekends and holidays, the nodes and edges of this dy-
namic network will be oversized during working week days compared to weekend.
The transformations that we will introduce later on, in the last three sections of this
article will mitigate the effects of these potential sources of distortion.
To buildD-WUNwe start by subsetting the TUcountry dataset by time interval (day)
in which observation have been published, fixing at midnight (00:00:00) UTC time
the day time transition. The vector containing the meta-data the day of publication
of our tweets is called
−−−→
DAY , whose element dayi corresponds to the day in which
observation i has been published online through Twitter. We use the vector
−−−→
DAY to
subset Tcountry for the different days observed in our dataset Tcountry. Daily subsets
are called T dcountry and defined as follows:
T dcountry = {i ∈ Tcountry|dayi = d}
The remainder of the process to build is identical to the one presented in the previous
section for building S-WUN the only difference is that we are now using T dcountry
instead of Tcountry and that we repeat the process for all d ∈ {1, ..., 272}. With each
T dcountry we obtain the corresponding matrixWd of the dynamic network in day d.
By repeating the process for all d ∈ {1, ..., 272} we obtain a set of 272Wd matrices
that we join together in a three dimensional tensorW:
For all d ∈ {1, ..., 272}we have :
wi,j,d =

∑170806
k=1|k∈T dcountry,OC f
′
k,i ∗ f ′k,j if i = j∑170806
k=1|k∈T dcountry f
′
k,j ∗ f ′k,i if i 6= j
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Figure 3.8. Dynamic Uncertainty Network TensorW
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Here follow three graphs describing some key aggregate features of the dynamic
network given by tensorW:
1. The network density by day - the mean number of non-null edges per node of the
network, it can be used as a proxy of the degree of connectivity/integration of the
network, and hence of the likelihood of uncertainty contagions (all other parameters
being equal);
2. The mean value of nodes’ weights by day- can be used to evaluate the overall mag-
nitude of local/internal uncertainty phenomena in the country network by day;
3. The mean value of edges’ weights by day- including missing edges (those with
zero/null weight), can be used to proxy the overall magnitude of international/-
transnational uncertainty phenomena in D-WUN by day;
Figure 3.9. Dynamic Worldwide Uncertainty Network statistics across time
As we can see from Fig. 3.9, both the structure (density) and the weights of our dy-
namic network experienced major changes during and just after the EU-referendum
and the US elections. The dates of these events are represented in the graphs by the
two vertical red lines. Even though the two aforementioned events were accompa-
nied by similar peaking patterns of the density of the network, their relative effects
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on the mean of the weights of edges and nodes were rather different. The EU refer-
endum had a greater effect on the mean of nodes’ weights that touched record high
values the day after the vote, whereas the mean of edges’ weights increased, but less
compared to the nodes. Given that the density of the network also increased con-
siderably after the EU-referendum it means that more contagion channels (edges)
appeared in the network but their mean weight must have changed little. Whereas,
after the US elections both the weights of nodes and those of the edges experienced
similar aggregate changes (in terms of relative size of the variation). The dissipa-
tion of local uncertainty in the network (represented by the mean of the weights of
nodes) appears to have been more rapid after the US elections than after the EU-
referendum. However, for what concerns international/transnational uncertainty
(represented by the mean of the weights of edges) the situation is the opposite. The
international uncertainty effects of the election of Trump on D-WUN appear to last
longer compared to those of the EU referendum. The period after the US elections
also appears to be characterized by more variance of uncertainty in the network,
from the point of view of both network density and the mean weight of the edges,
with respect to the two months that followed the EU-referendum.
Therefore we can conclude that, even though the two major events of the year 2016
appear to be similar from the point of view of the maximum density reached by our
uncertainty network during the two events, they are nevertheless extremely differ-
ent for what concerns changes in the mean of the weights of nodes and edges, which
represent respectively internal uncertainty and international uncertainty across the
network. They are also different from the point of view of the uncertainty dissi-
pation processes, through which, after the two events, the mean of the weights of
edges and nodes, of the uncertainty network, decreased towards to their long run
stationary levels. To tell it shortly, Brexit had a stronger and more persistent impact
on the node’s weights of our dynamic uncertainty network, whereas the US elec-
tions determined an almost specular effect on the edges’ weights. In both cases the
aforementioned variables continued oscillating, for more than one month, in a range
of values far above their long term averages. The observed uncertainty phenomena
around the US elections probably represents the impact, in terms of international/-
transnational uncertainty, not only of the US elections’ results, but also of US foreign
policy making under the Trump presidency. Similarly that of the EU referendum
also represents uncertainty linked to upcoming Brexit negotiations between the the
UK and the EU.
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3.4 Uncertainty Signals’ decomposition: Redundancy and In-
tensity
In this final section, wewish tomitigate asmuch as possible those representativeness
biases contained in W, which are due to the fact that we are working only with
tweets in English. To do so we rescale the weights of all the nodes and edges of our
dynamic network, using three distinct transformations:
1. The redundancy of uncertainty signals, which represents the variety of the sources
that posted twitter uncertainty signals concerning a specific edge/node observed in
a specific day;
2. The intensity of uncertainty in a node/edge in a given day with respect to uncer-
tainty in that node/edge in past days;
3. The intensity uncertainty in a node/edge in a given day with respect to uncertainty
in that same day in other nodes/edges;
Each transformation is applied separately to each element wi,j,d ofW. For a given
elementwi,j,d ofW, our transformations require us to use -only- the weights of other
nodes/edges ofW of the same day d, and the weights of same node/edge (i, j) of
W in prior days (t < d). We choose to use three transformations that share this
property of using exclusively past and present values of the network and being ap-
plied to single wi,j,d, to have the possibility of updating the contents of our tensor
in real time, both by adding new daily matricesWt and hence lengthening our time
dimension, and also, to have the possibility of adding additional countries, length-
ening our observed features dimension (adding columns to the F matrix), without
having to rescale again all -past- values of our tensorW at each update. In addition
to facilitate the interpretation of network’s weights and the merging of the the three
uncertainty tensors that we obtain through the three transformations described in
the next subsections, we want all our transformations to have as codomain subsets
of [0, 1]. So that when we will merge them together, by element-wise multiplying the
elements of these tensors, each Tensor will have equal influence on the final weight
of the Rescaled Dynamic Uncertainty Network (RD-WUN). Final weights will be
equivalent to the volumes in the three dimensional space represented by the three
tensors. Given the properties of volumes, the edges/nodes that will have -for a
given day- the highest rescaled uncertainty weights (closer to one), will be the ones
that will exhibit the higher "cubic-volume" weight, represented by the element-wise
multiplication of the three tensors. It is sufficient that one of these three weights is
zero to obtain a "cubic-volume" weight equal to zero for the corresponding element
in RD-WUN.
3.4.1 Redundancy Transformation and Tensor
The first transformation, called Redundancy, is motivated by the need of taking into
account the variety of the sources that, in a given day, contribute to the values of the
weights of a given node/edge by publishing one or more observations -Tweets- con-
cerning that specific node/edge. Since on Twitter, as in other social networks, many
signals of uncertainty are not based on the direct observation by the Twitter user
of the "state of uncertainty" in a particular part of the system, i.e. local uncertainty
(nodes) and transnational/international uncertainty (edges) in the network, but on
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simple imitation/repetition of the most common/widespread signals of uncertainty
of the day. We want to find a way (a simple transformation) to represent in the inter-
val [0,1[ the redundancy of edge/node specific sets of daily signals in our dynamic
uncertainty network. This in order to counteract/mitigate the impact of the imita-
tive behaviour, i.e. its effects, in the daily weights of the different nodes/edges in
our tensorW. Considering the fact that, the more there are observations regarding a
given country (node) or relation among countries (edge) in a given day, the more it is
likely that a great number (or share) of these observations will result from a process
of imitation of other signals, rather than direct observation of uncertainty. We can
assume that the likelihood of imitating others increases exponentially as a function
of the number of signals pertaining to the same node/edge. In addition, we assume
that when a single (only one) individual indicates/signals a state of uncertainty in
a given node/edge in a given day, it is equally likely (probability of 0.5) that his
signal corresponds to factual reality, i.e. in that country (or group of countries there
has been an uncertainty event or a change in expectation that justifies/explains the
signal, as it is likely (probability of 0.5) that his uncertainty signal is a "false flag"
and doesn’t correspond to reality, i.e. no event or information that may justify/ex-
plain a state of uncertainty in the mentioned country/countries actually occurred;
In addition we assume that the marginal contribution of an observation (in terms
of redundancy) must always be positive, but must decrease and tend to zero as the
number of observations concerning that node/edge increases;
To summarize what we have previously said, to identify the redundancy of the un-
certainty of the node (if i = j) or arc (if i 6= j) at time t, which we call redi,j,d, we
look for a sigmoid transformation (function) of the number of distinct sources x that
in a given day mention a given node/edge and call this redundancy transformation
Re(x). SinceRe(x)must respect the conditions which have been previously justified,
we are searching for a Re(x) that:
1. Has as domain [0,+∞[ = R+ and as codomain (cod(Re)) a subset of [0, 1[ :
[0,+∞[ Re(x)−−−→ cod(Re) ⊆ [0, 1[
2. Is increasing and concave where defined and continuous: dRe(x)dx > 0 where the first
order derivative is defined, and d
2Re(x)
dx2
< 0 where the second order derivative is
defined.
3. Must tend to 1 as x tends to +∞:
lim
x→∞Re(x) = 1
4. It must respect the following constraints Re(1) = 0.5 and Re(0) = 0;
Up to our knowledge, the simplest function that respects all the above conditions is
Re(x) = x/(x + 1) Where for redundancy equal to zero (0) we mean a situation in
which we are unable to evaluate whether an "event of uncertainty", is occurring or
is expected to occur in the considered area/s, because of the absence of uncertainty
signals for that area;
To count the distinct number of sources per day, per edge/node of the network we
use three vectors containing the following metadata variables for each observation
(Tweet):
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•
−−−−→
UsrId: The unique Twitter identifier of the user that uploaded observation i is called
UsrIdi;
•
−−−→
DAY : The day in which the observation was uploaded/published on twitter, which
we have previously defined and called dayi;
• F(i,) (ith row of F): The occurrence or concurrence of countries to which the observa-
tion i refers to;
Call T d,i,jcountry the set containing all observations of Tcountry published in day d, con-
cerning either a node i (if i = j) or an edge ij (if i 6= j). We have that the the number
of distinct sources for that day and node/edge combination, is equal to the cardinal-
ity of the set containing unique combinations of
−−−−→
UsrId and
−−−→
DAY , among the subset
of observations that are contained in that daily set of observations T d,i,jcountry referring
to that node/edge. by transforming the previously obtained value, by applying to
it the Re transformation, we obtain the redi,j,d element of the redundancy tensor,
called RED, that has the same size and structure (dimensions and features associ-
ated to the dimensions) ofW.
As we can see from Fig. 3.10 the structure (Density) isn’t affected by the Redundancy
transformation, as we expected. However the mean weights by day are rather dif-
ferent from before. By being dependent on the number of sources our weights now
show us when, and for which nodes/edges our measurements are more robust. As
we can see from the second and third graphs of Fig. 3.10, during major uncertainty
events, not only the volumes of activity are larger, also the number of sources that
produce this activity are relatively larger (with respect to the volumes) compared to
normal times (when uncertainty is low). Therefore during major events our mea-
surements of the degree of uncertainty in the node/edges of our network should
be in average more robust and precise (less noisy) respect normal times, and hence
less manipulable by single agents and BOTs. This quality is one of the strengths
of our approach, that becomes more significant during crises, which exploits Twit-
ter as a distributed uncertainty sensor and measurement system, whose aggregated
sensitivity and precision grows during major events.
Figure 3.10. Redundancy Tensor - Statistics by day
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By looking to the following video we can appraise the dynamics of redundancy of
uncertainty signals by day and by edge/node. The higher is redundancy,i.e. the
closer is a given redi,j,d to one, the more reliable are the uncertainty measurements
concerning that specific node/edge (i, j) in that specific day (d).
Figure 3.11. [Video] Redundancy Tensor - Dynamic Network Visualization
CLICK ON THE IMAGE ABOVE TO START THE VIDEO
(You must be connected to the internet)
If your PDF reader doesn’t support flash video direct streaming, the video can be
directly viewed at the following (Youtube) URL-link:
youtube.com/embed/nLquhP30TfE
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3.4.2 Impact Transformation and Tensor
The impact rescaling transformations applied to our our original tensor are two (dis-
tinct) functions of the elements ofW:
• One horizontal transformation, which exploits the country feature dimension, by
rescaling the weight of each node/edge by comparing it (in terms of percentile rank)
to the wights of other nodes/edges in the network at the same measurement time;
• One vertical transformation, which exploits the historical time-series dimension, by
rescaling the weight of each node/edge by comparing it (in terms of percentile rank)
to prior weights of the same node/edge;
Both transformations, which we call respectively h (x) (horizontal impact rescaling)
and v (x) (vertical impact rescaling), are both applied to each element wi,j,p of tensor
W.
v (x) is used to appraise the relative relevance/magnitude of signals of uncertainty
associated to a given node (geographic area) or edge (contagion channel among two
areas) with respect to the past values of that same node/edge. For each combination
of i, j and p, it is computed as the percentile rank (with strict sign of the inequality)
of observationwi,j,pwith respect to the set of observations, called Vi,j,p, with non null
weights (for which wi,j,t<p > 0) referring to the same node/edge identified through
i and j, considering only past values t < p, i.e. the weights of the days before p.
Whereas h (x) is used to appraise the relative relevance/magnitude of signals of un-
certainty associated to a given node (geographic area) or edge (contagion channel
among two areas) in a given day, with respect to those of the other nodes/edges
in that same day. It is computed as the percentile rank of wi,j,p with respect to the
set of observations, called Hi,j,p, with non null weights, for which wx 6=i,y 6=x,t=p > 0,
referring to other nodes (if i = j) or edges (if i 6= j) for the same p. By applying
the previously described transformations v (x) and h (x) to all wi,j,p we obtain the
tensors called V and H. By multiplying element-wise (Hadamard product) the ele-
ments ofV andHwe obtain the impact tensor I.
Figure 3.12. Impact Tensor - Statistics by day
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In the following video 3.13 we can observe the dynamics of the network represented
by I across time.
Figure 3.13. [Video] Impact Tensor - Dynamic Network Visualization
CLICK ON THE IMAGE ABOVE TO START THE VIDEO
(You must be connected to the internet)
If your PDF reader doesn’t support flash video direct streaming, the video can be
directly viewed at the following (Youtube) URL-link:
youtube.com/embed/htqIqX2ckPo
186 Ca’Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics
3.4. Uncertainty Signals’ decomposition: Redundancy and Intensity
3.4.3 Rescaled Dynamic Worldwide Uncertainty Network (RD-WUN)
Finally, by element-wisemultiplying (Hadamard product) tensor Iwith tensorRED,
we obtain our tensor R representing our final Rescaled Dynamic Worldwide Un-
certainty Network (RD-WUN) :
Figure 3.14. Rescaled Dynamic Worldwide Uncertainty Network: statistics by
day
As we can see from Fig. 3.14 it looks like some of the aforementioned distortions
and representativeness problems due to our sample of English tweets used to proxy
uncertainty in the whole world, have been mitigated: mean values of nodes and
edges appear to be less sensitive to events occurring in US and UK, which are the
two English speaking countries from which a large share of our tweets come from.
Therefore we fulfilled our objective of mitigating representativeness distortions, ob-
jective that pushed us to transform the weights of our original tensorW. In partic-
ular, the overestimation of uncertainty in/caused-by events occurring in countries
where the English language, Internet and Twitter are relatively more widespread in
the population, appear to be smaller after the transformations we have proposed in
this article.
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In the following video 3.15 we can observe the dynamics of the network represented
byR across time.
Figure 3.15. [Video] Rescaled Dynamic Network Visualization
CLICK ON THE IMAGE ABOVE TO START THE VIDEO
(You must be connected to the internet)
If your PDF reader doesn’t support flash video direct streaming, the video can be
directly viewed at the following (Youtube) URL-link:
youtube.com/embed/htqIqX2ckPo
Here follows a short list of interesting dates, with embedded links to their occurence
in the aforementioned video, which illustrate the capacity of RD-WUN in capturing
the dynamics of civil society uncertainty across the globe, potentially in real time:
• UKs EU-referendum (UK/GB, June 23rd 2016)
• Australian general elections (Australia, July the 2nd 2016)
• Failed Coup in Turkey (Turkey, July the 15th 2016)
• United States presidential elections (United States, November the 8th 2016)
• Italian Constitutional Referendum (Italy, December the 4th 2016)
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3.5 Conclusion
The findings of this empirical work confirm that, thanks to our Worldwide Uncer-
tainty Network, Twitter can be used, potentially in real time, as a worldwide dis-
tributed civil society uncertainty sensor system. Moreover, the observed patterns of
civil society uncertainty in areas of the world relatively unreached by Twitter users,
like Syria, North Korea and Afghanistan show us that, despite Twitter users may
not physically and directly observe states of civil society uncertainty in specific areas
in which civil or military conflicts occur, the volume and content of Twitter obser-
vations referring to uncertainty in these areas is far from being random. When con-
sidered collectively, Twitter users appear to be able to interpret and amplify those
signals that are associated to factual states of civil society uncertainty in the different
countries of the world and to recognize the dependencies among them.
3.6 Future Research
As we have seen in this final article, one of the most interesting qualities of Twitter
data about uncertainty is its multidimensionality which renders it particularly suit-
able for those research applications that, by using a network approach exploit the
high dimensionality of the data to enrich the interpretation of both content of tweets
and volume of activity. Unfortunately, at the moment, the Worldwide Uncertainty
Network is an undirected network, therefore even though we can say that an uncer-
tainty contagion channel exists among two countries we cannot claim with certainty
which is the direction of the contagion process.
One of possible solutions that could be used to overcome this problem/limitation,
which is the subject of the next study by the author, is to assume that inter-area civil
society uncertainty contagion is a process which is not instantaneous, but happens on
a discrete daily scale following a particular process, here summarized:
1. At time t, a local uncertainty event occurs in a country -called i- , i.e. a large num-
ber of agents from the civil society publicly signal the occurrence of an uncertainty
event in that country, the weight of node i is close to 1. Meanwhile, uncertainty in
another country -called j- is low, i.e. no or a very small number of agents signal the
occurrence of an uncertainty event in j, the weight of node j is close to 0;
2. Always at time t, agents evaluate the consequences of the civil society uncertainty
peak (1) in i for the country j; A potential contagion channel among the two countries
exists if a large number of agents publicly signal its existence, i.e. the higher is the
weight of the edge between i and j - called ij- the larger is the contagion channel;
3. At time t+1, which follows (1), contagion of civil society uncertainty from i to j may
have occurred if its effects are visible in country j. Which, in terms of Twitter obser-
vations, is equivalent to a large number of agents that publicly signal the occurrence
of an uncertainty event in the country j, while at the same time the contagion channel
ij should still be different from zero;
We could exploit the above stated identification strategy, together with the concept
of Granger Causation to identify and estimate the importance of these directed inter-
area contagion mechanisms by using the data in our transformed tensors to distin-
guish among:
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• Uncertainty hysteresis of a node (intra-area AR dependency): in a model where
the dependent variable is uncertainty in nodes (observed nodes’ weights), hystere-
sis can be identified through the autoregressive component on nodes’ weights, by
estimating the coefficients of an explanatory variable that contains lagged values of
nodes’ weights we can appraise the level of uncertainty hysteresis in a given node.
We hypothesize that the degree of uncertainty hysteresis is node (country) specific;
• Vulnerability of a country to international civil society uncertainty shocks (lagged
dependencies on edges’ weights): in a model where the dependent variable is un-
certainty in nodes (observed nodes’ weights), vulnerability to international uncer-
tainty shocks can be identified by estimating the coefficients of a set of proxy vari-
ables whose values are equal to the lagged weight of edges that lead to a given node;
• Vulnerability of a country to transnational civil society uncertainty contagion (inter-
area lagged dependencies): in a model where the dependent variable is uncertainty
in nodes (observed nodes’ weights), inter-area directed contagion can be identified
by estimating the coefficients of a set of proxy variables, whose values are equal
to the lagged weights of edges -proxying contagion channels- that lead to a given
node, multiplied by the lagged weights of the nodes at the other end of these edges
-proxying the importance of uncertainty sources to which a given node has been
connected to- ;
• Country specific civil society uncertainty shocks (local uncertainty impulses): iden-
tified through the residuals of a -estimated- model where the dependent variable is
uncertainty in nodes (observed nodes’ weights) and the explanatory variables are
those presented here above;
Since all weights in our rescaled tensors fall in the [0,1[ interval, the tensors of our
dynamic uncertainty networks appear to be particularly suitable statistical objects
to fit VAR models of uncertainty, by country, with lagged contagion among nodes
(countries) through edges (contagion channels), by using zero-inflated beta distri-
butions to represent uncertainty expectations in the various nodes and edges of the
network at a given moment in time.
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In the following appendix are made available the country dictionaries’ TOKENS (ordered
alphabetically). For those countries who haven’t been inserted directly in the Second Chapter
of this work (UK/GB and US).
Table 3.3. Country Dictionaries’ Tokens
Country Tokens
Name (CASE SENSITIVE)
Afghanistan*
Afghanistan afghanistan*
AFGHANISTAN*
Albania*
Albania albania*
ALBANIA*
Algeria*
Algeria algeria*
ALGERIA*
Angola*
Angola angola*
ANGOLA
Antarctica*
Antarctica antarctica*
ANTARCTICA
Arab Emirates**
Arab Emirates arab emirates***
ARAB EMIRATES**
Argentina*
Argentina argentina*
ARGENTINA*
Armenia*
Argentina armenia*
ARMENIA*
Australia*
Australia australia*
AUSTRALIA*
Austria*
Austria austria*
AUSTRIA*
Azerbaijan*
Azerbaijan azerbaijan*
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AZERBAIJAN*
Bahrain*
Bahrain bahrain*
BAHRAIN*
Bangladesh*
Bangladesh bangladesh*
BANGLADESH*
Belarus*
Belarus belarus*
BELARUS*
Belgium*
Belgium belgium*
BELGIUM*
Belize*
Belize belize*
BELIZE*
Benin*
Belize benin*
BENIN*
Bhutan*
Belize bhutan*
BHUTAN*
Boliva*
Bolivia bolivia*
BOLIVIA*
Bosnia*
bosnia*
Bosnia and BOSNIA*
Herzegovina Herzegovina*
herzegovina*
HERZEGOVINA*
Botswana*
Botwana botswana*
BOTSWANA*
Brazil*
Brazil brazil*
BRAZIL*
Brunei*
Brunei brunei*
BRUNEI*
Bulgaria*
Bulgaria bulgaria*
BULGARIA*
Burkina Faso**
Burkina Faso burkina faso**
BURKINA FASO**
Burundi*
Burundi burundi*
BURUNDI*
Cambodia*
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Cambodia cambodia*
CAMBODIA*
Cameroon*
Cameroon cameroon
CAMEROON*
Canada*
Canada canada*
CANADA*
Cape Verde**
Cape Verde cape verde**
CAPE VERDE**
Central African Republic**
Central African Republic central african republic**
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC**
Chad*
Chad chad*
CHAD*
Chile*
Chile chile*
CHILE*
China*
China china*
CHINA*
Colombia*
Colombia colombia*
COLOMBIA*
Congo*
Congo congo*
CONGO*
Costa Rica**
Costa Rica costa rica**
COSTA RICA**
Côte d’Ivoire**
Côte d’Ivoire côte d’ivoire**
CÔTE D’IVOIRE**
Croatia*
Croatia croatia*
CROATIA*
Cuba*
Cuba cuba*
CUBA*
Cyprus*
Cyprus cyprus*
CYPRUS*
Czech Republic**
Czech Republic czech republic**
CZECH REPUBLIC**
Denmark*
Denmark denmark*
DENMARK*
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Ecuador*
Ecuador ecuador*
ECUADOR*
Egypt*
Egypt egypt*
EGYPT*
El Salvador**
El Salvador el salvador**
EL SALVADOR**
England*
England england*
ENGLAND*
Eritrea*
Eritrea eritrea*
ERITREA*
Estonia*
Estonia estonia*
ESTONIA*
Ethiopia*
Ethiopia ethiopia*
ETHIOPIA*
EU*
eu*
European Union**
european union**
European Union EUROPEAN UNION**
E.U***
e.u***
Europe*
europe*
EUROPE*
Finland*
Finland finland*
FINLAND*
France*
France france*
FRANCE*
Gabon*
Gabon gabon*
GABON*
Gambia*
Gambia gambia*
GAMBIA*
Georgia*
Georgia georgia*
GEORGIA*
Germany*
Germany germany*
GERMANY*
Gibraltar*
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Gibraltar gibraltar*
GIBRALTAR*
Greece*
Greece greece*
GREECE*
Greenland*
Greenland greenland*
GREENLAND*
Guatemala*
Guatemala guatemala*
GUATEMALA*
Guinea-bissau**
Guinea-bissau guinea-bissau**
GUINEA-BISSAU**
Guinea*
Guinea guinea*
GUINEA*
Guyana*
Guyana guyana*
GUYANA*
Haiti*
Haiti haiti*
HAITI*
Honduras*
Honduras honduras*
HONDURAS*
Hong Kong**
Hong Kong hong kong**
HONG KONG*
Hungary*
Hungary hungary*
HUNGARY*
Iceland*
Haiti iceland*
ICELAND*
India*
India india*
INDIA*
Indonesia*
Indonesia indonesia*
INDONESIA*
Iran*
Iran iran*
IRAN*
Iraq*
Iraq iraq*
IRAQ*
Ireland*
Ireland ireland*
IRELAND*
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ISLAMIC STATE**
Islamic State**
islamic state**
ISIS*
Islamic State isis*
(of Iraq and the Levant) Isis*
isil*
Isil*
ISIL*
daesh*
Daesh*
DAESH*
Israel*
Israel israel*
ISRAEL*
Italy*
Italy italy*
ITALY*
Jamaica*
Jamaica jamaica*
JAMAICA*
Japan*
Japan japan*
JAPAN*
Jordan*
Jordan jordan*
JORDAN*
Kazakhstan*
Kazakhstan kazakhstan*
KAZAKHSTAN*
Kenya*
Kenya kenya*
KENYA*
Kuwait*
Kuwait kuwait*
KUWAIT*
Kyrgyzstan*
Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan*
KYRGYZSTAN*
Laos*
Laos laos*
LAOS*
Latvia*
Latvia latvia*
LATVIA*
Lebanon*
Lebanon lebanon*
LEBANON*
Lesotho*
Lesotho lesotho*
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LESOTHO*
Liberia*
Liberia liberia*
LIBERIA*
Libya*
Libya libya*
LIBYA*
Lithuania*
Lithuania lithuania*
LITHUANIA*
Luxembourg*
Luxembourg luxembourg*
LUXEMBOURG*
Macedonia*
Macedonia macedonia*
MACEDONIA*
Madagascar*
Madagascar madagascar*
MADAGASCAR*
Malawi*
Malawi malawi*
MALAWI*
Malaysia*
Malaysia malaysia*
MALAYSIA*
Mali*
Mali mali*
MALI*
Malta*
Malta malta*
MALTA*
Mauritania*
Mauritania mauritania*
MAURITANIA*
Mexico*
Mexico mexico*
MEXICO*
Moldova*
Moldova moldova*
MOLDOVA*
Mongolia*
Mongolia mongolia*
MONGOLIA*
Montenegro*
Montenegro montenegro*
MONTENEGRO*
Morocco*
Morocco morocco*
MOROCCO*
Mozambique*
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Mozambique mozambique*
MOZAMBIQUE*
Myanmar*
Myanmar myanmar*
MYANMAR*
Namibia*
Namibia namibia*
NAMIBIA*
Nepal*
Nepal nepal*
NEPAL*
Netherlands*
Netherlands netherlands*
NETHERLANDS*
New Zeland**
New Zeland new zeland**
NEW ZELAND*
Nicaragua*
Nicaragua nicaragua*
NICARAGUA*
Niger*
Niger niger*
NIGER*
Nigeria*
Nigeria nigeria*
NIGERIA*
North Korea**
north korea**
North Korea NORTH KOREA**
Pyongyang*
pyongyang*
PYONGYANG*
North Sudan*
North Sudan north sudan*
NORTH SUDAN*
Norway*
Norway norway*
NORWAY*
Oman*
Oman oman*
OMAN*
Pakistan*
Pakistan pakistan*
PAKISTAN*
Palestine*
Palestine palestine*
PALESTINE*
Panama*
Panama panama*
PANAMA*
198 Ca’Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics
3.0. Appendix - Country Dictionaries
Papua New Guinea**
Papua New Guinea papua new guinea**
PAPUA NEW GUINEA**
Paraguay*
Paraguay paraguay*
PARAGUAY*
Peru*
Peru peru*
PERU*
Philippines*
Philippines philippines*
PHILIPPINES*
Poland*
Poland poland*
POLAND*
Portugal*
Portugal portugal*
PORTUGAL*
Puerto Rico**
Puerto Rico puerto rico**
PUERTO RICO*
Qatar*
Qatar qatar*
QUATAR*
Romania*
Romania romania*
ROMANIA*
Russia*
Russian Federation russia*
RUSSIA*
Rwanda*
Rwanda rwanda*
RWANDA*
Saudi Arabia**
Saudi Arabia saudi arabia**
SAUDI ARABIA**
Scotland*
Scotland scotland*
SCOTLAND*
Senegal*
Senegal senegal*
SENEGAL*
Serbia*
Serbia serbia*
SERBIA*
Singapore*
Singapore singapore*
SINGAPORE*
Slovakia*
Slovakia slovakia*
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SLOVAKIA*
Slovenia*
Slovenia slovenia*
SLOVENIA*
Somalia*
Somalia somalia*
SOMALIA*
South Africa**
South Africa south africa**
SOUTH AFRICA**
South Korea**
South Korea south korea**
SOUTH KOREA**
South Sudan**
South Sudan south sudan**
SOUTH SUDAN**
Spain*
Spain spain*
SPAIN*
Sri Lanka**
Sri lanka sri lanka**
SRI LANKA*
Suriname*
Suriname suriname*
SURINAME*
Swaziland*
Swaziland swaziland*
SWAZILAND*
Sweden*
Sweden sweden*
SWEDEN*
Switzerland*
Switzerland switzerland*
SWITZERLAND*
Syria*
Syria syria*
SYRIA*
Tajikistan*
Tajikistan tajikistan*
TAJIKISTAN*
Tanzania*
Tanzania tanzania*
TANZANIA*
Thailand*
Thailand thailand*
THAILAND*
Timor-Leste*
Thailand timor-leste*
TIMOR-LESTE*
Togo*
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Togo togo*
TOGO*
Trinidad and Tobago**
Trinidad and Tobago trinidad and tobago**
TRINIDAN AND TOBAGO**
Tunisia*
Tunisia tunisia*
TUNISIA*
Turkey*
Turkey turkey*
TURKEY*
Turkmenistan*
Turkmenistan turkmenistan*
TURKMENISTAN*
Uganda*
Uganda uganda*
UGANDA*
Ukraine*
Ukraine ukraine*
UKRAINE*
Uruguay*
Uruguay uruguay*
URUGUAY*
Uzbekistan*
Uzbekistan uzbekistan*
UZBEKISTAN*
Vatican*
Vatican vatican*
VATICAN*
Venezuela*
Venezuela venezuela*
VENEZUELA*
Vietnam*
Vietnam vietnam*
VIETNAM*
Wales*
Wales wales*
WALES*
Yemen*
Yemen yemen*
YEMEN*
Zambia*
Zambia zambia*
ZAMBIA*
Zimbabwe*
Zimbabwe zimbabwe*
Zimbabwe*
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Country Indexes’ Time Series
In the following appendix are made avaliable the visualizatons of the time series of TU in-
dexes by country, for all those countries of the world that weren’t directly included in the
second Chapter. Here follows an embedded video (streamed from the web) of these plots, in
case of visualization problems related to the compatibility of your PDF reader, this video
(uploaded on Youtube) is also available at the following URL-link: www.youtube.com/em-
bed/JidFvtSJn2k. Plots of the TU indexes are presented in alphabetic order. We could not
include them in the PDF document, because of document size constraints, which were im-
posed for the uploading this thesis online. Indexes’ time series by country, as well as their
visualizations, can also be requested directly to the author by writing at the following email
address: carlo.santagiustina@unive.it
Figure 3.16. [Video] Twitter Uncertainty Indexes by Geographic Area
CLICK ON THE IMAGE ABOVE TO START THE VIDEO
(You must be connected to the internet)
If your PDF reader doesn’t support flash video direct streaming, the video can be
directly viewed at the following (Youtube) URL-link:
youtube.com/embed/JidFvtSJn2k
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S-WUN Edge Betweenness Centrality Measures
The Betweenness Centrality of a edge is equal to the fraction of shortest paths between all
pairs of (non isoloated) nodes in the S-WUN that pass through that edge of interest. In the
weighted version the shortest path is computed using as distances the inverse of the edges’
weights;
Table 3.4. S-WUN Edge Betweenness Centrality Measures
Contagion Unweighted Weighted
Channel Edge Betweenness Edge Betweenness
Name Centrality Centrality
GB/UK-albania 76.348 133.000
GB/UK-algeria 45.344 38.500
GB/UK-australia 24.525 269.000
GB/UK-austria 29.529 0.000
GB/UK-bahrain 58.977 38.500
GB/UK-belgium 86.925 0.000
GB/UK-belize 136.000 136.000
GB/UK-brazil 52.714 0.000
GB/UK-bulgaria 47.320 0.000
GB/UK-cameroon 47.212 136.000
GB/UK-canada 17.762 0.000
GB/UK-chad 61.582 136.000
GB/UK-chile 45.333 0.000
GB/UK-china 52.896 379.000
GB/UK-colombia 115.794 0.000
GB/UK-croatia 34.938 0.000
GB/UK-cyprus 27.326 0.000
GB/UK-estonia 136.000 136.000
GB/UK-finland 32.077 0.000
GB/UK-france 25.731 0.000
GB/UK-georgia 45.442 0.000
GB/UK-germany 37.937 210.000
GB/UK-ghana 128.673 394.000
GB/UK-greece 34.341 0.000
GB/UK-guyana 136.000 136.000
GB/UK-hong kong 35.913 0.000
GB/UK-iceland 78.112 0.000
GB/UK-india 28.524 0.000
GB/UK-indonesia 27.130 0.000
GB/UK-iran 28.703 0.000
GB/UK-iraq 53.040 0.000
GB/UK-ireland 42.524 270.000
GB/UK-islamic state 25.531 376.000
GB/UK-israel 29.816 397.000
GB/UK-italy 27.667 0.000
GB/UK-japan 33.048 0.000
GB/UK-kenya 101.478 0.000
GB/UK-kuwait 48.178 0.000
GB/UK-latvia 100.856 0.000
GB/UK-libya 34.076 0.000
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GB/UK-malaysia 37.406 0.000
GB/UK-malta 85.078 136.000
GB/UK-mexico 28.222 0.000
GB/UK-mozambique 94.693 264.000
GB/UK-nepal 106.045 0.000
GB/UK-netherlands 23.203 136.000
GB/UK-new zealand 40.578 0.000
GB/UK-norway 35.960 267.000
GB/UK-pakistan 41.565 0.000
GB/UK-palestine, state of 81.216 0.000
GB/UK-panama 52.190 0.000
GB/UK-philippines 33.282 0.000
GB/UK-poland 41.672 883.000
GB/UK-portugal 66.033 0.000
GB/UK-qatar 43.973 0.000
GB/UK-romania 82.702 136.000
GB/UK-russian federation 47.839 0.000
GB/UK-singapore 28.528 0.000
GB/UK-slovakia 70.413 136.000
GB/UK-somalia 79.388 0.000
GB/UK-south africa 31.686 0.000
GB/UK-south korea 43.907 0.000
GB/UK-south sudan 31.997 0.000
GB/UK-spain 29.424 0.000
GB/UK-sweden 31.310 0.000
GB/UK-switzerland 27.979 0.000
GB/UK-syria 25.792 0.000
GB/UK-thailand 59.373 0.000
GB/UK-turkey 50.263 0.000
GB/UK-uganda 128.469 270.000
GB/UK-ukraine 31.223 0.000
GB/UK-united states 76.501 3030.000
GB/UK-uruguay 136.000 136.000
GB/UK-venezuela 38.809 0.000
GB/UK-zimbabwe 39.849 0.000
afghanistan-australia 16.863 0.000
afghanistan-china 36.672 0.000
afghanistan-iran 12.363 0.000
afghanistan-iraq 14.663 0.000
afghanistan-islamic state 10.323 0.000
afghanistan-pakistan 13.143 0.000
afghanistan-somalia 16.567 0.000
afghanistan-syria 16.933 0.000
afghanistan-turkey 29.897 0.000
afghanistan-turkmenistan 136.000 136.000
afghanistan-ukraine 13.231 0.000
afghanistan-united states 93.365 270.000
afghanistan-venezuela 11.134 0.000
albania-hong kong 10.175 1.000
albania-moldova 6.984 0.000
albania-norway 8.146 2.000
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albania-turkey 34.744 0.000
albania-ukraine 11.538 0.000
algeria-canada 15.115 0.000
algeria-libya 6.836 0.000
algeria-nigeria 14.728 0.000
algeria-united states 55.579 97.500
angola-kenya 29.031 0.000
angola-nigeria 47.595 136.000
angola-portugal 25.946 0.000
angola-south africa 40.648 0.000
argentina-brazil 13.424 0.000
argentina-croatia 5.092 0.000
argentina-cuba 6.238 0.000
argentina-greece 13.588 0.000
argentina-japan 16.219 0.000
argentina-spain 13.091 0.000
argentina-united states 63.966 136.000
argentina-venezuela 8.589 0.000
armenia-china 77.823 127.000
armenia-germany 58.177 9.000
australia-austria 9.429 0.000
australia-canada 5.770 0.000
australia-china 10.603 0.000
australia-cyprus 5.928 0.000
australia-france 9.940 0.000
australia-hong kong 7.103 0.000
australia-india 5.699 0.000
australia-iran 5.099 0.000
australia-ireland 11.140 0.000
australia-japan 7.117 0.000
australia-malaysia 7.992 0.000
australia-new zealand 6.023 135.000
australia-norway 8.141 0.000
australia-pakistan 5.865 0.000
australia-russian federation 12.377 0.000
australia-singapore 6.248 0.000
australia-south africa 8.945 0.000
australia-south korea 8.460 0.000
australia-spain 9.447 0.000
australia-sri lanka 29.024 0.000
australia-switzerland 4.820 0.000
australia-syria 7.998 0.000
australia-turkey 13.324 0.000
australia-united states 29.903 0.000
australia-venezuela 6.950 0.000
austria-croatia 5.420 0.000
austria-finland 4.779 0.000
austria-france 10.042 0.000
austria-germany 9.788 0.000
austria-greece 9.459 0.000
austria-hungary 11.517 0.000
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austria-iran 9.111 0.000
austria-italy 6.581 136.000
austria-latvia 17.379 0.000
austria-netherlands 5.037 0.000
austria-romania 12.982 0.000
austria-spain 7.015 0.000
austria-switzerland 4.455 0.000
austria-united states 43.352 0.000
austria-uzbekistan 10.078 0.000
azerbaijan-thailand 136.000 136.000
bahrain-egypt 7.165 0.000
bahrain-kuwait 4.221 0.000
bahrain-oman 3.282 0.000
bahrain-qatar 2.325 0.000
bahrain-united states 65.515 97.500
bangladesh-india 32.532 136.000
bangladesh-iraq 16.426 0.000
bangladesh-united states 87.321 0.000
belarus-poland 40.417 136.000
belarus-russian federation 96.063 0.000
belgium-bulgaria 7.759 0.000
belgium-canada 26.227 400.000
belgium-france 27.680 0.000
belgium-germany 26.212 0.000
belgium-greece 20.834 0.000
belgium-ireland 18.187 0.000
belgium-netherlands 10.913 0.000
belgium-poland 11.109 0.000
belgium-romania 5.986 0.000
belgium-senegal 113.418 268.000
belgium-spain 16.677 0.000
bhutan-nepal 136.000 136.000
bolivia-guatemala 78.649 135.000
bolivia-peru 57.351 1.000
bosnia and herzegovina-rwanda 42.441 268.000
bosnia and herzegovina-serbia 101.768 400.000
brazil-china 17.567 395.000
brazil-croatia 9.128 0.000
brazil-cuba 14.666 0.000
brazil-germany 20.481 0.000
brazil-greece 17.696 0.000
brazil-haiti 22.557 0.000
brazil-hungary 15.971 0.000
brazil-india 11.298 0.000
brazil-indonesia 8.524 0.000
brazil-iran 8.481 0.000
brazil-islamic state 9.309 0.000
brazil-italy 11.025 0.000
brazil-japan 9.165 0.000
brazil-malaysia 12.701 0.000
brazil-netherlands 10.382 0.000
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brazil-nicaragua 66.934 0.000
brazil-nigeria 40.782 0.000
brazil-peru 72.772 135.000
brazil-poland 14.648 0.000
brazil-puerto rico 29.982 4.000
brazil-russian federation 17.789 0.000
brazil-slovenia 26.344 4.000
brazil-south africa 12.099 0.000
brazil-switzerland 6.632 0.000
brazil-syria 11.775 0.000
brazil-turkey 21.645 0.000
brazil-united states 36.122 0.000
brazil-venezuela 6.562 136.000
bulgaria-romania 5.960 0.000
bulgaria-russian federation 21.901 136.000
bulgaria-united states 66.170 0.000
burkina faso-colombia 34.579 8.000
burkina faso-turkey 101.421 128.000
burundi-kenya 78.210 0.000
burundi-rwanda 4.436 136.000
burundi-tanzania 2.517 0.000
burundi-uganda 50.836 0.000
cambodia-china 67.763 0.000
cambodia-japan 45.776 136.000
cambodia-philippines 22.461 0.000
cameroon-islamic state 7.727 0.000
cameroon-myanmar 6.566 0.000
cameroon-nigeria 15.963 0.000
cameroon-syria 12.503 0.000
cameroon-united states 53.193 0.000
canada-china 14.270 0.000
canada-cuba 19.794 0.000
canada-cyprus 7.043 0.000
canada-finland 9.118 0.000
canada-france 5.937 0.000
canada-georgia 15.099 0.000
canada-germany 10.174 0.000
canada-greece 11.157 0.000
canada-hong kong 10.423 0.000
canada-india 7.908 0.000
canada-iran 6.551 0.000
canada-ireland 9.208 0.000
canada-italy 6.230 0.000
canada-japan 7.055 0.000
canada-mexico 7.533 0.000
canada-new zealand 10.725 0.000
canada-nigeria 31.928 0.000
canada-norway 9.258 0.000
canada-pakistan 11.115 0.000
canada-philippines 7.349 0.000
canada-russian federation 9.153 0.000
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canada-singapore 7.019 0.000
canada-slovakia 23.316 0.000
canada-sweden 7.836 0.000
canada-switzerland 6.289 0.000
canada-syria 8.803 0.000
canada-thailand 13.572 0.000
canada-turkey 14.954 0.000
canada-ukraine 8.442 0.000
canada-united states 25.816 530.000
chad-united states 74.418 0.000
chile-germany 18.512 136.000
chile-mexico 6.333 0.000
chile-pakistan 8.616 0.000
chile-united states 57.819 0.000
china-colombia 55.028 0.000
china-france 20.549 0.000
china-germany 21.704 0.000
china-hong kong 17.217 135.000
china-india 11.009 0.000
china-indonesia 10.555 136.000
china-iran 12.557 0.000
china-ireland 29.133 0.000
china-islamic state 12.120 0.000
china-israel 16.120 0.000
china-italy 14.486 0.000
china-japan 9.569 0.000
china-jordan 40.268 136.000
china-kenya 70.994 0.000
china-libya 17.054 0.000
china-malaysia 16.014 136.000
china-mexico 13.324 0.000
china-mongolia 99.713 0.000
china-myanmar 20.370 0.000
china-nepal 44.704 0.000
china-new zealand 16.508 0.000
china-north korea 24.442 0.000
china-pakistan 14.403 0.000
china-peru 114.751 0.000
china-philippines 11.710 10.000
china-russian federation 26.473 0.000
china-singapore 12.310 0.000
china-south africa 18.627 0.000
china-south korea 19.687 0.000
china-spain 21.668 0.000
china-switzerland 12.720 0.000
china-syria 15.901 0.000
china-thailand 25.677 0.000
china-turkey 28.919 0.000
china-ukraine 17.330 0.000
china-united states 43.290 864.000
china-uzbekistan 19.756 136.000
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china-venezuela 15.261 0.000
china-vietnam 28.617 0.000
colombia-costa rica 135.000 135.000
colombia-haiti 16.741 0.000
colombia-hungary 18.502 20.000
colombia-india 35.460 0.000
colombia-mexico 14.516 0.000
colombia-paraguay 135.000 135.000
colombia-syria 24.291 0.000
colombia-turkey 40.494 0.000
colombia-united states 126.781 384.000
congo-germany 44.104 0.000
congo-ghana 15.315 134.000
congo-rwanda 40.329 2.000
congo-united states 112.748 0.000
costa rica-paraguay 1.000 1.000
croatia-france 11.034 0.000
croatia-haiti 9.672 0.000
croatia-russian federation 12.921 0.000
croatia-spain 8.051 0.000
croatia-switzerland 4.084 0.000
croatia-turkey 17.292 0.000
croatia-united states 39.147 136.000
cuba-france 23.546 0.000
cuba-haiti 9.362 135.000
cuba-jamaica 9.243 135.000
cuba-mexico 11.260 0.000
cuba-nicaragua 23.401 136.000
cuba-russian federation 21.687 0.000
cuba-united states 65.332 532.000
cuba-vietnam 11.656 0.000
cuba-yemen 16.295 0.000
cyprus-france 7.744 0.000
cyprus-germany 8.792 0.000
cyprus-greece 6.976 0.000
cyprus-india 10.927 136.000
cyprus-ireland 5.966 0.000
cyprus-italy 6.414 0.000
cyprus-malta 9.463 0.000
cyprus-spain 4.402 0.000
cyprus-turkey 15.710 0.000
cyprus-united states 38.749 0.000
czech republic-germany 78.503 129.000
czech republic-spain 57.497 7.000
denmark-france 47.745 0.000
denmark-germany 41.582 0.000
denmark-italy 37.818 136.000
denmark-portugal 8.855 0.000
egypt-france 15.731 0.000
egypt-greece 11.038 0.000
egypt-iraq 13.443 0.000
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egypt-israel 8.863 0.000
egypt-italy 13.795 0.000
egypt-jordan 11.946 0.000
egypt-kuwait 6.084 0.000
egypt-lebanon 9.745 0.000
egypt-libya 10.672 2.000
egypt-oman 10.366 0.000
egypt-palestine, state of 14.064 134.000
egypt-panama 8.714 0.000
egypt-qatar 4.847 0.000
egypt-spain 13.141 0.000
egypt-turkey 24.632 0.000
egypt-united states 48.259 0.000
el salvador-honduras 1.000 1.000
eritrea-ethiopia 20.564 2.000
eritrea-somalia 117.089 134.000
ethiopia-israel 61.308 0.000
ethiopia-nepal 35.761 268.000
ethiopia-tanzania 18.168 136.000
ethiopia-uganda 27.885 0.000
ethiopia-uzbekistan 44.525 0.000
finland-germany 12.461 0.000
finland-iraq 13.612 0.000
finland-ireland 10.241 0.000
finland-italy 9.539 0.000
finland-latvia 11.892 0.000
finland-russian federation 12.206 136.000
finland-slovakia 6.997 0.000
finland-sweden 3.281 0.000
finland-united states 47.517 0.000
france-germany 8.845 10.000
france-greece 8.658 0.000
france-iceland 31.428 0.000
france-indonesia 8.527 0.000
france-iran 8.376 0.000
france-ireland 12.657 0.000
france-islamic state 8.832 0.000
france-italy 5.265 0.000
france-japan 10.120 0.000
france-mexico 10.662 0.000
france-morocco 35.730 0.000
france-netherlands 7.096 0.000
france-nigeria 39.301 0.000
france-poland 10.961 0.000
france-portugal 18.200 0.000
france-russian federation 13.957 0.000
france-south sudan 12.715 0.000
france-spain 6.905 261.000
france-sweden 9.289 0.000
france-switzerland 7.237 0.000
france-syria 10.135 0.000
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france-thailand 20.538 0.000
france-turkey 16.968 0.000
france-united states 30.581 377.000
france-uzbekistan 15.772 0.000
france-zimbabwe 14.395 0.000
gabon-united states 136.000 136.000
gambia-ghana 22.888 0.000
gambia-liberia 5.733 2.000
gambia-nigeria 91.620 0.000
gambia-senegal 27.288 136.000
gambia-uganda 47.464 0.000
georgia-latvia 6.881 135.000
georgia-moldova 9.641 135.000
georgia-russian federation 16.807 402.000
georgia-ukraine 6.439 0.000
georgia-united states 61.797 0.000
germany-greece 11.972 0.000
germany-india 16.741 0.000
germany-indonesia 9.310 0.000
germany-ireland 14.674 0.000
germany-islamic state 12.805 18.000
germany-israel 14.937 0.000
germany-italy 5.540 380.000
germany-japan 13.426 0.000
germany-lebanon 24.916 0.000
germany-netherlands 6.863 0.000
germany-philippines 10.980 0.000
germany-poland 10.980 0.000
germany-portugal 16.634 0.000
germany-romania 30.634 0.000
germany-russian federation 18.367 0.000
germany-south africa 15.343 0.000
germany-spain 6.274 0.000
germany-sweden 9.991 0.000
germany-switzerland 8.567 0.000
germany-syria 15.170 0.000
germany-turkey 27.203 0.000
germany-ukraine 11.687 0.000
germany-united states 49.871 518.000
ghana-haiti 18.681 0.000
ghana-jordan 16.417 0.000
ghana-liberia 28.355 130.000
ghana-nigeria 25.928 0.000
greece-iceland 21.460 0.000
greece-ireland 13.813 0.000
greece-israel 12.301 0.000
greece-italy 7.813 6.000
greece-japan 14.945 0.000
greece-kuwait 14.486 4.000
greece-macedonia 93.250 136.000
greece-mozambique 28.223 6.000
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greece-netherlands 6.717 0.000
greece-poland 8.641 0.000
greece-portugal 14.585 0.000
greece-qatar 11.206 0.000
greece-russian federation 18.902 0.000
greece-spain 6.793 0.000
greece-syria 12.417 0.000
greece-turkey 26.607 258.000
greece-united states 41.282 0.000
greece-venezuela 11.963 0.000
guatemala-peru 8.590 0.000
guatemala-united states 214.477 269.000
guinea-papua new guinea 1.000 1.000
haiti-jamaica 5.892 1.000
haiti-united states 85.762 0.000
hong kong-india 12.217 0.000
hong kong-japan 9.620 0.000
hong kong-united states 43.483 0.000
hong kong-vietnam 7.431 0.000
hungary-india 17.153 0.000
hungary-italy 13.171 0.000
hungary-japan 16.807 0.000
hungary-poland 13.058 633.000
hungary-portugal 12.447 0.000
hungary-serbia 39.515 530.000
hungary-slovenia 9.240 5.000
hungary-switzerland 6.731 0.000
hungary-united states 68.674 0.000
iceland-panama 6.351 136.000
india-indonesia 7.757 0.000
india-iran 6.954 0.000
india-islamic state 8.096 0.000
india-israel 12.159 0.000
india-italy 8.683 0.000
india-japan 5.710 0.000
india-libya 10.270 0.000
india-myanmar 15.619 0.000
india-nepal 32.256 526.000
india-netherlands 11.530 0.000
india-new zealand 9.443 0.000
india-nigeria 32.639 0.000
india-pakistan 11.041 532.000
india-russian federation 17.887 0.000
india-singapore 8.916 0.000
india-slovenia 32.665 117.000
india-south africa 10.586 0.000
india-south korea 15.197 0.000
india-south sudan 12.998 0.000
india-spain 13.554 0.000
india-sri lanka 41.292 135.000
india-switzerland 6.811 0.000
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india-thailand 17.253 0.000
india-turkey 13.495 0.000
india-united states 25.721 1586.000
india-venezuela 10.121 0.000
india-zimbabwe 13.647 0.000
indonesia-italy 6.538 0.000
indonesia-malaysia 2.951 0.000
indonesia-pakistan 5.128 0.000
indonesia-philippines 3.424 0.000
indonesia-singapore 5.122 0.000
indonesia-south africa 5.987 0.000
indonesia-thailand 4.901 0.000
indonesia-turkey 12.695 0.000
indonesia-united states 30.113 0.000
iran-iraq 7.782 0.000
iran-islamic state 3.273 0.000
iran-italy 6.851 0.000
iran-lebanon 14.063 0.000
iran-libya 4.993 0.000
iran-nigeria 18.229 0.000
iran-pakistan 8.099 0.000
iran-russian federation 11.059 0.000
iran-saudi arabia 20.591 0.000
iran-singapore 6.857 0.000
iran-syria 5.864 0.000
iran-turkey 10.684 0.000
iran-united states 22.551 136.000
iran-uzbekistan 7.724 0.000
iran-venezuela 4.769 0.000
iraq-islamic state 6.309 0.000
iraq-kuwait 10.961 0.000
iraq-libya 8.197 0.000
iraq-nigeria 29.064 0.000
iraq-russian federation 21.662 0.000
iraq-serbia 61.983 0.000
iraq-somalia 15.259 0.000
iraq-syria 10.367 136.000
iraq-united states 46.251 0.000
iraq-venezuela 9.280 0.000
iraq-vietnam 16.896 0.000
iraq-yemen 22.840 0.000
ireland-israel 13.459 0.000
ireland-italy 12.476 0.000
ireland-malta 19.788 0.000
ireland-namibia 136.000 136.000
ireland-netherlands 7.435 0.000
ireland-new zealand 11.782 0.000
ireland-nigeria 36.973 0.000
ireland-norway 10.626 0.000
ireland-philippines 9.329 0.000
ireland-poland 11.237 0.000
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ireland-singapore 9.844 0.000
ireland-spain 9.401 0.000
ireland-united states 61.836 0.000
ireland-vietnam 21.002 0.000
islamic state-libya 4.373 268.000
islamic state-nigeria 14.865 0.000
islamic state-philippines 7.121 0.000
islamic state-russian federation 11.267 0.000
islamic state-somalia 11.741 0.000
islamic state-syria 5.166 6.000
islamic state-turkey 10.785 0.000
islamic state-united states 24.383 0.000
islamic state-uzbekistan 7.419 0.000
israel-italy 8.593 0.000
israel-japan 10.400 0.000
israel-kuwait 10.362 3.000
israel-mexico 7.350 0.000
israel-pakistan 8.907 0.000
israel-palestine, state of 16.304 268.000
israel-thailand 11.611 0.000
israel-turkey 16.941 0.000
israel-ukraine 7.957 0.000
israel-united states 37.183 0.000
italy-japan 6.939 0.000
italy-lebanon 17.604 9.000
italy-netherlands 5.616 0.000
italy-new zealand 11.394 0.000
italy-philippines 8.216 0.000
italy-portugal 13.948 0.000
italy-russian federation 11.555 0.000
italy-slovenia 28.991 7.000
italy-spain 5.955 18.000
italy-sweden 8.431 0.000
italy-switzerland 4.423 0.000
italy-syria 9.409 0.000
italy-turkey 14.045 0.000
italy-ukraine 8.375 0.000
italy-united states 31.297 0.000
italy-uzbekistan 11.246 0.000
jamaica-united states 120.865 0.000
japan-myanmar 12.223 0.000
japan-nepal 25.320 0.000
japan-netherlands 8.327 0.000
japan-new zealand 9.703 0.000
japan-nigeria 37.195 0.000
japan-north korea 16.112 0.000
japan-philippines 7.010 0.000
japan-russian federation 13.998 0.000
japan-singapore 7.042 0.000
japan-slovenia 24.944 2.000
japan-spain 10.688 0.000
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japan-switzerland 5.570 0.000
japan-thailand 15.737 0.000
japan-united states 30.440 268.000
japan-venezuela 8.588 0.000
japan-vietnam 15.513 0.000
jordan-lebanon 6.985 0.000
jordan-united states 77.060 0.000
kazakhstan-russian federation 136.000 136.000
kenya-netherlands 23.297 0.000
kenya-nigeria 32.848 140.000
kenya-rwanda 77.945 0.000
kenya-somalia 15.930 8.000
kenya-south africa 15.400 0.000
kenya-tanzania 72.926 0.000
kenya-uganda 7.026 0.000
kenya-united states 116.814 0.000
kuwait-oman 7.352 0.000
kuwait-qatar 4.020 0.000
kuwait-singapore 9.777 0.000
kuwait-united states 49.808 0.000
kuwait-vietnam 10.415 0.000
kuwait-yemen 16.356 129.000
laos-nepal 74.336 4.000
laos-vietnam 62.818 132.000
latvia-moldova 9.335 1.000
lebanon-macedonia 23.081 0.000
lebanon-saudi arabia 6.305 0.000
lebanon-ukraine 11.974 0.000
lebanon-united states 78.805 127.000
liberia-nigeria 101.912 4.000
libya-nepal 15.367 0.000
libya-nigeria 18.487 0.000
libya-russian federation 15.136 0.000
libya-singapore 6.108 0.000
libya-syria 8.290 0.000
libya-tunisia 18.768 136.000
libya-united states 28.892 0.000
libya-venezuela 6.551 0.000
macedonia-saudi arabia 21.673 0.000
malawi-mozambique 136.000 136.000
malaysia-philippines 4.026 0.000
malaysia-syria 9.455 0.000
malaysia-thailand 6.460 0.000
malaysia-united states 41.996 0.000
malta-spain 21.671 0.000
mexico-pakistan 6.395 0.000
mexico-philippines 4.625 0.000
mexico-russian federation 12.924 0.000
mexico-singapore 5.195 0.000
mexico-spain 9.185 0.000
mexico-thailand 7.381 0.000
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mexico-united states 32.656 136.000
moldova-russian federation 47.292 0.000
moldova-turkey 55.052 0.000
moldova-ukraine 18.282 0.000
mongolia-pakistan 36.287 136.000
morocco-united states 100.270 136.000
mozambique-south africa 18.615 0.000
mozambique-united states 117.781 0.000
mozambique-zimbabwe 11.738 0.000
myanmar-singapore 6.457 0.000
myanmar-syria 13.398 0.000
myanmar-thailand 9.602 136.000
myanmar-united states 54.779 0.000
myanmar-vietnam 6.813 0.000
nepal-new zealand 13.454 0.000
nepal-somalia 14.908 0.000
nepal-united states 108.206 0.000
netherlands-poland 4.441 0.000
netherlands-russian federation 11.295 0.000
netherlands-spain 4.951 0.000
netherlands-switzerland 4.263 0.000
netherlands-ukraine 7.468 0.000
netherlands-united states 30.915 0.000
new zealand-pakistan 6.214 0.000
new zealand-sri lanka 14.497 1.000
new zealand-turkey 17.981 0.000
new zealand-uzbekistan 7.765 0.000
new zealand-zimbabwe 7.716 0.000
nicaragua-venezuela 46.066 0.000
niger-nigeria 136.000 136.000
nigeria-saudi arabia 28.596 0.000
nigeria-somalia 26.149 0.000
nigeria-south africa 16.078 0.000
nigeria-south sudan 12.307 0.000
nigeria-sri lanka 34.401 0.000
nigeria-turkey 56.456 0.000
nigeria-united states 109.678 520.000
north korea-russian federation 20.525 0.000
north korea-south korea 4.303 1.000
north korea-united states 60.645 135.000
north korea-uzbekistan 6.361 0.000
north korea-zimbabwe 8.433 0.000
norway-russian federation 14.781 0.000
norway-switzerland 6.524 135.000
norway-thailand 8.819 0.000
norway-united states 49.079 0.000
oman-qatar 5.668 0.000
oman-united states 109.331 136.000
pakistan-panama 11.685 270.000
pakistan-sri lanka 20.586 0.000
pakistan-thailand 9.489 0.000
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pakistan-turkey 18.510 0.000
pakistan-united states 46.803 0.000
palestine, state of-syria 25.858 0.000
panama-qatar 4.011 0.000
panama-united states 65.203 0.000
philippines-russian federation 12.783 0.000
philippines-singapore 3.942 0.000
philippines-thailand 6.993 0.000
philippines-united states 39.160 126.000
poland-portugal 6.991 0.000
poland-spain 6.618 0.000
poland-sweden 5.224 0.000
poland-united states 54.438 0.000
portugal-spain 12.341 136.000
puerto rico-united states 106.018 132.000
qatar-spain 12.598 0.000
qatar-syria 13.278 0.000
qatar-united states 51.259 136.000
russian federation-singapore 12.150 0.000
russian federation-slovakia 28.494 0.000
russian federation-south africa 18.474 0.000
russian federation-spain 14.349 0.000
russian federation-sweden 11.715 0.000
russian federation-switzerland 9.012 0.000
russian federation-syria 14.278 0.000
russian federation-turkey 25.957 763.000
russian federation-ukraine 10.564 0.000
russian federation-united states 53.303 1589.000
russian federation-uzbekistan 17.759 0.000
russian federation-venezuela 11.346 0.000
russian federation-vietnam 25.482 0.000
rwanda-tanzania 6.811 0.000
rwanda-uganda 52.133 0.000
saudi arabia-united states 101.344 136.000
serbia-turkey 129.780 0.000
singapore-somalia 15.032 0.000
singapore-thailand 8.562 0.000
singapore-united states 28.442 136.000
singapore-vietnam 7.058 0.000
slovakia-sweden 6.781 0.000
slovenia-switzerland 13.815 1.000
somalia-united states 88.434 260.000
south africa-turkey 17.080 0.000
south africa-united states 35.203 402.000
south africa-zimbabwe 7.285 270.000
south korea-united states 48.216 135.000
south sudan-syria 9.753 0.000
south sudan-turkey 15.464 0.000
south sudan-uganda 13.230 136.000
south sudan-united states 39.033 0.000
south sudan-zimbabwe 5.058 0.000
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spain-sweden 7.013 0.000
spain-turkey 22.061 0.000
spain-united states 41.400 0.000
swaziland-united states 136.000 136.000
sweden-thailand 9.621 136.000
sweden-united states 43.845 0.000
switzerland-turkey 12.346 0.000
switzerland-united states 30.498 0.000
syria-turkey 9.248 0.000
syria-ukraine 7.345 0.000
syria-united states 26.871 264.000
syria-venezuela 6.435 0.000
syria-yemen 31.818 0.000
syria-zimbabwe 10.327 0.000
tanzania-uganda 45.796 0.000
thailand-turkey 25.805 0.000
thailand-united states 70.372 532.000
thailand-zambia 35.410 0.000
tunisia-united states 117.232 0.000
turkey-ukraine 12.558 0.000
turkey-united states 56.128 0.000
turkey-uzbekistan 18.688 0.000
turkey-venezuela 13.837 0.000
turkey-yemen 53.535 263.000
turkey-zambia 76.812 0.000
turkey-zimbabwe 14.809 0.000
uganda-united states 149.787 0.000
ukraine-united states 38.824 136.000
united states-uzbekistan 47.327 0.000
united states-venezuela 34.525 0.000
united states-vietnam 66.776 266.000
united states-zimbabwe 47.075 0.000
uzbekistan-venezuela 8.787 0.000
uzbekistan-zimbabwe 7.537 0.000
zambia-zimbabwe 24.445 136.000
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S-WUN Node Centrality Measures
Closeness and betweenness (node) centrality measures have been computed using as dis-
tances the inverse of the edges’ weights. Whereas, the eigencentrality measure has been com-
puted using the original weighted network matrix. Eigencentrality values have been then
rescaled in the [0, 1] interval;
Table 3.5. Weighted Node Centrality Measures
Weighted Weighted Rescaled Weighted
Country Closeness Betweenness Eigencentrality
Name Centrality Centrality
GB/UK 0.00087063 4222 0.70987
afghanistan 0.00086982 135 0.02762
albania 0.00076506 0 0.00037
algeria 0.00082357 0 0.00162
angola 0.00083864 0 0.00002
arab emirates NA 0 0.00033
argentina 0.00083124 0 0.00114
armenia 0.00076921 0 0.00042
australia 0.00086429 134 0.08842
austria 0.00081885 0 0.00113
azerbaijan 0.00077244 0 0.00001
bahrain 0.00071974 0 0.00044
bangladesh 0.00085550 0 0.02900
belarus 0.00084246 0 0.00010
belgium 0.00085647 266 0.00292
belize 0.00077906 0 0.00033
benin NA 0 0.00033
bhutan 0.00082438 0 0.00007
bolivia 0.00041578 0 0
bosnia and herzegovina 0.00083211 266 0
botswana NA 0 0.00033
brazil 0.00084928 269 0.01556
brunei NA 0 0.00033
bulgaria 0.00085588 0 0.00037
burkina faso 0.00056774 0 0
burundi 0.00068348 0 0
cambodia 0.00086474 0 0.00625
cameroon 0.00081922 0 0.00070
canada 0.00086338 397 0.23512
cape verde NA 0 0.00033
central african republic NA 0 0.00033
chad 0.00085325 0 0.00679
chile 0.00082944 0 0.00221
china 0.00086552 1159 0.80218
colombia 0.00086046 273 0.00545
congo 0.00077177 0 0.00045
costa rica 0.00042227 0 0
croatia 0.00082295 0 0.00141
cuba 0.00087257 401 0.14309
cyprus 0.00084104 0 0.00752
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czech republic 0.00076282 0 0.00005
côte d’ivoire NA 0 0.00033
denmark 0.00076878 0 0.00001
ecuador NA 0 0.00033
egypt 0.00084167 0 0.00193
el salvador 0.00005102 0 0
eritrea 0.00081518 0 0
estonia 0.00084577 0 0.00133
ethiopia 0.00078748 135 0.00003
finland 0.00085568 0 0.00150
france 0.00085387 256 0.10379
gabon 0.00086201 0 0.00422
gambia 0.00081153 1 0.00001
georgia 0.00081011 268 0.00102
germany 0.00085735 637 0.08661
ghana 0.00086501 261 0.00566
greece 0.00086167 137 0.00998
guatemala 0.00084075 134 0.00141
guinea 0.00005102 0 0
guinea-bissau NA 0 0.00033
guyana 0.00086428 0 0.00532
haiti 0.00084884 0 0.00445
honduras 0.00005102 0 0
hong kong 0.00086184 0 0.04975
hungary 0.00084256 526 0.00051
iceland 0.00082137 0 0.00045
india 0.00086719 1516 0.46454
indonesia 0.00086495 0 0.15609
iran 0.00085654 0 0.01709
iraq 0.00084440 0 0.00411
ireland 0.00085959 135 0.11189
islamic state 0.00085802 266 0.02700
israel 0.00086059 266 0.01996
italy 0.00085781 278 0.02169
jamaica 0.00085085 0 0.00424
japan 0.00086622 135 0.19303
jordan 0.00085463 0 0.00611
kazakhstan 0.00082017 0 0.00007
kenya 0.00083662 6 0.00226
kuwait 0.00077420 0 0.00011
kyrgyzstan NA 0 0.00033
laos 0.00077133 0 0.00001
latvia 0.00075320 0 0.00005
lebanon 0.00085652 0 0.00679
lesotho NA 0 0.00033
liberia 0.00016601 0 0
libya 0.00084208 135 0.00389
lithuania NA 0 0.00033
luxembourg NA 0 0.00033
macedonia 0.00077188 0 0.00001
madagascar NA 0 0.00033
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malawi 0.00076763 0 0
malaysia 0.00085215 0 0.00826
mali NA 0 0.00033
malta 0.00085044 0 0.00168
mauritania NA 0 0.00033
mexico 0.00086141 0 0.06036
moldova 0.00076249 0 0.00004
mongolia 0.00080204 0 0.00039
montenegro NA 0 0.00033
morocco 0.00087145 0 0.03203
mozambique 0.00081189 135 0.00105
myanmar 0.00081962 0 0.00253
namibia 0.00081245 0 0.00010
nepal 0.00082838 399 0.00694
netherlands 0.00084370 0 0.00358
new zealand 0.00083295 0 0.00146
nicaragua 0.00078062 0 0.00007
niger 0.00076747 0 0
nigeria 0.00085617 400 0.00637
north korea 0.00086844 0 0.02420
norway 0.00085570 134 0.02790
oman 0.00082469 0 0.00094
pakistan 0.00084887 401 0.01963
palestine, state of 0.00085841 133 0.00180
panama 0.00082602 135 0.00165
papua new guinea 0.00005102 0 0
paraguay 0.00042227 0 0
peru 0.00081126 0 0.00039
philippines 0.00085554 0 0.13420
poland 0.00085386 758 0.00702
portugal 0.00083551 0 0.00120
puerto rico 0.00082502 0 0.00095
qatar 0.00084663 0 0.00193
romania 0.00085065 0 0.00167
russian federation 0.00086823 1513 0.07443
rwanda 0.00074932 135 0
saudi arabia 0.00087043 0 0.02955
senegal 0.00083265 134 0.00001
serbia 0.00083457 397 0.00002
singapore 0.00086081 0 0.09583
slovakia 0.00085390 0 0.00200
slovenia 0.00001647 0 0
somalia 0.00085998 133 0.00499
south africa 0.00087126 268 0.02247
south korea 0.00086054 0 0.01216
south sudan 0.00085567 0 0.00064
spain 0.00084573 143 0.01644
sri lanka 0.00078510 0 0.00024
suriname NA 0 0.00033
swaziland 0.00078120 0 0.00047
sweden 0.00083088 0 0.00185
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switzerland 0.00083192 0 0.00204
syria 0.00085528 135 0.03307
tajikistan NA 0 0.00033
tanzania 0.00077152 0 0.00001
thailand 0.00086237 402 0.01939
timor-leste NA 0 0.00033
togo NA 0 0.00033
trinidad and tobago NA 0 0.00033
tunisia 0.00081269 0 0.00048
turkey 0.00086757 638 0.02858
turkmenistan 0.00077841 0 0.00001
uganda 0.00085922 135 0.02225
ukraine 0.00086094 0 0.02400
united states 0.00087330 7404 1
uruguay 0.00083780 0 0.00100
uzbekistan 0.00085806 0 0.01355
venezuela 0.00083195 0 0.00073
vietnam 0.00086686 131 0.01186
yemen 0.00082009 128 0.00010
zambia 0.00073857 0 0.00001
zimbabwe 0.00082041 135 0.00061
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S-WUN Local Transitivity Measures
Table 3.6. S-WUN Local transitivity scores
Country Name Local Transitivity
GB/UK 0.47705
afghanistan 0.76404
albania 0.40360
algeria 0.84574
angola 0.57400
arab emirates NA
argentina 0.86429
armenia 1.00000
australia 0.77796
austria 0.69079
azerbaijan NA
bahrain 0.80347
bangladesh 0.50376
belarus 0.00000
belgium 0.44471
belize NA
benin NA
bhutan NA
bolivia 1.00000
bosnia and herzegovina 0.00000
botswana NA
brazil 0.52161
brunei NA
bulgaria 0.50532
burkina faso 1.00000
burundi 1.00000
cambodia 1.00000
cameroon 0.60635
canada 0.77477
cape verde NA
central african republic NA
chad 1.00000
chile 0.65753
china 0.65661
colombia 0.47900
congo 0.15686
costa rica 1.00000
croatia 0.77970
cuba 0.67771
cyprus 0.75546
czech republic 1.00000
côte d’ivoire NA
denmark 1.00000
ecuador NA
egypt 0.30559
el salvador NA
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eritrea 0.00000
estonia NA
ethiopia 0.08571
finland 0.71745
france 0.69419
gabon NA
gambia 0.08904
georgia 0.64780
germany 0.66079
ghana 0.01635
greece 0.62130
guatemala 0.03448
guinea NA
guinea-bissau NA
guyana NA
haiti 0.42818
honduras NA
hong kong 0.85921
hungary 0.15243
iceland 0.35846
india 0.73109
indonesia 0.95158
iran 0.76514
iraq 0.51575
ireland 0.83008
islamic state 0.70679
israel 0.41269
italy 0.60466
jamaica 1.00000
japan 0.67680
jordan 0.25305
kazakhstan NA
kenya 0.36492
kuwait 0.28754
kyrgyzstan NA
laos 0.00000
latvia 0.39035
lebanon 0.70918
lesotho NA
liberia 1.00000
libya 0.47207
lithuania NA
luxembourg NA
macedonia 0.15385
madagascar NA
malawi NA
malaysia 0.87723
mali NA
malta 1.00000
mauritania NA
mexico 0.83560
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moldova 0.43920
mongolia 1.00000
montenegro NA
morocco 1.00000
mozambique 0.47467
myanmar 0.70978
namibia NA
nepal 0.31053
netherlands 0.82614
new zealand 0.62311
nicaragua 0.54545
niger NA
nigeria 0.24990
north korea 0.69542
norway 0.94233
oman 1.00000
pakistan 0.61799
palestine, state of 0.63082
panama 0.27308
papua new guinea NA
paraguay 1.00000
peru 0.33333
philippines 0.85798
poland 0.51069
portugal 0.62599
puerto rico 1.00000
qatar 0.75646
romania 0.84328
russian federation 0.58952
rwanda 0.22500
saudi arabia 0.73723
senegal 0.00000
serbia 0.00000
singapore 0.90221
slovakia 1.00000
slovenia 1.00000
somalia 0.56250
south africa 0.78151
south korea 0.63159
south sudan 0.28141
spain 0.64061
sri lanka 0.84639
suriname NA
swaziland NA
sweden 0.64197
switzerland 0.61108
syria 0.62150
tajikistan NA
tanzania 0.38911
thailand 0.62261
timor-leste NA
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togo NA
trinidad and tobago NA
tunisia 1.00000
turkey 0.52465
turkmenistan NA
uganda 0.32481
ukraine 0.77121
united states 0.39076
uruguay NA
uzbekistan 0.72431
venezuela 0.68949
vietnam 0.76889
yemen 0.27500
zambia 0.60000
zimbabwe 0.40729
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Estratto (Italiano):
Nel primo articolo di questo lavoro analizziamo la letteratura sull’incertezza. Dedichiamo
particolare attenzione alla relazione tra metacognizione, incertezza ed aspettative. Analizzi-
amo il ruolo del linguaggio e della comunicazione nell’emergere e nella risoluzione di stati
di incertezza. Ipotizziamo che le persone si sentono incerte in relazione alla sorpresa attesa,
che dipende dal grado di divergenza fra le aspettative probabilistiche di diversi agenti, elic-
itate pubblicamente durante processi di comunicazione e metacognizione sociale. Livelli di
sorpresa attesa intollerabili o superiori alla media, resi espliciti attraverso il linguaggio, pos-
sono essere considerati segnali informativi utilizzabili per coordinare processi di revisione
delle aspettative all’interno di un gruppo o della società civile. Il secondo articolo vuole
dimostrare, in modo empirico, che possiamo estrarre ed aggregare i segnali di incertezza
provenienti da fonti decentralizzate, come agenti di mercato e membri della società civile,
utilizzando Internet e più specificatamente Twitter come archivio di informazioni che con-
tiene la "saggezza delle folle" riguardo allo stato di incertezza in una specifica comunità o
gruppo, in un dato momento. Estraiamo ed aggreghiamo questi segnali, costruendo un in-
sieme di indici di incertezza della società civile per Paese. Modellizziamo la dipendenza tra i
nostri indici di incertezza della società civile e alcuni proxy del livello di incertezze politica
e di mercato preesistenti, evidenziando le differenze nella loro reattività ad eventi reali verifi-
catesi nel 2016, come il Referendum sulla permanenza del Regno Unito nell’Unione Europea
e le elezioni Presidenziali negli Stati Uniti. Infine, nel terzo articolo proponiamo un nuovo
strumento, chiamatoWorldwide Uncertainty Network, per misurare ed analizzare le di-
namiche ed interdipendenze dell’incertezza della società civile dei diversi Paesi del mondo.
Questo strumento può essere utilizzato per identificare l’importanza sistemica dei diversi
Paesi, in termini del loro ruolo nella percolazione sociale dell’incertezza a livello continentale
e/o globale. I risultati di questo studio dimostrano che i segnali di incertezza provenienti
da Twitter possono essere utilizzati per migliorare la nostra comprensione dei meccanismi di
contagio e amplificazione dell’incertezza, sia fra Paesi che fra mercati, società civile e sistemi
politici;
Abstract (English):
In the first article we review existing theories of uncertainty. We devote particular atten-
tion to the relation between metacognition, uncertainty and expectations. We also analyse
the role of natural language and communication for the emergence and resolution of states
of uncertainty. We hypothesize that agents feel uncertainty in relation to their levels of
expected surprise, which depends on probabilistic expectations-gaps elicited during commu-
nication processes. Under this framework above tolerance levels of expected surprise can be
considered informative signals. These signals can be used to coordinate, at the group and
social level, processes of revision of probabilistic expectations. When above tolerance levels
of uncertainty are explicated by agents through natural language, in communication net-
works and public information arenas, uncertainty acquires a systemic role of coordinating
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device for the revision of probabilistic expectations. The second article of this research seeks
to empirically demonstrate that we can crowd source and aggregate decentralized signals of
uncertainty, i.e. expected surprise, coming from market agents and civil society by using the
web and more specifically Twitter as an information source that contains the "wisdom of the
crowds" concerning the degree of uncertainty of targeted communities/groups of agents at
a given moment in time. We extract and aggregate these signals to construct a set of civil
society uncertainty proxies by country. We model the dependence among our civil society
uncertainty indexes and existing policy and market uncertainty proxies, highlighting con-
tagion channels and differences in their reactiveness to real-world events that occurred in
the year 2016, like the EU-referendum vote and the US presidential elections. Finally, in
the third article we propose a new instrument, called Worldwide Uncertainty Network,
to analyse the uncertainty contagion dynamics across time and areas of the world. Such an
instrument can be used to identify the systemic importance of countries in terms of their civil
society uncertainty social percolation role. Our results show that civil society uncertainty
signals coming from the web may be fruitfully used to improve our understanding of uncer-
tainty contagion and amplification mechanisms among countries and between markets, civil
society and political systems;
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